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INTRODUCTION

My aim in this dissertation is to examine the role that intentions
to refer should play in a theory of reference.

The general question a

theory of reference is supposed to answer is "How are words connected to
objects in the world?"

The traditional answer is that the connection is

grounded in a prior connection between minds and objects in the world.
According to this view,

human beings

identify objects

thoughts about them before they have language.

and entertain

The connection between

words and objects is made by people who intend to use a word to refer to
an object which they can already identify and about which they can
already think.
This answe.r has been challenged by some twentieth century philosophers.

Some have argued that our thoughts about objects in the world

are mediated and structured by language.

Some have argued that any

attempt to explain reference in terms of intentions to refer are circular.

Perhaps the most serious objection to theories that try to explain

the connection between words and objects in terms of intentions to refer
is that such theories cannot adequately account for the normative aspect
of language, that is, they cannot account for the fact that there are
correct and incorrect usages.
tions to refer,

If reference were just a matter of inten-

then, with intentions of the specified kind,

a word

could refer to anything.
By using a divide and conquer strategy, this dissertation chal1
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lenges the claim that reference is determined by intentions to refer.
The claim that reference is determined by intentions to refer is divided
into two claims:

one is a claim about how reference is disambiguated;

the other is about how expressions in a language get their reference
potential.

By dividing the claims in this way, we can see more clearly

in what contexts, and to what extent, intentions to refer determine reference.
The first two chapters of the dissertation are devoted to methodology.

Chapter One states the explanatory goals of a theory of refer-

ence.

In Chapter Two I develop er i ter ia of adequacy for a theory of

reference.
Chapters Three through Six are devoted to theories of disambiguation.

In these chapters I clarify and defend the claim that reference

is disambiguated by intentions to refer.

In Chapter Three I develop the

distinction between theories of disambiguation and theories of reference
potential and reject one type of intentionalist theory.
the theory

that

I

reject,

the

reference of

According to

an ambiguous

referring

expression is the object that satisfies some descriptive or representational content that the speaker has in mind when she utters the expression.

I reject this account because it is subject to counter examples

based on fortuitous satisfaction.
Chapter Four is devoted to theories of disambiguation that claim
that the speaker's intentions to ref~r do not disambiguate reference.
According to these theories,

contextual features

reference of ambiguous referring expressions.

I

alone determine the
rule out

contextual

theories of disambiguation because the features to which these .accounts
appeal are themselves ambiguous.

I concede, however, that contextual
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features are important, even if not all-important, ·non-linguistic determinants of reference.
Chapters Five and Six argue that a speaker's intentions to refer
do play some role in determining the reference of ambiguous referring
expressions.

In Chapter Five I examine the role of intentions to refer

in determining the reference of proper names.

I distinguish two types

of proper names, official and unofficial, and argue that the reference
of these names, once they are established means of referring, depends on
causal chains linking the speaker's utterance to the referent.

Int en-

tions to refer are important only for breaking these causal chains and
thus introducing a new referent.
Chapter
names.

Six

looks

at

referring

expressions other

than proper

It argues that there are reference chains which explain how the

reference of some ambiguous expressions are determined.

It also argues

that intentions to refer play a role in initiating causal chains with an
ambiguous referring expression.

The

reference of ambiguous referring

expressions which initiate a reference chain is determined by the speaker's intentions to refer to the object she has in mind.

This object is

the one that is causally related to the mental representation that is
referentially linked to the speaker's referring expression.

Chapter Six

concludes that the speaker's intentions do play a role in disambiguating
reference, but it also concludes that when linguistic and non-linguistic
determinants of reference are taken into account, the role that a speaker's intentions to refer play in determining reference turns out to be
quite small.
Chapters Seven and Eight discuss intentionalist theories 0£ reference potential.

Chapter Seven rejects

the claim that the

reference
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potential of

expressions

for singular

speaker's intentions to refer.

reference

It argues that

is determined

by a

reference rules which

state how the reference of singular referring expressions is determined
can and should avoid mention of a particular speaker's intentions to
refer.
Chapter Eight is concerned with theories of reference potential
which claim that reference potential is determined by speakers' intentions to refer.

I argue that Gricean accounts, which try to explain

semantic reference (or reference potential relative to a language)

in

terms of individual speaker's intentions to refer, are either circular
or require untenable assumptions
pre-linguistic people.

about the

intellectual abilities of

I then discuss theories of reference which try

to explain the reference potential of expressions in a language in terms
of some group's intentions to refer.
to refer are formulated in terms

I argue that if these intentions

of criteria for application of the

term, such accounts are unacceptable.

The kind of intention to refer

which guides individual speakers (or the sum of individual speakers) in
their application of a term, (for example, the intention to refer with
the word 'gold' to all and only shiny, yellow, metallic objects) is not
the kind of intention that sets the standards of correct and incorrect
uses of referring expressions.

The intentions which do set the stan-

<lards of correctness are more general.

In the case of natural kind

terms, they are intentions to refer to the things that actually belong
to that kind.
ferent,

With other terms, the standard of correctness may be dif-

but even with these terms it

is a general intention (if any

intention at all) to use a word correctly that determines a word's reference and not a specific intention to refer to all

and only those
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things that have certain characteristics.

CHAPTER I

THE EXPLANATORY GOALS OF A THEORY OF REFERENCE

This chapter identifies and evaluates three conceptions of reference:

1) reference as speaker's identification; 2)

reference as the

communication of a referent to an audience; and 3) reference as determining an object to be the subject of discourse.

Since the conception

of reference plays a role in setting explanatory goals for a theory of
reference, the results of this chapter will provide a groundwork for
developing acceptable explanatory goals for a theory of reference.
Before discussing these three conceptions

of reference,

remarks about theories of reference in general are in order.

a

few

The goal

of a theory of reference is to account for our ability to refer, our
ability to talk (and to think in words) about things.

As theories of

reference have developed, two basic models of reference have emerged.
On one model, reference is a relation between words and the world; words
in a language refer to objects in the world.
ring is an act.

On the other model, refer-

A person refers to an object by means of something,

either a referring expression of a language, a gesture, or perhaps a
picture or image.

The first model, which sees reference as a relation

between words and objects in the world,
ence.

is a model of semantic refer-

The second is a model of speaker's reference.
While it is possible to concentrate on one or the. other type of

reference, speaker reference or semantic reference, an adequate theory
6
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of reference must take account of both.

For in order to explain our

ability to refer it is not sufficient to say that there are connections
between words in a language and things in the world and to specify what
these connections are.

Such an explanation does not account for our
Con-

ability to exploit these connections in the act of referring.

versely, an account of speaker's reference is inadequate as a theory of
reference unless it can tell us how the devices used for referring work
(i.e., how words or images connect with items in the world).
In this discussion of reference I shall assume that both speakers
and words or phrases in a language refer.

The basic data that a theory

of reference must account for includes both the fact that speakers refer
and the fact that words refer.
In accounting for our ability to refer, a primary task of a theory
of reference is to identify the factors which determine or fix the referent of an expression or an act of referring.

One basic question for a

theory of reference is: "How is the referent of an act of referring or
of a referring expression determined?"

A referring expression is one

which picks out an object or objects as the subject of discourse.

For

example, in the sentence, "Aristotle was a Greek philosopher," the name
"Aristotle" picks out Aristotle as the subject of discourse.

In the

sentence, "I am drinking coffee now," the word "I" indicates that I am
the subject of discourse.

I am what the sentence is about.

In an act

of referring a person picks out a subject of discourse by using some
referential device.

For example, when I say, "Aristotle was a Greek

philosopher," I make someone, namely Aristotle, the subject of my statement.

I am talking about Aristotle.
The idea of 'picking out'

an object is vague and metaphorical.

8

'Talking about' something also seems vague.

Although these phrases con-

vey (approximately) the right idea, they seem ill-suited for the purposes of a theory of ·reference, for saying what someone does when he or
she refers or what

counts

as referring.

To sharpen the concept of

referring, we may propose viewing reference either as 1) the identification, on the part of the speaker, of some object as the referent of the
expression or act of referring, 2) the communication of the referent of
an expression or act of referring to an audience, or 3) determining an
object to be the subject of the discourse (whether the parties to the
discourse know that this

is

the subject of discourse or not).

The

explanatory goals of the theory of reference will then be formulated in
terms of these conceptions of reference.

Those who view reference as

the speaker's identification of a referent see the theory of reference
as

a theory

of identification.

They ask a theory

of reference to

explain how the referent of a referring expression or act of referring
is identified by the speaker.

If one takes reference to be essentially

a part of the communicative act, one requires that a theory of reference
explain how we communicate the referents of our expressions and acts of
referring to others.

If reference is viewed as the d.etermining of a

referent for expressions

and acts of referring,

then the explanatory

goal should be to account for the way in which the referent of a referring expression or act is determined.
In this dissertation, I will take the basic explanatory goal of a
theory of reference to be that of discovering the determinants of reference, the mechanisms by which some object is made the referent of an act
of referring or of a referring expression.

That is, I believe a theory

of reference is a theory of the determination of a referent for an act
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of referring or for a referring expression.

I choose this way of look-

ing at the theory of reference because I believe it is the most neutral
perspective from which to begin.

At the very least, when someone or

something refers, there is some object (or purported
the referent.

obj~ct)

which is

What we want to know is what makes that thing the refer-

ent, how is that connection made.
In the following sections I will discuss the alternative views of
reference: reference as identification and reference as communication.
I will argue that the basic explanatory goal of a theory of reference is
neither just to account for the speaker's identification of a referent
nor just to account for the ability to communicate one's referent to
someone else.

Rather, these two goals are subsumed under the more gen-

eral goal of explaining how the referent of a referring expression or
act is determined.

Reference as Identification
A more technical sounding word roughly synonymous with 'picking
out'

(as in the phrase,

'Picking out a referent') is 'identification'.

We might want to equate reference with identification.

If we did, we

would want to say that a speaker refers if she identifies a referent.
Thus, our theory of reference would be a theory of identification.

As I

have said, I will not adopt this view as it stands.
One of the problems with equating reference with identification is
that ihe notion of identification is ambiguous.

Identification is some-

times analyzed as recognition of an object by a speaker.

Identification
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can also mean individuation or specification of an object by a speaker.
Reference is not

identification in the sense of recognizing an

individuated object. · An example taken from Hilary Putnam demonstrates
that this interpretation of reference is too strict.

1

Putnam confesses

that he cannot tell the difference between elm trees and beech trees,
and yet he can refer to elm trees.

When he says, "Elm trees are decidu-

ous," he refers to elm trees (not to elm and beech trees) even though if
he were asked to pick out or identify what he was talking about he could
not.

He would not recognize the elm trees as elm trees (and as distinct

from beech trees).

Such a case is enough to show that reference is not

a matter of recognizing objects.
Identification as the individuation or specification of an object
is very close to what I call determining or fixing a referent.
tify an object as the referent,

To iden-

in this sense, is to distinguish an

object as the subject of discourse.

To say that a theory of reference

is a theory of identification, when identification is understood in this
way, is more acceptable.

However, I would reject the view that refer-

ence is merely speaker's identification.

When reference is successful,

some object is identified as the subject of the discourse, but the person or thing doing the identifying need not be the person or thing who
did the referring.

If it is true that both people and words can refer,

then to speak of reference as speaker's

identification would require

another definition of reference to capture the sense in which words are
said to refer.

1

"The Meaning of Meaning," in Mind,
215-271. See especially pp. 226f.

Language,

and Reality,

pp.
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Further, the use of the term 'identification' can be misleading.
One reason the term 'identification' is misleading is that it has definite cognitive elements.

Identification is primarily a cognitive skill;

it is something that an intelligent agent does.

If this is true, then

it is difficult to see how words or phrases can refer.
cation model, the referrer,

On the identifi-

in this case the referring expression,

supposed to identify some object.

is

But it seems that words are not the

kinds of things that are capable of identifying, except derivatively.
Words identify objects only in the sense that they enable an intelligent
agent to identify an object.

A theory of reference is better off if it

does not assume without argument that one or the other type of reference, speaker's or semantic, is primary.
neutral concept to characterize reference,
or 'determine'.

It would be better to use a
a concept such as 'specify'

Although 'identification' can be defined as the speci-

fication of an object as the subject of discourse, and is not objectionable if it is understood in this limited sense, the temptation to ignore
this

stipulation is

'identification'

strong.

For this reason I

when characterizing

wil 1 avoid the term

reference and

speak

instead

of

determining a referent.
To see reference as identification can also be misleading because
identification presupposes that the object to be identified is already
specified in some way.

Identification is a success word.

can identify the correct object or the wrong object.

That is, one

But to be able to

identify an object correctly or incorrectly the object must first be
specified in some way.

The identification consists

in knowing which

object matches those specifications or at least in recognizing the specifications.

If we can choose between seeing reference as the determin-
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ing of an object to be the subject of discourse and seeing reference as
the determining of an object to be the subject of discourse along with
the knowledge or recognition on the part of the speaker that that object
is the subject of discourse, we sh6uld choose the former,

once again

because it is more neutral than the latter and because it does not create difficulties for understanding semantic reference.
It might be objected that a referent is determined by the very act
or process of identification, so to identify and to determine a referent
are actually the same thing.

But it should be noted that I am not deny-

ing the possibility that identification of some kind is the mechanism of
reference.

What I am claiming is that even if identification were the

only mechanism of reference the theory of reference should not presuppose without argument that it is.

To see the theory of reference as a

theory of identification at the outset is illegitimate.

The explanatory

goals of the theory should not be defined in terms of a preferred explanation.

Reference as Communication
Some theorists view reference as a communicative act.

To refer,

according to this theory, is to communicate to someone the subject of
one's discourse.

And the goal of a theory of reference is to explain

how the speaker communicates the referent to an audience.

This model of

reference is an identification model which holds that referring is a
matter of an audience's identification of the subject of discourse.
It would be wrong to restrict reference to communicative acts,
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acts

with a

speaker

and an

For

audience.

although

in many

cases

reference does serve the purposes of communication, very often a referrer (either a person or a referring expressiorr) does identify an object
for an audience, nonetheless this is not always the case.
who correctly _says or thinks to himself,

The person

"This table sure is wobbly,"

refers to some table, 2 as surely as the person who says the same thing
to another.

Taking the audience out of the picture has no effect on

reference; it does not make an act of referring or a referring expression into something else.
Of course it could be said that there is an audience and a referrer whenever someone talks to himself or thinks out loud.
in such cases. is the speaker himself.

The audience

This sounds plausible enough.

But being one's own audience does not seem to be the same as communicating with oneself. Real communication, I suspect, requires at least two
distinct persons.
Further, if we take reference to be a matter of identifying some
object for an audience other than the speaker, then we encounter some
obvious counter-examples.
in Paris is famous."
Paris.

For suppose I say to my student, "The bourse

It would seem that I am referring to the bourse in

But if reference is a matter of identifying some object for an

audience I could have failed to refer.

If my student did not know what

object was being talked about, perhaps she hasn't the slightest idea
what a bourse is, or she thinks bourse is a kind of· soup, then she would
not identify the proper object.
tification for

2

an

audience,

It would follow, if reference is iden-

that

I

had not

referred.

The words 'this table' also refer to some table.

But this

is

•
14

clearly wrong.

Identification, so understood, is not a necessary condi-

tion for reference.
This counter-example may not be conclusive.

For my student may be

able to identify the object in question in another way; she may identify
it by aping II!Y referring expression.

Thus,

she could identify the

object I was referring to by using the expression, 'the bourse in Paris', even though she doesn't know exactly what object that is, or even
though she thinks the object is soup.

However, the counter-example can

be modified to rule out this type of reply.

Instead of saying, "The

bourse in Paris is famous," to my student I may say it to someone who
doesn't know English well enough to identify referring terms.

Such an

audience wouldn't even be able to say I was referring to the bourse in
Paris.

Or I may say this to someone who is not paying attention.

She

would not be able to say that I was referring to the bourse in Paris.
Nonetheless, I would still have referred to the bourse.

It follows that

reference is not primarily a matter of identifying an object for some
audience other than oneself.

Reference as Determining a Referent
Having rejected both the identification and communication models
of reference, I will understand the primary goal of a theory of reference to be that of explaining how the referent of an act of referring or
of a referring expression is determined.

A theory of reference should

tell us what the mechanisms of reference are and how they work.

A per-

son's ability to refer and perhaps also her ability to understand the

15
references of others will be explained in terms of these mechanisms.
In the remainder of this chapter I will develop more fully my conception of a theory of reference as a theory of how reference is determined.

Before doing so I will distinguish two things that the theory of

reference is concerned to do.

Briefly, the theory of reference should
I have

tell us what things or kinds of things can be used to refer.
already said that people refer and words refer.
do so using some device.

When people refer they

Let us call such devices 'referring devices'.

Some words and combinations of words are referring devices.

One task of

the theory of reference is to identify the types of referring devices.

3

Another part of the theory of reference, the central part, explains how
these devices work.

It tells us how a referring device (for example a

definite description) determines a referent.

This part of the theory of

reference is concerned with the mechanisms of reference.
A referring device is a means of determining a referent (or referents).

The task of identifying the kinds of referring devices is that

of specifying what kinds of things can or do determine referents, or in
other words, saying what kinds of things people can and do use to refer.
What the theory of reference is concerned to do in identifying referring
devices is to specify the semantically significant elements of a discourse, those which affect the truth conditions of a statement.

4

In this

section I will develop a conception of referring devices that is some-

3

The task of identifying particular devices is left to the linguist.
They can do so by specifying conditions for a word or phrase's being a
referring device or by enumerating the devices, or by giving rules for
generating such devices.
4

Or satisfaction conditions for a non-indicative sentence.

16
what unusual,

though not unprecedented.

conception is its generality.

What

is unusual

about this

Theories of reference are often limited

to an explanation of linguistic reference,
pieces of language hook up to the world.

to an explanation of how
The referring devices which

are considered_ by such theories are linguistic devices.

The theory that

I am developing is not limited to an account of linguistic reference or
to linguistic referring devices, even though it is primarily concerned
with such devices. 5
If something is a referring device, it must satisfy two requirements:

1) it must determine or co-determine a referent for a discourse

and 2) it must affect the truth or satisfaction conditions of a sentence.

I shall limit my discussion of referring devices to those that

are used in a sentence, assuming for the sake of argument that referring
devices refer only in the context of a sentence.

Thus, I will assume

that the words, 'Winston Churchill' do not refer unless they are used in
making a statement and, similarly, a photograph of Winston Churchill
does not refer to Winston Churchill unless the photograph is part of a
statement.

This assumption will help us to form criteria of adequacy

for a theory of reference.

It may turn out that once we understand the

mechanisms of reference for these devices as they occur in sentences
that we can drop the restriction.
It should be noted that the identification of referring devices is
not an explanation of how referring devices determine a referent.

My

discussion of referring devices does not purport to explain how differ-

5

I will count such things as pictures (in certain contexts), gestures such as pointing, and perhaps even mental images as non-linguistic
referring devices.

17
ent types of referring devices work.

It neither precludes nor presup-

poses explanatory or ontological relations between types of referring
devices.

That is, it.does not presuppose that non-linguistic referring

devices are the basis for linguistic referring devices, or vice-versa.
Nor does it

pr~suppose

that all referring devices are on a par or can be

explained in the same way.

Linguistic and non-linguistic

referring

devices are grouped together on the basis of a functional similarity.
Both types of devices can determine a referent for a statement or a discourse.

This functional similarity need not be based on identical mech-

anisms.
Many kinds of linguistic referring devices have already been identified.

Proper names, definite descriptions, and indexicals are kinds

of linguistic devices

for referring to individuals.

also kinds of linguistic devices for referring.

6

Class terms are

Most of the basic kinds

of referring terms have already been identified, though there is still
some controversy over sub-divisions within these general classes.

7

In

addition to kinds of linguistic referring devices, the theory of reference should identify any non-linguistic devices for referring that may
exist.

The theory of reference, broadly interpreted, is a theory of how

referring devices determine a referent, not just a theory of how linguistic devices

determine a

referent.

If non-linguistic devices

are

6

'Individuals' should be broadly construed.
It refers not only to
individual objects, but also to places, times, events, feelings; in
short, anything that can be individuated is an individual in this sense.
7

For example, Keith Donnellan has argued that there are two kinds of
definite descriptions, attributive and referential.
See "Reference and
Definite Descriptions," The Philosophical Review,
75 (1966), pp.
·281-304.
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also

used

for

referring

and

for

making

statements,

then

explanation falls within the scope of the theory of reference.

their
If this

is. true, there is no non-arbitrary reason for treating non-linguistic
devices differently from linguistic devices in
Non-linguistic

devices

for

a theory of reference.

referring would

be

like

linguistic

devices for referring in the relevant respect if they determined a referent for a statement (or for a segment of discourse).

In this section

I will show that there are such devices by giving examples that fulfill
this criterion.

Later I will argue that a theory of reference which

recognizes these non-linguistic determinants of reference is in a better
position to explain linguistic reference than those that do not.

8

In the following examples, note that sometimes the non-linguistic
element of the discourse determines the referent of the statement by
itself.

In those cases we see that without the non-linguistic device

there would be no statement because there would be no referent for the
discourse.

In these examples the function of the non-linguistic refer-

ring device parallels the

function of

linguistic devices

in that

1)

without the device the discourse has no truth conditions (no statement
is made); and 2) had the device been different and not co-referential,
the truth conditions of the statement would have been different.

If a

non-linguistic device fulfills these two conditions, it is semantically
significant.
It is possible to determine a referent for a statement without
using lingusitic devices for referring.

For example,

for a Chicago television network consists

8

See Chapter Four.

an advertisement

of a photograph of Alfred
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Hitchcock and the caption, "is a classic".

This combination of photo-

graph and caption makes a statement about something.
statement is determined by the photograph.

The subject of the

In this case, the photograph

is a non-linguistic device which is used to determine the subject of a
discourse;

it

is a non-linguistic referring device.

Other referring

devices could have been used to make more or less the same statement.
Instead of a photograph of Hitchcock the advertisement could have used a
portrait, or an illustration, or a caricature or Hitchcock.
also have used the words,

'Alfred Hitchcock' .

It could

Each of these devices

would have determined a referent for the statement.
Gestures, either alone or in conjunction with a linguistic referring device, can also be used to determine a referent for a statement.
For example, I stand in front of a classroom waving a book in the air
and ask, "Red or pink?"

I am asking a question about something; there

is a subject of my sentence.

The device I used to determine a referent

for my sentence was the book-waving gesture.
non-linguistic referring device.

9

have determined the same referent.
said "Red or pink?"

This gesture is another

There are other gestures which could
I could have pointed to the book and

or picked up the book and looked at it while saying

"Red or pink?"
Pointing is a gesture that is often used. in conjunction with linguistic referring devices, though it sometimes can determine a referent
alone.

The pointing gesture should be considered semantically signifi-

cant when used with linguistic referring devices if the referent of the

9

Note that how it determines a referent is not in question here,
only whether it determines a referent.

20
statement
different.

would

have

been

different had

the

pointing

gesture

been

For example, if I say "That is pretty," while pointing to a

picture, the referent would be the picture.

Had I said the same thing

while pointing to something else, say a coffee cup, the referent would
have been different.

The difference in reference,

and thus in truth

conditions is due to the difference in the gesture, not to any difference in linguistic devices.

Since the gesture does directly affect ref-

erence and truth conditions it should be considered semantically significant.

10

It might be argued that mental images or other intentional states
can directly affect the truth conditions of a statement.

If this is

true, then these images and states would also be semantically significant.
In the preceding paragraphs, I have identifed several different
non-linguistic

referring

devices.

What

is

significant

devices is that they determine a referent for a discourse.

about

these

In Chapter

Four, I wi 11 argue that such devices should be recognized as determinants of reference even within the context of a theory of linguistic
reference.

For if they are not recognized, the linguistic device (espe-

cially in the case when two devices are being exploited) is given the
full burden of determining reference.

10

In some cases, for example with

Howard Wettstein, in "How to Bridge the Gap between Meaning and
Reference, Synthese, vol. 58 (1984) 63-84, develops a theory of demonstratives in which he agrees that a gesture such as pointing can determine or at least co-determine a referent. Wettstein calls non-linguistic cues semantically significant if they are the cues that the speaker
relied on to communicate his referent (p. 72) or the cues which he, to
all appearances, exploits (p. 73).
For further discussion of his
theory, see Chapter Four.
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demonstratives

and

other

indexicals,

blindness

to

non-linguistic

determinants of reference leads to an inaccurate picture of how the linguistic device works. ·
Once we have identified referring devices, we can begin to explain
how reference is determined.

Referring devices are those devices which

determine a referent for a statement or a segment of discourse.

The

theory of reference is primarily an account of how referring devices do
this.

One way to develop an account of how referring devices determine

a referent is to formulate a set of reference rules.

T~ese

rules would

determine a function from a referring device to the item which is its
referent.

For example, one might explain how proper names determine a

referent by stating the reference rule for proper names.

Some proposed

rules have been: 1) the referent of a proper name is that individual who
satisfies the descriptive content associated with that name, 11 and 2)
the referent of a proper name is that individual who is called by that
name in the relevant linguistic community.

These rules purport to tell

us how any given proper name determines a referent for

a discourse.

What is presupposed in such accounts is that there is some rule which
governs

the operation of a

referring device and that

the referring

device determines a referent because there is a relation of the type
specified by the rule between the device and its referent.
An account of reference which attempts to explain how referring
devices determine reference by discovering the mechanisms of reference
looks for those relations which underlie the reference relation.

The

reference of referring devices is explained in terms of these more basic

11

This is (roughly) the descriptivist theory of proper names.
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relations which are expressed as reference rules.
~

12

The reference of an

of referring is explained in terms of the device (or devices) the

speaker uses to make

a statement and the reference rule (or rules) for

that device (or those devices).
covertly (e.g.,

Sometimes a speaker refers to an

obj~ct

by making a statement silently to herself) and then

refers to another object overtly (e.g., by making a different statement
out loud).

In each case, the referent of the act of referring depends

on the device that was used to refer.

What the referent is, in each

case, depends on, or is detemined by, how that referring device works.
We can understand the difference between semantic reference and
speaker's reference in terms of two different acts of referring.

In the

case of semantic reference, the speaker refers by using publicly observable referring devices (e.g., spoken or written words, gestures such as
pointing, etc.);

in speaker's reference, the speaker refers by using

non-observable referring devices (e.g., silent words, images, etc.).

A

speaker's intended referent, when it is different from the referent of
the observable referring devices she uses, is the referent of the nonobservable referring device she uses in making a statement she believes
is equivalent to the observable sentence she produces.

However, the

situation can be (and usually is) somewhat more complicated than this.
A person may use two different referring devices in conjunction with one
act of predication.

12

For example, she may refer to a certain object by

There are other types of theories of reference which do not
explain reference in terms of mechanisms of reference.
For example,
disquotational theories of reference, although they give rules of reference, do not account for reference in terms of mechanisms of reference.
A typical reference rule for a disquotat ional theory would be: "Cat"
refers to cat.
No underlying relation between the referring device,
"cat", and its referent, cat, is postulated.
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means of a perceptual image of it while saying out loud, "That tree sure
• II
is b 1g.

She uses two referring devices, the perceptual image and the

words 'that tree' , in conjunct ion with the words 'sure is big' .

Here

also there would be a difference between semantic reference and speaker' s

reference.

The semantic reference of the act of referring is

determined by the reference rules governing the expression 'that tree';
the speaker's reference of the act of referring is determined by the
reference rules governing perceptual images.
The primary goal of this dissertation is to discover whether and
to what extent a speaker's intentions to refer determine the referent of
the words or expressions she uses.

What we want to know is whether, in

the reference rules for linguistic referring devices,
should be made to the speaker's intended reference.

13

some reference

Whether a speaker's

intended reference should be part of the reference rule for a linguistic
referring device depends on whether such a reference rule best explains
how the referent of that device is determined.
In the next chapter I will develop criteria of adequacy for a
theory of reference.
for

a referring

I will say under what conditions a reference rule

device

(or kind of device)

is

acceptable.

In the

remaining chapters I will consider and evaluate theories of reference.
The role that intentions to refer should play in a theory of reference
will be the role they do play in the best explanation of how reference
is determined.

13

Or more generally, in the reference rules for publicly observable
referring devices.

CHAPTER II

CRITERIA OF ADEQUACY FOR A THEORY OF REFERENCE

In Chapter One we argued that a theory of reference should tell us
how the reference of referring devices is determined by giving reference
rules for these devices.

In the following chpaters we will be examining

different theories of how reference is determined in order to discover
whether and to what extent a speaker's intention to refer (or, in some
cases, speakers' intentions to refer) play a role in determining refer~
ence.

However, before we evaluate particular accounts of reference, we

should develop some general criteria of adequacy for a theory of reference.

These criteria will provide general guidelines for criticizing

the theories we will be considering.·
In

~eveloping

our criteria of adequacy we should look for criteria

which would be accepted by the proponents of any theory of reference
which attempts to explain how reference is determined by providing reference rules for different types of referring devices.
should be as uncontroversial as possible.
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These criteria
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Criterion One

One criterion for a

correct theory of reference that should be

uncontroversial is as follows:
A reference rule for expression-type ~ is adequate only if, for any
expression. ~ of type ~' the rule correctly specifies (or predicts)
the referent of e.
The idea behind this

criterion is

that if one has

the correct

theory of reference, then one will be able to 'predict' the referent of
each expression for which all the relevant features
known.

are specified and

That is, if a theory of reference is correct, it will identify

the correct referent given the proper information.
relevant

If one has all the

information required by the theory and is still unable car-

· rectly to identify the referent, then there is something wrong with the
theory.
Failure to meet this specification, however, does not mean that a
theory of reference is hopelessly misguided.
plete,

it

will

not

meet

this

requirement.

If the theory is
Of

course

an

incom-

incomplete

theory is not an adequate one, but the theory may be on the right track.
One should not reject an approach to
because it is incomplete.

or a picture of reference just

However, if a theory is purportedly complete,

then failure to fulfill this criterion would indicate that something was
amiss.
Using this criterion to criticize a theory of reference is difficult because in order to use it we must be able to compare the predicted
referent to the

'actual'

dieted

to

referent

the

or

'correct'

correct

one,

referent.
we

must

To compare the prehave

some

independent

grounds for saying that something is the correct referent.

Suppose we
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were to argue that, according to the theory of reference we opposed, the
referent of expression

E would be

~'

but that,

is y, therefore the theory must be wrong.

in fact, the referent

For the argument to succeed,

we must have some theory-neutral way of discovering the correct referent.

If our sole grounds for saying that the correct referent is

y

were that, according to our preferred theory, the referent would be

y,

our argument would fail.

There might be other grounds for preferring

our own theory, but the fact that the two theories have different implications does

not,

in itself,

provide a

justification

for

rejecting

either of the theories.
We might appeal to ordinary linguistic practices or
intuitions.

linguistic

We can argue that the man on the street would take the ref-

erent to be y, or that our linguistic intuitions, untainted by commitment to a particular theory of reference or other philosophical hobbyhorse, would lead us to believe that

y is the referent.

Arguments of

this sort will work only if the intuitions are clear and uncontroversial
or the man in the street's response is actually a good reflection of
common linguistic know 1edge.
conclusive.

And even then, the ar gum en t wi 11 not be

For the man on the street can sometimes give unjustified

and even bizarre reports and intuitions can unwittingly be tainted by
theory.
In summary,

failure to meet this first criterion can indicate a

theory's incompleteness.

It can also indicate that the theory is wrong.

But if we want to argue that a theory picks out the wrong thing as the
referent of an expression, we must show not only what the correct referent is, but also why that should be considered the correct referent.
We can see more clearly the legitimate and illegitimate employment
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of this criterion in criticizing a theory of reference by looking at
some cases where it is applied.

For example, this criterion is cor-

rectly applied in the criticism of a certain version of the causal
theory of reference.
name cannot

b~

Gareth Evans argues that the referent of a proper

determined by tracing a chain of references to a naming

ceremony (given that each person in the chain intends to use the terms
to refer to that

individual to which the person from whom he first

learned the term referred) . 1 For if this type of chain of references
were what determined the referent of a name, then the name 'Madagascar',
for example, should refer to some part of the African mainland.

How-

ever, 'Madagascar' actually refers to an island off the coast of Africa.
Since even the proponents of this version of the causal theory of names
would agree that

'Madagascar'

refers

to an

island off the coast of

Africa, we may conclude that there is something wrong with this version
of the causal theory of names.
A similar criticism can be levelled against a certain descriptivist theory of reference.

2

According to this version, the referent of a

referring expression, as it is used by a particular person,

is deter-

mined by what the speaker had in mind when using the expression.
version would say that the referent of a natural kind term,

This

as it is

used by a particular speaker, is the set of objects that fit or satisfy
that speaker's mental representation of the objects.

Now suppose that

someone who does not know the difference between beeches and elms says,

1

Gareth Evans, "The Causal Theory of Names," Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, Supplemental Volume 47, pp. 187-208.
2

The example is taken from Hilary Putnam.
precisely this way, but it is apt.

He does not use it in

28
"Elm trees are subject to dutch elm disease."
trees'

refers

to

elm

trees,

that

seems

hypothesis, there are· no ideas, images,

In this sentence,

uncontroversial.

'elm

But,

by

concepts or other representa-

tions that the speaker has about elm trees which he doesn't also have
about beech trees.

What satisfies his mental representation of elm

trees (if anything), are both elm and beech trees.

So, according to the

theory in question, elm trees would refer to beech and elm trees.

Since

'elm trees' refers only to elm trees, there must be something wrong with
the theory.
This argument fails.

The sense in which it is uncontroversial

that 'elm trees' refers to elm trees is not the same sense in which it
is uncontroversial that 'elm trees'
elm trees.

as this speaker uses it refers to

It could be argued that the speaker uses the expression 'elm

trees' to refer to elephants (under certain conditions).

Similarly, he

could use this expression to refer to elm and beech trees.

If the

speaker is not using this expression as an expression of English, then
our knowledge of what ·'elm trees' refers to in English does not justify
our saying that the referent of 'elm trees' as this expression is used
by this speaker is elm trees.

In fact, there seem to be no clear intui-

tions about what 'elm trees', as it is used by this particular speaker,
refers to.

Even the speaker may not be able to tell us what 'elm trees'

refers to as she uses it.
In applying criterion one, our linguistic intuitions

~bout

what an

expression refers to in English can only be used to discredit theories
which purport to explain how the reference of English expressions is
determined.

Our linguistic intuitions about what an expression.as used

by any arbitrary English speaker refers to can only be used to criticize
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theories which purport to explain how the reference of an expression as
used by any arbitrary speaker of English is determined.

Using criterion

one; it will be difficult to discredit a theory that purports to tell
how the reference of a referring expression, as used
speaker, is

de~ermined,

~

particular

_§!

for we have few, if any, clear, theory-neutral

intuitions about the reference of such expressions.
If,

impossible to apply this criterion.
tained that the speaker uses

for example,

It will not be
it were ascer-

a particular expression as

an English

expression, then we would expect the reference of the expression as the
speaker uses it to be the same as the reference of the expression in
English.

In that case our intuitions about English will be an indepen-

dent ground for saying that something is the correct referent.

Criterion Two
A second uncontroversial

criterion of adequacy for

reference is taken from Gareth Evans.

3

a theory of

This criterion states what I take

to be an (almost) universal view of the relation of reference to truth
in extentional contexts.

The criterion can be stated as follows:

A theory of reference is adequate only if it is such that for any
statement of the form '~ is f', if what the theory identifies as the
referent of the statement actually is f then the statement must be
true.
The criterion simply requires that reference play a role in determining

3

Evans states the criterion differently, and in a more controversial
form. Evan says that for a statement of the form 's is P' if what the
speaker refers to is P, then it follows that the statement is true.
Evans thereby assumes that the speaker's referent and the semantic referent are always the same.
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the truth conditions of sentences of this form.

This is a requirement

that intentionalists and non-intentionalists alike would accept.

4

Criticism of theories of reference which claim that the theory
fails to meet this requirement are subject to the same kind of limitations as those based on the first criterion.
ing a neutral position.

The problem again is find-

With the first criterion, what was required was

some alternative, neutral way of identifying the correct referent.
applying this

second criterion what is

In

required is a neutral way of

deciding what statement is made and whether the statement is true.
It may seem, at first,
applying this criticism.

that the critic is on firmer ground in

For there do seem to be ways of determining

the truth of a statement which are neutral with respect to the theory of
reference one employs.

A competent botanist,

for example,

can tell

whether the statement, "Elm trees are subject to dutch elm disease," is
true without taking any stands on the correct theory of reference.

And

anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of English knows that the statement,
"Elm trees are elm trees," is true.
However, one cannot determine whether a statement is true, no matter how clever one may be, if one does not know what statement is being
made. What statement is made depends, in part, on what the referents of
referring expressions within that statement are.
cizing a theory for failing

t~

So once again, criti-

meet the requirements of the second cri-

terion requires a theory-neutral way of identifying the correct referent.

4

Here again, whether a theory meets this criterion depends on what

Intentionalist theories would not be as likely to accept Evans criterion because of its equation of speaker and semantic reference.
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claim is being made.

We cannot assume that the statement that is made

is necessarily the same as the statement that is made by using those
words as an English sentence.
Failure to take account of non-standard usages would yield very
curious

result~.

For consider the following case.

Let us say that two

spies make up a code according to which 'the big red bear' will refer to
a certain high-ranking Soviet official.
ment, "The big red bear is

Spy number one makes the state-

in Washington, D. C."

official actually is in Washington, D. C. ,
bears, big or little,
question,

in Washington.

Suppose the Soviet

but that there are no red

According to the criterion is

can a theory which says that the referent of 'the big red

bear' is a high-ranking Soviet official be correct?

If it can, then the

truth of the statement must follow from the facts that the speaker was
referring to a high-ranking Soviet official and that that person was
indeed in Washington.

However,

if we do not

allow for non-standard

usages, then the truth of the statement "The big red bear is in Washington," does not follow from these facts, since there is no big red bear
in Washington.

Therefore, the statement couldn't be true.

I think that we would want to say that the sentence is true.

But

if we insist that the statement be interpreted literally, that is, in
accordance with standard,

dictionary English, then it will be false.

However, I doubt that anyone would be tempted to say that any theory of
reference which identifies the high ranking Soviet official as the referent of "the big red bear" is inadequate on the grounds that there were
no big red bears in Washington, D.C. when the statement was made.
Once again, in applying this criterion we must be careful.to note
the claim that is being made.

Our intuitions about truth conditions for
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English sentences are irrelebant if we are evaluating theories of reference for sentences which are not in English.

Intuitions about truth

conditions for sentences which in a private language tend to be less
clear and less neutral than necessary for a conclusive refutation of a
theory of reference for that language.

Criterion Three
A third criterion of adequacy for a theory of reference might be
as follows:
A reference rule for an expression E in a language 1 is adequate
only if should the rule predict the referent of expression ~ is x,
then we will find that competent speakers of L use E to refer to x
and take other competent speakers of 1 to refer to x with E.
This criterion should be uncontroversial.

The idea behind it is that

competent speakers are those speakers who use the language (including
its referring expressions) correctly.

It is by looking at the linguis-

tic behavior of competent speakers of a language that we discover what
the expressions of that language refer to.

Or, more precisely, it is by

looking at the linguistic behavior of speakers who are competent in the
use of a particular referring expression, or who have mastered the use
of that

expression,

express ion.

that

we discover

the correct

referent

of

that

A correct reference rule for an express ion in a language

should predicat that

x is the referent of E if and only if those who

have mastered the expression refer to

~

when they use it.

We might

also argue that if the mechanism by which a referent of an expression is
determined is expressed by a reference rule for that expression, then
understanding that expression's reference potential consists in knowl-

•
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edge of this rule.

For example,

if definite descriptions determine a

referent according to the Russellian rule, i.e., the referent of a definite description is the unique individual who satisfies the description,
then my understanding of a definite description consists in my knowledge
of this rule.

5

But this claim is controversial and we need not make it.

To test a reference rule for an expression in a language by using
this criterion, we would compare a competent speakers actual linguistic
behavior to the behavior we would expect if her understanding of the
expression consisted in her knowing the proposed reference rule.

If a

competent speaker's understanding of a referring expression conflicts
with the understandi_ng she would have if her understanding consisted in
recognition of a proposed reference rule, then the proposed reference
rule

is

called

into question.

That

is,

we would

have grounds

for

rejected a .reference rule if a competent speaker understands an expression as referring to one thing, while the proposed rule of reference
specifies some other thing as the referent.
On the face of it this looks

like a perfectly legitimate and

straightforward way of evaluating a theory of reference for expressions
in a language.

However, in applying this criterion we encounter diffi-

culties, for to do so legitimately, we must be able to identify competent speakers without begging the question.

Depending on how we iden-

tify competent speakers, it may also be necessary to distinguish when a

5

This is somewhat oversimplified. My understanding of a particular
definite description would consist in my knowledge of the particular
rule of reference for that description. For example, I understand the
expression, "the man in room 29 wearing a flannel shirt," by knowing the
rule: the referent of 'the man in room 29 wearing a flannel shirt' is
the unique individual who is the man in room 29 wearing a flannel shirt.
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competent speaker's linguistic behavior accords with her knowledge of
the language and when it does not, since even a competent speaker can
occasionally make mistakes.
We must avoid begging the question of which theory of reference is
correct when

w~

identify competent speakers.

If we identify competent

speakers as those whose linguistic behavior conforms to our expectations, and our expectations are, in turn, based on what we take to be
the correct rules of reference, then we will obviously not get independent confirmation of our hypothesis concerning particular mechanisms of
reference.

Unless our hypothesis is so crazy that no one uses referring

devices the way we expect them to, the hypothesis concerning mechanisms
will inevitably be confirmed by the linguistic practices of all competent speakers of the language.

They will be confirmed because we have

ruled out of consideration the people who do not act as the rule prediets by denying that they are competent speakers or that they have mastered the device in question.
Judgments of linguistic competence or mastery are often made by
comparing

expected linguistic

behavior

to

actual behavior.

In

his

paper, "Individualism and the Mental," Tyler Burge tells a story about a
person suffering from arthritis.

6

This person, let's call him Art, has

had arthritis for some time and has used the term,

'arthritis' in con-

nection with his own condition, his father's condition, similar conditions

of

other elderly

people,

etc.

He has

made statements

about

arthritis using the term 'arthritis,' and he has interpreted the state-

6

Tyler Burge, "Individualism and the Mental",
Philosophy, IV (1979), pp. 73-121.

Midwest Studies in
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ments of his doctor and others which contained the word,

'arthritis'.

However, during one of his visits to the doctor, Art remarks that his
arthritis has spread to his thigh.

If we believe that the reference

rule for 'arthritis' is as follows, "Something is the referent of 'arthritis' if and only if it is an inflammation of the joints," then Art's
linguistic behavior will indicate that he has not mastered the English
expression 'arthritis'.

If he had, he would not have used this expres-

sion to refer to an ache in his muscle.

The important thing to note in

this case is that if we judge Art's linguistic competence or mastery in
this way, that is, by noting whether his linguistic behavior conforms to
predictions of how he should (or should not) behave, then we are basing
our judgments on some rule of reference.

The judgment that he should

have behaved in such and such a way can only be based on some rule, in
this case, a rule of reference.
This method of judging competence or mastery is fairly standard.
If someone calls a cat a horse, or says,

"Horse!" in the presence of

cats and absence of horses, we tend to think that he has not mastered
the term,
says,

'horse'.

If someone calls Ronald Reagan "Paris, France," or

"The president of the United States is Paris France," we would

conclude that she has not mastered the name,

'Paris, France' (unless we

had evidence to indicate that the speaker was mentally unsound or had
crazy beliefs or had not mastered 'the president of the United States').
We may also challenge someone's claim to have mastered a particular referring device if they cannot do things we would expect a person
who has mastered that device to do.

For example, we may expect a person

who has mastered the term 'elm tree' not only to make statements about
elm trees but also to represent truth conditions for statements about
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elm trees in such a way that his being able to represent these truth
conditions entails his ability to determine whether there is an elm tree
in his field of vision.
What is behind this judgment of mastery is very likely a reference
rule which sa~s

something like:

the referent of

'elm tree'

is

that

object which matches a certain mental template or satisfies a certain
descriptive content in the mind.

If the reference rule for 'elm tree'

was quite different, for example, "The referent of 'elm tree' is whatever botanists call elm trees," then it would no longer make sense to
judge a non-botanist's mastery of the term 'elm tree' by whether that
person could tell there was an elm tree in her field of vision.
It may well be that comparing actual to expected behavior, especially linguistic behavior, is a legitimate way of determining whether a
person has mastered a referring device.
only legitimate way.

In fact, I suspect it is the

However, if mastery is tested in this way, then we

cannot pretend that the actual linguistic practices of speakers who have
mastered linguistic devices can provide independent empirical evidence
for the correctness or incorrectness of a particular account of reference.
the

As long as a particular account of reference is presupposed by
judgement

of competence or

mastery,

the practices

of competent

speakers will not be an independent, empirical check on the theory of
reference.
What is needed,

if the actual linguistic practices of competent

speakers are to provide conclusive, theory-independent empirical evidence for one account of reference and count as conclusive counter-examples to some other account,
tence.

is a theory-neutral way of judging compe-

Can such a way be found?
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One possibility

is

to

judge

the competence of

any particular

speaker by whether her linguistic behavior is similar to most speakers'
practices.

7

That is, we could define a competent speaker as one whose

linguistic behavior is the same as that of the majority of other speakers belonging to the same linguistic community and who are in similar
circumstances.

This would be a theory-neutral definition of competence.

Moreover, with this definition we can judge incompetent the speakers who
seem obviously incompetent.

The person who says "Look at that horse!"

in the presence of a cat and the absence of a horse has clearly not mastered the use of the English term 'horse', since the majority of English-speakers would not say "Look at that horse!" under those conditions.

This criterion has some intuitive appeal.
However, this criterion will not work.

One reason to reject it is

that it cannot be neutral with respect to rules of reference.

It can be

argued that the bias would be incorporated into the criterion for membership in a linguistic community.

If inclusion in a certain linguistic

community involves using sounds or inscriptions in the same way as others use those sounds or notations, or something similar to this, and if
the basis for sameness of use is accepting or operating according to the
same reference rules, then the criterion for mastery fails to be neutral.
Another reason to reject this majoritarian criterion is that it is
difficult to apply.

Consider this case,

for example.

Having an elm

tree in one's field of vision may be a circumstance that many people

7

This criterion for mastery requires that we assume the majority of
speakers have mastered the device in question.
As we shall see, this
assumption is problematic.
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find themselves in.

If this is the kind of circumstance we are inter-

ested in, then we would ask, "What do the majority of speakers say in
such circumstances?"

If we were to find some one thing, or even a lim-

ited range of things, that the majority of English-speakers who found
themselves in this circumstance said, I should be very surprised.

The

mere presence of elm trees in one's field of vision is too undefined a
situation to prompt any pattern of

linguistic behavior common to a

majority of English-speakers.
However, it is possible to define the situation more precisely by
adding to the mere presence of an elm tree in the field of vision the
question, "Yes or no? do you see an elm tree?" 8 Since there is only a
limited range of responses to this situation, we might reasonably expect
a pattern of responses to emerge.

The respondents can say either

or "no" or "I don't know," or they could remain silent.

II

yes, II

It is likely

that a majority of them, if they are acting in good faith, would respond
in one of these ways, so we could determine who had mastered the sentence and its referring terms and who had not.
However, even if we had overcome the difficulty of picking out the
members of a linguistic community in a neutral way, and had satisfactorily defined the situation, there would still be a problem with the
majoritarian criterion for mastery.

For if it is possible that a major-

ity of speakers in a linguistic community have not mastered some referring device, then the fact that a person's linguistic practices conformed to those of the majority would have no bearing on whether she had

8

This would be in accordance with Quine' s suggestions in _W_b_r_d _a_n_d
Object (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1960), and _T_h_e _R_o_o_t_s
of Reference (La.Salle, Illinois: Open Court Press, 1973).
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mastered that device.
Consider what could happen, for example, if the majority of English speakers had not ·mastered the use of the term 'elm tree'.

Suppose

for the sake of argument that mastery of the term entails being able to
identify elm t+ees when they are present, and suppose that most people
do not know the difference between beeches and elms.

Each person polled

is in the situation described above--that is, there is an elm tree in
each person's field of vision and the person is asked the question, "Yes
or no? do you see an elm tree?"

It is possible that the result of the

poll would show that the majority of people do not think they see an elm
Suppose most of them guessed,

tree.
rectly.

and the majority guessed incor-

The majoritarian criterion would say that those people who

answered "no" had mastered the use of the expression, when, by hypothesis, they had not.
It might be objected that such a pattern of responses could not
arise unless most of the people polled acted in bad faith.

If the peo-

ple were truthful, those who did not know whether there was an elm tree
in their field of vision should have answered, "I don't know," rather
than "yes" or

II

no. II

There are at least two ways of replying to this objection.

One is

to point out the fact that people are often willing to give information
when they don't really know what they're talking about, and they do so
sincerely (that is, with no intention to deceive or to play a trick).·
Many people have found this to be the case when they have asked directions in a big city.

On the basis of experiences

like this, it seems

reasonable to conclude that there are people who would prefer ariswering
a question incorrectly to admitting ignorance.

It is also quite common
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that people think they know the answer to a question when in fact they
do not.

So it could be that the people being polled about elm trees

answered in good faith, in the sense that they did not intend to lie and
were willing to answer the question to the best of their ability.
theless, the

m~jority

None-

happened to answer incorrectly.

Even if it were not possible that the majority of language users
would,

in good faith,

answer incorrectly in a situation like the one

described above, the majoritarian criterion would still fail correctly
to identify those speakers who had mastered the referring devices in the
sentence,

"Yes or no, is there an elm tree in your field of vision?"

Suppose that the majority of speakers did not know whether the tree in
front of them was an elm tree and they also knew that they didn't know,
so they responded "I don't know."

Could the majoritarian criterion cor-

rectly identify those speakers who had mastered the referring device,
'elm tree'?

If the criterion is applied straightforwardly, then those

who answered, "I don't know," wil 1 be the ones who have mastered the
sentence, since their practice corresponds to that of the majority of
same language users.

But, by hypothesis, mastery required being able to

identify elm trees when they were present.
If those who answered "I don't know," are dropped from the pool of
respondents, then it is again possible that those people who think they
know an elm tree when they see one, but who do not, will outnumber those
who actually do know an elm tree when they see one.

In either case, the

majoritarian criterion would fail to identify correctly people who had
mastered the referring device.
In summary, a majoritarian criterion of mastery which says· that a
person has mastered a referring device if his linguistic behavior is the
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same as that of the majority of same language speakers in similar circumstances will probably not be neutral with respect to rules of reference.

Even if it is",· it will still fail to be an accurate test of mas-

tery if there are referring expressions which the majority of speakers
have not

maste~ed.

A majoritarian criterion for mastery would also run into difficulties if there were expressions which people would use only in situations
which occurred very rarely or in situations which were essentially private (if

the~e

are any).

In such situations one cannot determine what

the majority of people actually do say,

for the majority never find

themselves in that situation.
A criterion for mastery which identifies competent speakers on the
basis of what the majority of same-language users would say (as opposed
to what they actually do say) will fail to be neutral.

9

To predict what

the majority of same language users would say in a well-defined situation, one must have some notion of the right thing to say in that situation, or at least of the most ·understandable or appropriate thing to
say in that situation.

The standard of correctness or appropriateness

must be some kind of prescriptive rule, if the prediction is to have any
justificaiion.

So in this case also a rule of reference is presupposed

in the criterion for mastery.
The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that the theory
of reference cannot be understood as a set of hypotheses on one hand and
a set of linguistic practices on the other, such that we need only to

9

For a full development of this point see John Biro, "Intentionalism
in the Theory of Meaning," The Monist, 62 (1979), pp. 238-259.
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look at linguistic practices to see whether our theory is correct.

A

theory of reference cannot be empirical if being empirical means there
are theory-neutral observations of actual
confirm or disconfirm hypotheses
inform these pr_actices.

about

linguistic practices which

the rules of reference which

One cannot observe linguistic practices as lin-

guistic practices without presupposing the correctness of some rules of
reference.
Although the actual linguistic practices of competent speakers of
a language do not provide theory-neutral data against which a proposed
theory of reference can be tested, the theory of reference obviously
cannot be evaluated independently of

these practices.

The relation

between linguistic practices and hypotheses about the rules of reference
is much like the relation between any other empirical data and hypotheses.

There is a give and take.

Actual linguistic practices are the

bases for provisional hypothese about rules of reference; these hypotheses,
tices.

in turn, guide us in the evaluation of actual linguistic pracIn the theory of reference we try to adjust the two to get the

best possible fit.

Neither is given absolute authority.

Actual lin-

guistic practices may convince us that our hypotheses about the rules of
reference are wrong.

Generally well-supported hypotheses about rules of

reference may tell us that a particular linguistic act (either a choice
of referring device or an interpretation of some device) is incorrect.

CHAPTER III

DISAMBIGUATING REFERENCE

In the preceding chapters

I

have discussed what

an acceptable

theory of reference is supposed to do and how such a theory can be
tested.

I have argued that we should conceive of the theory of refer-

ence as a theory of reference determination rather than as a theory of
identification or a theory of communication.

I proposed that the theory

of reference determination be developed in terms of referring devices
and mechanisms
expressed as

of reference.

reference rules

device D is whatever
relation R to D.

The mechanisms
of the

of reference are to be

following form:

'y's, or the referent of

Q

The referent of

is whatever stands in

I then developed my position on how a theory of refer-

ence should (and can) be tested.
The primary goal of this dissertation is to show what role intentions to refer should play in a theory of reference.

In terms of this

purpose the preceding chapters have merely been stage setting.

My gen-

eral strategy for working out the proper place of mental intentions in a
theory of reference is to distinguish two roles that mental intentions
have played in theories of reference.

By looking at intentions in terms

of these different roles, we shall get some insight into the motivations
for and virtues of intentionalist theories.

We shall also see where

criticisms of intentionalist theories are most cogent.

It will be help-

ful to look at the role mental intentions play in theories of reference
43

44
in terms of two explanatory tasks--(1) the task of explaining how referring expressions get the reference potential they have, and (2) the task
of explaining how the· referent of an expression which can be used to
refer to more than one thing actually refers to only one thing on an
occasion of use--since both the justifications for and the criticisms of
theories which rely on mental intentions usually relate to one or the
other of these tasks (but not necessarily to both).
We can categorize most theories of reference by looking at which
of these tasks they perform.

For example, description theories of names

such as those of Frege, Russell, and Searle, which claim that there is
associated with each name a description or group of descriptions which
the referent must satisfy, are primarily concerned to explain the reference-potential of proper names.

According to these theories,

it

is

because there is some description associated with the name 'Aristotle'
which some individual (namely, Aristotle) satisfies (or satisfies more
fully than any other individual) that the name 'Aristotle' can be used
to refer to Aristotle.

These theories do not tell us what the actual

referent of a use of the name 'Aristotle' is when 'Aristotle' is associated with several distinct

sets

of descriptions. According to these

theories, the name 'Aristotle' is associated with a_ description of the
Greek philosopher and Aristotle is the referent of 'Aristotle' because
he satisfies that description.
However,

'Aristotle_' may also associated with a description of my

cat, and with a description of the Greek shipping tycoon.

In each case

the fact that the referent satisfies most of the descriptions associated
with the name is supposed to explain why that object is a possible referent of the name use.

These descriptivist theories tell us nothing
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about which possible referent of an expression is the actual referent of
a use of that expression.

Of course an answer in the descriptivist spirit is easy enough to
produce.

We could propose, for example, a limited descriptivist theory

which says

tha~

the actual referent of a use of an expression is the

object which satisfies the description the speaker had in mind, or which
the speaker currently associates with the name.

However, this elabora-

tion is not an essential part of the description theory of proper names,
and should be evaluated separately.

Reference Potential and Reference Disambiguation
One role that mental intentions play in theories of reference is
that of providing a principle of disambiguation.
times been used to explain how a

Intentions have some-

term which could, according to the

rules of the language, be used to refer to more than one thing, actually
refers to only one of these things on an occasion of use.

Many refer-

ring devices can be used to refer to more than one thing.

For example,

the name 'Aristotle' can refer to the Greek philosopher but also to the
cat I named Aristotle.

When r·say "Aristotle was very good at figuring

things out," I could be referring to either Aristotle the philosopher or
Aristotle the cat.
theories,

What I am referring to, according to intentionalist

is determined

by what

I

had

in mind,

which

individual

I

intended to refer to, in addition to whatever it is that determines the
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possible referents

of 'Aristotle'

(usually,

linguistic conventions).

1

Thus, one of the roles intentions have played in the theory of reference
is to explain how refe·rence is disambiguated.
A second role that mental intentions have played in theories of
reference (and more generally, in theories of meaning) is to explain how
words and symbols get their significance.

Mental intentions are brought

into the explanation of the linguistic rules themselves.

According to

some theorists, the rules which govern the use of referring devices must
be explained in terms of intentions to use these referring devices in a
certain way.

An intentionalist theory of reference potential says that

'Aristotle' can refer to Aristotle the philosopher and Aristotle the cat
because the speaker uses this name with the intention to refer to these
objects with the name.

2

Some intentionalist theories leave the notion of

intending to refer unanalyzed.

Others have attempted to analyze it in

terms of a) the speaker's identifying an object through some mental content and b) the speaker's trying to communicate to an audience which
object she had thus identified.

3

When intending to refer is analyzed in

1

I will leave the two notions, 'having in mind' and 'intending to
refer' rather vague here. They will be spelled out more fully within
the discussions of satisfaction theories and causal theories of disambiguation as well as in the discussion of reference potential. See the
remainder of this chapter, Chapter Six and Chapter Eight.
2

Of course the intentionalist story of how referring expressions get
their reference potential is much more complicated. Examples of intentionalist theories -Of reference potential would be the view developed by
David Lewis in Convention (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969),
and that of H.P. Grice in "Meaning," Philosophical Review, 66 (1957),
pp. 377-388, and "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence Meaning and Word Meaning,"
Foundations of Language, 4 (1968), pp. 225-242. These theories will be
discussed in detail in Chapter Eight.
3

One could argue that Searle's position in Intentionality: An Essay
in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres, 1983),
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this way, the intentionalist can explain reference potential in terms of
mental contents associated with the name.

These contents may be a sin-

gle identifying description· for each object to which the name can refer,
along the lines of Russell's theory of names.

Or they can be a cluster

of descriptions which are satisfied by the potential referent,

along

the lines of Searle' s proposal in "Proper Names. 114 The mental contents
can also be non-discursive or non-conceptual, for example, mental images
and perceptual images.

What is common to all intentionalist theories is

that the mechanism of reference, the relation which underlies the reference relation is one in which referring devices are linked to some mental . intention,

and it is by virtue of this

link that a referent is

determined for that referring device.
If we divide the explanatory roles mental intentions have played
in theories of reference in this way, then we can distinguish two corresponding explanatory tasks for a theory of reference.
that a theory of reference must perform
explain how the actual

are as follows:

The two tasks
(1)

referent of a particular use of a

it must

referring

device is determined and (2) it must explain how the possible referents
of a referring device are determined.
What we have then is a two-part theory.

We explain how reference

is determined in terms of linguistic conventions or rules which impose
constraints on uses of referring expressions.

Although there is consid-

erable disagreement about what ·these rules are like and how they oper-

is an example of such a view.
4

Mind, 67 (1958), pp. 166-173.
sell or Searle held such a theory.

This is not to say that either Rus-
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ate, most theorists would agree that there are linguistic conventions
which specify the meaning of referring expressions in terms of general
directions for the use of these expressions.

These general directions

tell us what the expression can be used to refer to.

In our terminology

we would say that they determine the expression's reference potential.

5

Even those theorists who want to restrict talk of reference to
uses of referring expressions would recognize that there is some kind of
relation between expression types and possible referents.

The expres-

sion 'John', for example, even in abstraction from any particular use,
still seems to stand in a certain relation with some objects (namely,
people named John) and not with others.

The expression 'the house' sim-

ilarly stands in a kind of relation with some objects (namely, houses)
that it does not stand in with others (for example, trees).

This rela-

tion is:• established by the meaning of the terms, by linguistic rules,
habits and conventions.
expression.

The meaning assigns possible referents to the

Or in other words, the meaning determines a set of paten-

tial referents.
erence potential.

We will say, then, that expressions (types) have a refIn other words, there are certain things ·which the

expression can be used to refer to.

So one stage of the theory of ref-

erence concerns the form of linguistic rules.

What we need to do at

this stage is to specify the relation which obtains between referring
expressions and potential referents of those expressions.
Because many referring expressions in a natural

language can be

used to refer to more than one object, but, on an occasion of use, actu-

5

Reference potential should be understood as relative to a given
language.
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ally

refer to

only

one of

these objects,

the

theory of

reference

determination for such languages cannot be simply a theory of the meaning of referring expressions.

What is needed, in addition, is an expla-

nation of how a particular referent is determined for a given use of a
referring expression when that expression can be used to refer to more
than one thing.

We will call this part of the theory of reference 'the

theory of reference disambiguation', or 'theory of disambiguation' for
short.

What has to be done at this stage of the theory is to discover

in what relation an object must stand to a use of a referring expression
in order for it to be the referent of that expression as it would be
used under these circumstances.
form:

So we would have reference rules of the

x is the referent of a use of

~

if and only if

~

is a potential

referent of a and x stands in relation R to a on this occasion of use.
In summary, on the model I will be using in the next four chapters, to explain how the referent of a referring expression is determined we must discover (a) what

it is that determines

the reference

potential of referring expressions, and (b) what it is that determines
the actual referent of a use of a referring expression (given the constraints upon
rules).

possible referents

of

the term

The virtue of this model is that it

imposed

by linguistic

allows us to see more

clearly the distinct roles mental intentions have played in theories of
reference.

By separating these roles we are in a better position to see

where mental intentions

are .problematic and where they are required.

Although not every theory of reference can be fitted neatly into this
model, it is, nonetheless, quite helpful.
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Theories of Disambiguation
In· the remainder of this chapter I will discuss the role mental
Linguistic conventions

intentions play in theories of disambiguation.

and rules determine the reference potential of expressions in a language, but they do not always provide enough information to tell us
which potential referent is the. referent of a use of an expression.
Often, even though an expression could be used to refer to many different objects, that expression on a particular occasion of use, refers to
only one thing.

A theory of disambiguation is needed to explain what

makes that one thing the referent of that use of the expression.
Accounts of reference disambiguati'on assume that the set of possible referents is delimited by linguistic conventions.
set can vary widely.

The size of the

For some devices (e.g., complete definite descrip-

tions used attributively), there is only one possible referent--namely,
the object which uniquely satisfies the description.
in a middle range.

Some proper names (e.g.,

Proper names fall

'William Shakespeare' and

'Paris, France') have a small number of possible referents, while others
(e.g., 'John' and 'Bill') have a much larger one. The set of possible
referents for pure demonstratives
These devices

('this'

and 'that')

is very large.

can be used to refer to . almost any object, event,

or

activity.
There

are

many

limited

different
to

accounts

a particular

of

kind

disambiguation.

of

linguistic

Some

accounts

are

referring

device.

For example, there are accounts of disambiguation for proper

names that cannot be extended to explain how other referring devices are
disambiguated.

Some

accounts

are quite

general;

they apply

to

all
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referring devices

which potentially refer

to more than

one object.

There is no reason to suppose, in advance, that one principle of disambiguation should apply to every kind of referring device.

It may be

that there are differences in the principles of disambiguation which
reflect differences in the form of linguistic rules for various kinds of
referring device.

Proper names, for example, may be a peculiar kind of

referring device in that the linguistic conventions governing the use of
proper names are not to be phrased in terms of a single linguistic rule.
It may be that there are as many reference rules or linguistic conventions for the name 'John', for example, as there are Johns.

The princi-

ple of disambiguation in such a case could be formulated in terms of
which linguistic convention is being followed.
inapplicable

to

referring

devices

such

as

This principle would be
'the

table'.

It

seems

unlikely that there are as many different linguistic conventions governing the use of the words 'the table' as there are tables, and we do not
seem to have as many distinct linguistic conventions for 'the table' as
we may have for 'John'.

So to disambiguate the referent of 'the table'

we cannot look to the particular linguistic convention that the speaker
is following.

Limited Intentionalist Accounts
Limited intentionalist

accounts

are theories

of disambiguation

which hold that the referent of a use of a referring expression (or
device) is that individual which is a possible referent of the expression (or device) and which the speaker has in mind or to which she
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to refer. 6

intends

These accounts

are

limited in that

explain how linguistic conventions arise.

they do not

They do not explain how pos-

sible referents are determined, but presuppose that they are.

There-

fore, according to limited intentionalist accounts, intentions have only
a limited role to play in determining reference.
important in determining reference potential.

Other factors may be
Limited intentionalist

theories explain how the referent of a use of a referring expression is
determined in terms of (a) linguistic conventions which determine reference potential and (b) the
sion.

intentio~s

of the person using the expres-

In a limited intentionalist theory

use of a referring expression
ent of

~

is the actual referent of a

; if and only if

~

is a potential refer-

E and x is the individual the speaker intends to refer to or has

in mind.

It should be kept in mind that limited intentionalist theories

do not try to explain how expression get their reference potential; they
assume that expressions have such a potential.
Limited intentionalist theories explain the determination of reference for a particular use of a referring device in terms of possible
referents

and the speaker's

intentions.

theories is something like this.
makings of a. good chairman."

The intuition behind these

Suppose someone says "John has all the

The person is referring to some John, but

we cannot tell, from the sentence itself or from the referring expression that was used, which John the sentence is about.

6

To discover which

In the following chapters I shall be concerned primarily with linguistic devices because most theories of reference deal almost exclusively with these devices. The points made abou~ linguistic reference
can easily be extended to include non-linguistic referring devices.
I
shall also restrict the discussion, for the most part, to singular reference.
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John is the referent of 'John' on this occasion, we need to know which
John the speaker had in mind, which one she was thinking of when she
made the statement.

The reason we need to know which John the speaker

was thinking of is alledgedly that the speaker's intentions are what
determine the referent of 'John' on the occasion of use (granted that
the person the speaker is thinking of can be referred to by the name
'John').
alternative to the intentionalist account of disambiguation

An

which says the referent of 'John' in the sentence "John has all the makings of a good chairman" is the John the speaker had in mind or intended
to refer to would be an account which says that the referent of 'John'

,

in this sentence is the object that stands in a certain causal relation
to the speaker or to his utterance of 'John' .

The referent is whatever

object is causally related to this utterance of 'John' in the appropriate way.

7

There are also non-intentionalist accounts of disambiguation

which appeal to contextual features of the utterance to disambiguate
reference.

8

There are two basic types of limited intentionalist theories.

We

noted earlier that limited intentionalist theories claim that reference
is disambiguated by what the speaker had in mind or intended to refer
to.

We can distinguish the two basic types of intentionalist theories

7

The 'appropriate' way would have to be spelled out in such a way
that what the speaker 'had in mind' or intended to refer to was irrelevant if such an account is to be a real alternative.
8

See, for example Howard Wettstein, "How to Bridge the Gap Between
Meaning and Reference," Synthese, 58 (1984), pp. 63-84, and Colin
McGinn, "The Mechanisms of Reference," Synthese, 49 (1981), pp. 157-186.
McGinn tries to account for the disambiguation of demonstratives in
terms of space-time relations between the utterance and the referent.
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in terms of how they analyze the concept of 'having in mind'

and in

terms of what they take to be the important relation between what the
speaker has in mind and objects in the world.

One kind of intentional-

ist theory sees the reference relation as a satisfaction relation.
referent of

som~

The

referring device is that possible referent which satis-

fies or matches what the speaker has in mind.

Because the relation is a

satisfaction relation the analysis of 'having in mind' is usually formulated in terms

of mental or cognitive contents.

The other kind of

intentionalist theory sees the reference relation as a causal relation
between objects and utterances via mental states.

According to these

theories, the referent of a particular use of a referring device is that
object which (directly or indirectly) caused the speaker's use of the
referring device.
contents or,
mind'.

for

9

Causal intentionalist theories need not posit mental
that matter,

any particular picture of

'having ill

The exact causal mechanisms operating within the speaker's brain

(or mind) which link the referent to the object need not be spelled out.
To evaluate limited intentionalist theories I will first present
some representative satisfaction theories.

The merits of these theories

will be outlined and objections will be discussed.

I will then discuss

general objections to intentionalist theories of disambiguation.

These

objections motivate the search for an account which does not explain how
reference is determined in terms of speakers' intentions.

In the fol-

lowing chapters I will compare the merits of intentionalist theories of

9

Note that this type of causal theory traces the causal chain from
the object, through the speaker's mental states, to the use of a·referring device. A causal theory which by-passed mental states would not be
an intentionalist one. See note 8, this chapter.
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disambiguation with those of non-intentionalist (contextual) theories.
I will argue that non- intentionalist theories cannot account for many
cases in which determinate reference is

mad~.

I discuss causal intentionalist theories.
tionalist

theo~ies

In Chapters Five and Six

I argue that causal inten-

preserve the important insights of satisfaction theo-

ries while escaping some of the most damaging objections to these theories.

Finally, I argue that if we take non-linguistic referring devices

seriously and take account of the constraints on possible referents
imposed by these devices as well as by linguistic conventions, the best
explanation of how reference is disambiguated will be an intentionalist
one.

Satisfaction Theories of Disambiguation
Satisfaction theories see reference determination in terms of satisfaction or fit

between mental

contents

and objects

in the world.

These mental contents might be concepts (in the form of descriptions in
some language or other),

10

or they could be mental representations (in

the form of images) or contents of perceptual experiences.
Some satisfaction theories of disambiguation restrict the analysis
of 'having in mind' to conceptual contents.

The speaker identifies an

individual _by means of mental descriptions.

These descriptions deter-

mine the referent of a use of a referring device in that they set the

10

Since limited intentionalist theories presuppose the existence of
linguistic rules and conventions, the language of thought could be
either a natural language or mentalese or a combination of these.
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conditions which a possible referent must satisfy if it is to be the
actual referent of that use.

An example of a descriptivist theory of

disambiguation can be.found in the theory of proper names developed by
Michael McKinsey.

11

McKinsey defines the denotat;ion of a proper name

token uttered by a person at a particular time in terms of what the
speaker is referring to and what the proper name can be used to refer
to.
If ~ is a token of a proper name uttered by ~ at !, then a denotes x
if f x is the one and only individual w such that (i) S refers to w
with ~ at t and (ii) ~' s referring to-~ with ~ at ! is an actualization of -S's stable disposition to refer ... to~ with tokens of the
same type a; a. 12
The second clause states McKinsey's analysis of reference patential, and since we are only concerned with theories of disambiguation in
this chapter, we will ignore it.

13

The first clause, "S refers tow with

a at !, " tells us how the referent of a proper name that can be used to
refer to more than one individual is determined.
the referent

According to McKinsey,

is determined by the speaker's act of referring.

14

Not

every theory which explains disambiguation in terms of speaker's reference is an intentionalist one.

An intentionalist theory says that the

11

"Names and Intentionality," The Philosophical Review, Vol. 87, No.
2 (April 1981), pp. 171-200.
12

Ibid., p. 195.

13

Chapters Seven and Eight will be devoted to intentionalist theories of reference potential.
14

This analysis of the principle of disambiguation for proper names
is similar to Tyler Burge's. Burge, like McKinsey, sees disambiguation
as a function of a person's act of reference.
Disambiguation, for
Burge, is a matter of what the speaker designates or refers to with a
particular proper name.
For a statement of Burge' s theory of· proper
names see "Reference and Proper Names, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol.
70, No. 14 (August 1973), pp. 425-439.
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referent of a referring expression (for example, a proper name) is,. at
least in part, determined by the mental states of a speaker or the contents of those states, in other words, by what the speaker had in mind.
Usually speaker's reference is defined in terms of what the speaker had
in mind, but

i~

need not necessarily be defined that way.

For example,

one could define speaker's reference in causal terms:
refers to ~ with ~ at ! if and only if -x caused -a to be a referring device for ~ and the use of a at t is the result of a causal
chain terminating at ~ alone.

~

Thus, not every theory of disambiguation in which speaker's reference
plays a role is an intentionalist theory.
McKinsey's account of speaker's reference is clearly an intentionalist one.

McKinsey defines speaker's reference as follows:

S refers to x with a at t

f(~,~,!),

-=

(by definition)

~

dominantly satisfies

15

where .QC~'~'!) is "the cluster of properties associated with a token i!
by a speaker ~ at !· 1116 The cluster of properties which a speaker associates with a name at a given time is the cognitive content which determines the referent of the speaker's act of referring.

The referent is

that individual which dominantly satisfies this content.
A similar theory of disambiguation can be given for incomplete
definite descriptions.

An incomplete (or indefinite) definite descrip-

tion is a definite description which could be used to refer to a number
of individuals but on an occasion of use refers to only one. 1 r In the

15

Ibid., p. 193.

16

Ibid., p. 192.

17

Definite descriptions are devices for singular reference which
consist of the definite article (in English, 'the') and a predicate.
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sentence,

"The cat is an the mat," 'the cat' and 'the mat'

indefinite definite descriptions.
cat, but as it is

used~

'The cat' can be used to refer to any

it refers (or purports to refer) to only one.

A purely conceptual

satisfaction theory

incomplete definite descriptions would say that
description

~

are both

of disambiguation

for

the referent of the

is that possible referent which satisfies (or dominantly

satisfies) the descriptive (or at least conceptual) content C that the
speaker associates with this use of
of utterance.

The

~'

or associates with a at the time

incomplete description

that the speaker actually

utters is supplemented by further descriptive content which the speaker
associates with this use.
cat is on the mat."

For example, suppose our speaker says, "The

Every cat is a potential referent of 'the cat' .

What makes a particular cat the referent of this use of 'the cat' is, on
this account, further descriptive content which the speaker associates
with her use of 'the cat' at this time.

These descriptions are the ones

the speaker uses to identify the cat (for herself) and,

if querried

about which cat was meant, would be able to supply to help her audience
pick out the correct referent.

The cat which is being referred to is

the one which satisfies (or dominantly satisfies or satisfies more fully
than any other cat, etc.) the descriptive content in the speaker's mind.

Within the theory of reference, definite descriptions have been classified in terms of (i) whether they denote anything and (ii) whether they
uniquely denote something.
Definite descriptions which do not denote
any object are called 'improper definite descriptions'. An example of
an improper definite description would be 'the present king of France'.
Definite descriptions which denote something may either uniquely denote
or denote several objects (but purport to refer to only one).
A uniquely denoting definite description would be 'the natural number between
2 and 4'. Definite descriptions which do not uniquely denote are called
'incomplete' or 'indefinite' definite descriptions.
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It is because the speaker has sufficient descriptive content to identify
a particular cat (for herself, not necessarily for her audience), that
The descriptive

this use of 'the cat'. refers to some particular cat.

content which enables the speaker to identify the particular cat she is
talking about must be satisfied by the cat which is the referent of this
use of

'the cat'

and it

is because a particular cat satisfies

this

descriptive content that it is the referent.
The linguistic rules governing pure demonstratives 18 and some pronouns determine a set of possible referents that is so large that their
contribution

to

reference

determination

is

almost

empty.

The

word

'that' in the sentence "That's nice" could be used to refer to almost
anything.

19

With these referring expressions, the theory of disambigua-

tion is almost the whole story of reference determination. 20 Perhaps for
this reason the theory of demonstratives has become a kind of 'test
case' (or last stronghold) for intentionalist theories.
It

is possible to extend the conceptual satisfaction model

account for disambiguation of pure demonstratives.
sort would say the speaker identifies
means of mental descriptions which the

to

An account of this

(for herself) an individual by
individual satisfies.

Having

18

The pure demonstratives of English are 'this' and 'that' without
further modification. An 'impure' demonstrative would have a modifier,
for example, 'that man'.
19

'Anything' does not mean any object.
'That' might refer to an
object, a stat:e of affairs, a property, etc.
It could refer to any
individual or feature thereof.
20

Usually there are other non-linguistic referring devices (demonstrations) which co-determine possible referents for demonstratives.
For the present, we will restrict our discussion to uses of demonstratives which are not accompanied by a demonstration.
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thus identified the individual, the speaker is in a position to refer to
it.

The individual to which she intends to refer with the word 'that'

is the one she has identified by means of these descriptions.

It is the

one that satisfies (or dominantly satisfies) these descriptions.

Thus,

the referent of her use of 'that' would be the individual she intends to
refer to,

namely, the

individual which satisfies the mental

content

associated with this use of the word 'that'.
In "Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions," Keith Donnellan
raised some serious objections to the principle of identifying descriptions. 21 This principle says that a speaker can refer to an object only
i f he is in a position to supply some description whic.h uniquely charac-

terizes that object.

Since limited descriptivist theories account for

disambiguation of reference in terms of the speaker's mental descriptions which determine a particular object to be the referent of the
expression, they are vulnerable to these objections.
There

are

basically

three

objections

against limited descriptivist theories. 2 2
these objections here.

which

have

been

raised

I will briefly characterize

A more thorough discussion of them will follow.

One objection is that these theories require that whenever reference is
disambiguated the speaker must have a mental description which uniquely
characterizes the referent.
case.

It seems unlikely that this is always the

A second objection is that when the speaker has more than one

mental description which uniquely characterizes the referent,

21

22

limited

Synthese, 21 (1970) pp. 335-358.

Limited intentionalist
disambiguation.

theories are

intentionalist

theories

of
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descriptivist accounts seem to have no way of saying which description
is the correct one, the one that should count.
cerns the fallibility· of speakers' beliefs.

The third objection conSpeakers can have wildly

mistaken beliefs about objects and still refer to them rather than to
some other

obj~ct

about which their beliefs are true.

Let us consider

these objections in turn.
The first objection is that it is not the case that a speaker will
always have some description which uniquely characterizes the object to
which he wants to refer, but nevertheless he does refer to that object.
Donnellan offers the following proof.
Suppose a child is gotten up from sleep at a party and introduced to
someone as 'Tom', who then says a few words to the child. Later the
child says to his parents, "Tom is a nice man." The only thing he
can say about 'Tom' is that Tom was at a party.
Moreover, he is
unable to recognize anyone as 'Tom' on subsequent occasions. His
parents give lots of parties and they have numerous friends named
'Tom'.
The c'ase could be built up, I think, so that nothing the
child possesses in the way of descriptions, dispositions to recognize serves to pick out in the standard way anybody uniquely. That
is, we cannot go by the denotation of his description nor whom he
points to, if anyone, etc. Does this mean that there is no person
to whom he is referring? 23
Obviously not.

In fact,

it seems obvious that the Tom he is talking

about is the one who talked to him at the party.

If Donnellan is right

in thinking that the child could refer to Tom even though there are no
descriptions which enable him to pick out the Tom he means, then the
descriptivist account of disambiguation must be wrong.

The reference of

'Tom'

not have mental

is

disambiguated even though the speaker does

descriptions which only one Tom satisfies.
It is not immediately evident that Donnellan is right.

23

QE. cit., p. 343.

If the
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child did not think of Tom as the guy who said such-and-such or at least
as the man his parents introduced as 'Tom' at some time (the child may
not be able to describe this time in English, but he can identify it in
terms of a sequence of events), then the utterance is inexplicable.

If

the child does not have some conception of Tom, one which separates this
Tom from other people he knows, it is not clear how he can make a statement about him, especially since his use is not directly parasitic. 24
Even though he may not be able to articulate this conception in English
and even though it may not be adequate for a subsequent recognition of
Tom, it may still be enough to determine a unique referent for this use
of 'Tom'.
What this example might show is that the ability to have something
in mind need not be a purely conceptual one.

The child might not be

able to think of the Tom he is referring to in terms of descriptions
which this Tom satisfies, yet he might be able to distinguish this Tom
from others in his ken by means of, for example, remembered images in
his own subjective time.

If there are other ways of 'having in mind',

in addition to having mental descriptions, then an account of reference
disambiguation which includes these ways would be preferable to a purely
descriptivist account.
Another problem for descriptivist theories is that sometimes the
speaker can volunteer several uniquely denoting descriptions, and there

24

The child's use of the name 'Tom' to refer to Tom may be parasitic
in the sense that he got this name from someone else. What I mean here
is that the child did not just borrow his use of 'Tom' from someone who
was using it in the immediate context.
Had his parents been talking
about Tom and the child said "Is Tom a nice man?" he could be just hooking up to his parent's use without any knowledge of who he was talking
about. In Donnellan's example he does not seem to be doing this.
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is no non-arbitrary way to say which one is the 'cor~ect' one or the one
that actually determines reference.

If all the descriptions denote the

same object, this is riot a serious problem.
well as any other.
about the

obje~t

Any description will do as

But suppose the speaker has some mistaken beliefs

in question.

She may associate several descriptions

with her use of a referring expression, each of which uniquely denotes
different objects.

For example, suppose I say "That is cluttered."

I

associate the descriptions 'the desk I am now perceiving' and 'the desk
in Room 357 that belongs to Cliff Wirt' with the word 'that', believing
that the two descriptions denote the same object.

Unbeknownst to me,

however, Cliff has switched desks with someone else.
If the descriptivist theory of disambiguation is correct, if the
referent of 'that' in "That is cluttered" is the individual that satisfies the descriptive content I associate with my utterance of 'that',
then it would follow that my utterance is still ambiguous or that I am
referring to two different things with the word 'that'.
ther of these alternatives seem to be the case.

However, nei-

At the very least, the

descriptivist theory would have to be modified to account for cases like
this.
Michael McKinsey attempts to supplement descriptivist theories by
making a distinction between derivative
defines these terms as follows:

and primary

intentions.

He

"When a person's having a given inten-

tion is a part of the explanation of the person's having another intention, but not vice versa, I will say that the former intention is primary with respect to the latter or equivalently, that the

latter is

derivative from the former."
By making this distinction we might be able to disambiguate my
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utterance of 'that' by discovering which was my primary inteniton: to
refer with 'that' to the desk I am now perceiving or to refer to the
desk that belongs to Cliff Wirt.
go something like this.

The explanation of my intentions might

I intend to refer to the desk that belongs to

Cliff Wirt because I intend to refer to the desk I am now perceiving and
I believe that this desk belongs to Cliff Wirt.

Moreover, my intention

to refer to the desk I am now perceiving would not change if I did not
believe it belonged to Cliff Wirt and therefore, did not intend to refer
to the desk that belongs to Cliff Wirt.

Since my primary intention was

to refer to the desk I am now perceiving, the desk which satisfies this
description is the referent of 'that'.
On the other hand,

if I intended to refer to Cliff Wirt' s desk

(believing that any desk which belonged to Cliff Wirt would be cluttered) and intended to refer to the desk I was perceiving only because I
believed it belonged to Cliff Wirt and I intended to refer to Cliff
Wirt's desk, then the referent would, on McKinsey's a~count, be the desk
which belongs to Cliff Wirt (even though that was not the desk I was
perceiving.)

This conclusion conflicts with our intuitions.

A third objection to descriptivist theories of disambiguation is
that the speaker can have mistaken beliefs about an object, so it satisfies none of the descriptive content in the speaker's head, and nonetheless refer to that object.

For example, suppose a person sees an object

which he takes to be an antelope, but which is in fact a rock shaped
like an antelope.
night."

The person says

"That has been

watching us

all

The descriptions the speaker associates with 'that' are such

that the rock satisfies none of them (e.g., the description 'the· antelope standing over there',

'the entity which has

been watching us',
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etc.).

Nonetheless, the speaker does seem to be referring to the rock.

If his mistaken beliefs were revealed, he might say something like, "Oh,
it couldn't have beeri watching us all night.

It's a rock."

'It'

in

these sentences refers to the same thing that 'that' referred to.
Of course, the proponent of a descriptivist theory could find some
description that the speaker could have associated with 'that' and which
would uniquely denote the rock, for example, the description 'the entity
which I am now perceiving', or 'the entity which is causing my antelope
perception'.

But the fact

that one can always

come up with such a

description does not mean that the speaker always has such a description
in mind.
Thinking of an object or 'having an object in mind' does not seem
to be just a matter of having a set of descriptions which uniquely characterize that object.

Having a uniquely denoting definite description

in mind is one way to individuate an object, but it is not the only way.
We are able to think of an individual even when it would be an effort to
come up with a description that uniquely and accurately characterizes
that individual.

Often we

accompanying description.

25

identify objects perceptually, without an
Or we can identify the object by remembering

it through images, rather than through descriptions.

26

25

Perceptually discriminating some object may provide the basis for
a description (e.g., 'the object I now see'), but such a description
need not accompany the perception to make it individuating. Whether a
perceiver who has no concepts would be able to identify individuals is a
different question.
26

Earlier I suggested that the child may have identified Tom in this
way. The child may not have any descriptions which uniquely characterize Tom. It could identify Tom by means of images arranged in a time or
event sequence.
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Considerations like those above have led to a revised version of
descriptivist theories.

In the revised version, disambiguation still

depends on what a person 'has in mind', and the referent of a referring
device with more than one possible referent is still the possible referent which

sati~fies

or fits some mental content.

What is different is

that the mental content need not be a uniquely denoting description.

It

could be the non-propositional content of a perceptual or of a mnemonic
•
2 7
experience.

If we add to the ways in which a speaker can be said to have an
object in mind in this way, we might be able to answer at least one of
the objections raised against satisfaction theories.

Given these addi-

tional mental contents, we need not require that the speaker has a uniquely denoting mental description of an object in order for her to refer
to that object.

A perceptual or mnenomic content will do as well.

ever, even if satisfaction accounts

How-

are supplemented with these non-

propositional mental contents, the problem of mistaken beliefs and fortuitous

satisfaction

remains.

The person

who said,

"That

has

been

watching us all night," for example, may have not only mistaken beliefs
about the thing she is seeing, but also mistaken perceptions.

The con-

tent of her perceptual experience may be distorted so that she actually
sees antelope ears and eyes.

Neverth_eless, the thing she is referring

to is not an antelope at all.

Further, even if there were some antelope

2 7

There is some disagreement about what it means for an object to
satisfy the content of a perceptual experience.
Some would see this
content as a kind of picture which the referent resembles more closely
than any other object.
A more sophisticated theory is proposed by
Searle.
For Searle, an object satisfies the content of a perceptual
experience if (a) it resembles that content and (b) it causes that experience.
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which corresponded exactly to the content of her visual perception it
would not be the referent of 'that'.

Assessment of Intentionalist Accounts
Limited
appeal

intentionalist theories

have the

and generality to recommend them.

based on considerations

virtues

of

intuitive

Their intuitive appeal

like the following.

is

When someone says some-

thing, e.g., "Aristotle was good at figuring things out" and we are not
sure what the referent is because the linguistic rules of our language
determine more than one possible referent, we generally try to find out
which one of these possible referents the speaker had in mind.

We try

to find out which one the speaker meant perhaps by asking her to supply
further identificatory information which we assume she has.

The infor-

mation may be in the form of a description, as in 'Aristotle, my cat' or
in the form of an ostension by means of which the speaker conveys (or
tries to convey) perceptual information--'That Aristotle'
the cat).
rectly,

for

(pointing to

Moreover, when we say something which is interpreted incorexample, when I

say "John B. has

the makings of a good

chairman," and I find I have been misinterpreted, I base my judgment on
the fact that my audience did not understand whom I meant.

The truth

conditions for the statement made depend upon the John B. I was thinking
of.

Moreover, these conditions are the truth conditions for the state-

ment that was made no matter who hears the statement, if anyone.

Had I

been thinking of a different John B. at the time, a different statement
would have been made.

If someone else had said the same words with a

68

different John B. in mind, the statement would have had different truth
conditions, and if he had the same John B.

in mind, the truth condi-

tions would have been the same.
These intuitions are powerful as long as we accept the constraints
imposed upon P?ssible referents by linguistic rules.

When the speaker

has an individual in mind which does not fall within the range of possible referents determined by the relevant

linguistic rule,

intuitions

about the actual referent are not as strong or as universally shared.
For example, if I had Cliff Wirt in mind when. I said "John B.

has the

makings of a good chairman," it would not be so clear that the actual
referent of my utterance was the person I was thinking of.
theory of disambiguation does not handle such cases.

But the

It is restricted

to explaining how an actual referent is determined, given that a range
of possible referents has already been determined by linguistic rules or
conventions.

The intuitive

evidence

for

intentionalist accounts

of

disambiguation is also weak when there is no strong consensus as to the
nature of the linguistic rules governing a kind of referring device.
Disagreement on this level, however, is typically disagreement about the
extent to which intentions determine reference, not about whether intentions have some role in determining reference.

28

28

See, for example, the interchange between Rod Bertolet and John
Biro concerning demonstratives.
(Bertolet, "Demonstratives and Intentions," Philosophical Studies, 38 (1980), pp. 75-78; and Biro, "Intention, Demonstration and Reference," Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, Vol. 43, No. 1 (September, 1982), pp. 35-41.) Bertolet argues
that demonstrations do not determine the reference of demonstratives.
His view is that the linguistic rule for demonstratives is quite empty
and the disambiguating principle is the speaker's intentions.
Biro's
view is that the demonstrative and demonstration together determine a
referent, and Bertolet's alledged counter-examples to such a view do not
address this possibility.
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In

addition to

their

intuitive

appeal,

theories also have the advantage of generality.

limited

intentionalist

The principle of disam-

biguation is the same for every linguistic device that requires disambiguation.
is operative

It could be argued that the same principle of disambiguation
fa~

non-linguistic referring devices as well.

For example,

we noted earlier that the picture of Alfred Hitchcock in the advertisement which consisted of this picture and the words, "is a classic," had
more than one possible referent.

The picture could be referring to the

man, or to some prominent feature of the man, or to something associated
with him (e.g., his movies or his television program).
erent of the picture in this use is indeterminate.

The actual ref-

A limited intention-

alist theory could explain how this picture has a determinate referent
in terms of the speaker's intentions. 2 9 A similar point could be made
about gestures such as waving a book and asking "Red or pink?" or pointing to something and saying "I love that."
restricted range of possible referents.
rist could claim that the actual

In both cases we find a

A limited intentionalist thee-

referent is

that possible referent

which the 'speaker' had in mind.
Although limited intentionalist theories are highly intuitive and
general they are not universally accepted.

In the following paragraphs

I will briefly characterize the major objections to limited intentionalist theories and evaluate these objections.

These objections apply to

any kind of intentionalist theory, not just to satisfaction theories.

29

30

The notion of a speaker would have to be extended when applied to
non-linguistic reference. Perhaps we could say the speaker is the person who is primarily responsible for that particular occurrence of that
configuration of symbols.
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Some of the reasons for rejecting intentionalist theories actually
have very little to do with limited intentionalist theories.
gested earlier that

d~viding

I sug-

theories of reference into (1) theories of

disambiguation and (2) theories of reference potential would be beneficial because some criticisms which would apply to theories of reference
potential are beside the point when applied to theories of disambiguation.

For example, one cannot criticize a limited intentionalist theory

for failing to recognize the normative force of language, since limited
intentionalist theories presuppose linguistic rules which set the limits
on what could be referred to with a certain device.

Let us assume, for

the time being, that limited intentionalist theories are logically independent of intentionalist theories of meaning.

We shall discuss only

those objections that are directed specifically to limited intentionalist theories.
One objection to limited intentionalist theories is motivated by a
particular view of how reference determination and an audience's identification of the referent are related.
tion are as follows.

The general lines of the objec-

If reference is determined in part by what the

speaker had in mind, and it is not possible to observe what someone has
in mind, how is it possible for an audience to know what the referent
is?

People who are not mind readers often (perhaps even generally) cor-

rectly identify the referent of a use of a referring device.
not need to know what was going on in the speaker's head.

They do

Since it it

very unlikely that their repeated success is the result of a series of

° For objections that apply only to satisfaction theories see above,
pp. 60-67.
3
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·lucky guesses, something else, something which is publicly accessible,
must account for their ability to identify the correct referent.

What-

ever it is that the audience relies on must at least be related to the
determinants of reference.
One way t_o formulate the objection is to say that limited intentionalist theories of reference flout an important methodological principle.

According to one theorist, Michael Pendlebury, the principle in

question is that
a semantic convention which assigns denotations to referring expressions must be such that mastery of that convention would help an
audience to ascertain the denotation of an utterance of the expression on the basis of purely public facts about the context of utterance. 31
Limited intentionalist theories seem to flout this principle since the
semantic convention (or rule) which they say determines a referent (in
Pendlebury's terms--assigns a denotation) is:

the actual referent of a

use of a referring device is the possible referent which the speaker had
in mind (or was thinking of).

The question an intentionalist theory

must answer is this: how is mastery of this rule or convention going to
help the audience to identify the correct referent?

All the audience

has to go on are the "purely public facts" about the context of utterance (and the publicly accessible linguistic rules which determine reference potential).
ing.

These are not facts about what the speaker is think-

In fact, there are no purely public facts which could tell us what

the speaker is thinking.

3 1

It is not clear, then, how knowledge of the

This expression of the principle is Michael Pendlebury' s.
See
"How Demonstratives Denote," The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol.
22, No. 1 (Spring 1984), pp. 91-104, especially, p. 102. In this.paper,
Pendlebury develops what he calls a "mental reference" theory for demonstratives and he considers (and dismisses) this objection.
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relevant semantic rule is supposed to "help" the audience identify the
correct referent.

32

To identify the correct referent she will have to

rely on those aspects· of the speech situation to which she does have
access.
We should look at Pendlebury' s

requirement more closely.

Why

should knowledge of the relevant semantic convention help (or enable) an
audience to identify the correct referent?
this

requirement

derives

from the

Pendlebury suggests that

nature of natural

languages.

He

accepts the gist of the principle "on the strength of the fact that natural languages are public institutions which are learnable on the basis
of public facts about language use." 33 It is difficult to deny that publie facts about language use are what enable us to learn the semantical
rules of the language.

However, it is not clear what the important con-

nection between learning semantic rules and identifying correct referents is.
lie facts

Pendlebury seems to think that because we have to rely on pubabout

language use to

learn the semantical

rules

of the

language, we must also rely on public facts to apply the semantical
rules in ascertaining correct referents.

However, he does not say why.

It seems quite possible that on the basis of purely public facts
about language use we could

learn that the reference rule for referring

expressions with more than one possible referent is something like what

32

Pendlebury requires only that mastery of the semantic convention
help an audience identify the correct referent. Some theorists might go
even further. It could be argued 'that knowledge of the semantic convention must allow the audience to identify the correct referent, in the
sense that if one knows the semantic conventions and relevant facts
about the situation, one knows the referent.
33

Ibid., p. 102.
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a limited intentionalist theory says.
all, use public facts

Intentionalist theorists, after

about language use to

justify their theories.

There is no reason to suppose that language users could not do the same
thing.

The fact that we must rely on publicly accessible data to learn

reference rules seems to have little to do with the methodological principle which says that mastery of semantic conventions

should either

enable or help an audience to determine the correct referent of a use of
a referring device.
The important connection between the determinants of reference and
what the audience uses to identify the referent is that the two must be
so related that it is not a matter of luck that the audience gets the
referent right.

If the audie.nce always gets the referent right, then

there must be an obvious and close relationship between what determines
reference and what the audience relies on.
referent wrong,

If it sometimes gets the

the relationship need riot be so close.

relationship is that of identity.

The closest

If what the audience uses to identify

the correct referent are the same things that determine reference, then
we would expect the audience to identify the correct referent most of
the time.

34

If the audience identifies the referent on some other basis,

it is more likely to fail to identify the correct referent.

Since we

seem usually (but not always) to get the referent right, there should be
a fairly direct relationship between what the hearer relies on to identify the referent

and what actually determines

reference which would

guarantee that degree of success in identifying the correct referent.

34

We would want to make some allowances for sloppiness or lapses of
attention and things of that sort.
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The real problem, then, is not a problem about how reference rules
are learned; it is, instead, a problem about how we successfully communicate reference.
able to

Successful communication requires that an audience be

identify the correct referent

in some non-arbitrary manner.

Limited intentionalist theories, by making the speaker's thoughts

an

important determinant of reference, rule out the possibility that correct identification of a referent is due to an identity between the
determinants of reference and the information the audience relies on to
identify the referent.

The information an audience has to go on does

not and can not include knowledge of what the speaker is thinking (at
least not in the sense of directly accessible knowledge).

For there is

no way for the ~udience to get inside the speaker's head to see what he
is thinking.

This does not mean, however, that the audience's identifi-

cation of the referent must be arbitrary if intentionalist theories are
correct.
What Pendlebury is concerned about is the relationship between the
rules of reference which tell how reference is determined and the audience's basis for identifying the correct referent.

Pendlebury acknowl-

edges that knowing how reference is determined should help the audience
to identify the correct referent.
help the audience or how much.

But it is not clear how it should

We can propose that knowing how refer-

ence is determined should at least suggest a strategy for identifying
the referent.

If reference is determined, in part, by what the speaker

had in mind, then to identify the referent one should try to find out
what the speaker was thinking of.
to the objection.
doubt

about

This is the answer Pendlebury gives

He notes that we do use this strategy when we· are in

the referent

of some

expression,

either

by asking

the
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speaker what he meant, or when that is not possible, by trying to reconstruct what the speaker must have been thinking of on the basis of his
interests, the preceding conversation, the non-linguistic context, and
other behavioral cues.
If it were not possible to figure out what the speaker had in mind
with some relatively high degree of accuracy, then the de facto ability
of an audience to identify the correct referent (within a range of possible referents) would be inexplicable for the limited intentionalist
theorist.

The privacy of thoughts

blocks

any direct

access

to the

determin_pnts of reference, but there do seem to be indirect ways to tell
what someone is thinking of.

The existence of such ways of ascertaining

what the speaker was thinking of is enough for the limited intentionalist theories to account for the possibility of correct identification of
the referent.

The fact that there is some discrepancy between what an

audience relies on to identify the correct referent and what determines
reference also explains how it is possible to identify a referent incorrectly.

Since we do

identify the wrong referent often enough,

this

explanatory power should count in favor of limited intentionalist theories.
The objection I have considered so far concerns the necessity that
there be some connection between what determines reference and what an
audience relies on to identify the referent.

We have seen that this

part of the objection is not a problem for limited intentionalist theories.

Another objection to

limited

intentionalist

theories

is

that

there are some cases when the speaker's intentions take a back seat to
other

factors

which

determine

reference.

speaker has in mind seems to be irrelevant.

In

these

cases

what

the

Howard Wettstein presents
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such a case.

35

Suppose that our speaker walks up to Smith, stares straight at him,
extends his finger right in Smith's face, and says "That is a selfdestructive man."· No one ... could have any doubt that the speaker
intends to ostensively indicate Smith. Unfortunately ... our speaker
was merely stretching, his mind was elsewhere, and he intended to
convey his reference by more subtle background cues, cues that
indeed identify Jones, his intended referent.
In such a case, I am
strongly inclined to suppose ... that Smith, the individual apparently
pointed to, is the referent. 36
The moral Wettstein draws from this story is that the speaker's intentions were not what determined the referent in this case.

The speaker

was thinking of Jones, yet the referent of 'that man' was Smith.
I am hestiant to accept Wettstein' s conclusions

so quickly.

I

agree that the audience has some justification for taking Smith to be
the referent.

However, the fact that it is justified does not entail

that the correct referent is Smith.

The initial plausibility of the

view that the referent was Smith even though the speaker had Jones in
mind is seriously compromised if we extend the conversaticn so that it
becomes clear to the audience that Smith was not the intended referent.
Suppose Smith' protests, "What makes you think I'm self-destructive?" and
our speaker says "I wasn't talking about you.

I was thinking of Jones."

Smith might well correct his interpretation of "That man is self-destructive."

He may challenge the appropriateness of the pointing ges-

ture ("Then why did you point at me?"), and the speaker may have to
explain his action
stretching. 11 )

0

("Oh,

I'm sorry.

I wasn't pointing,

I was

just

37

35

~·

36

Ibid., p. 72.

37

This further interchange might indicate that pointing and saying

cit.
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One reason we cannot conclude that the speaker's intentions did
not determine the referent of 'that man' is that we do not have any
theory-independent way· of deciding who was the correct referent of 'that
man' in.this case.

We would agree that the audience has some justifica-

tion for taking Smith to be the referent, but we do not know why it is
justified.

One possibility is that the audience is justified because it

based its identification of the referent on the very things which determined the referent.

The cues 'that man', looking at Smith, and pointing

in Smith's face actually determined the referent according to the rule:
The referent of 'that man' is whatever individual is a possible referent of 'that man' and is the actual man which is being demonstrated. 38
If the audience identifies Smith as the referent because Smith is a possible referent of that man and he is the man who is being demonstrated,
and if this is the correct reference rule for 'that man', then the audience is justified in believing that Smith is the referent.
However, the audience would also be justified in believing that
Smith is the referent of 'that man' if the reference rule is a version
of a limited intentionalist theory.

For example, suppose the correct

reference rule is:
The referent of 'that man' is whatever is a possible referent of
'that man' and is the individual the speaker was thinking of when
she said 'that man'.
Since the audience cannot get 'inside'

the speaker's head to discover

'that' is a conventional means for determining reference.
It may also
indicate that pointing must be an intentional action--i~ must be used to
refer--if it is to determine reference, or it may be that the difference
between pointing and stretching is an observable one. It does seem that
pointing and stretching do not look the same.
38

This is Wettstein's position.
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what she is thinking of, its justification will depend on whether it is
justified in inferring what the speaker is thinking of on the basis of
publicly accessible clues.

On the basis of the clues available to the

audience at the time of the utterance the audience

is justified in

Of course, because

believing that the speaker was thinking of Smith.

the evidence an audience has to go on never entails the belief, the justification is always defeasible.

Further evidence may lead the audience

to revise its hypothesis about what the speaker was thinking of.
The kind of case that Wettstein cites cannot support the conclusion that the actual referent of a use of a referring device is not
determined in part by what the speaker had in mind.

Even i f we accept

Wettstein' s intuition that the referent was Smith--the person who was
pointed at--instead of Jones (the person the speaker had in mind), the
case for an intentionalist theory of disambiguation
compromised.

is not seriously

If the correct referent of 'that man' is Smith rather than

Jones, it cannot be the case that the correct reference rule for demonstratives is as follows:
speaker had in mind.
would have been Jones.

The referent of 'that

x' is whatever x the

If this were the correct rule, then the referent
But an intentionalist theorist need not accept

this reference rule.
It is consistent with limited intentionalist theories to say that
reference is determined by rules governing the use of referring devices
such that

sometimes the speaker's intentions have almost no role

determining reference.

in

Looking at Wettstein's case, we find more than

one referring device at work.

There is the linguistic referring device

'that man' which does not determine a unique referent.

Any man could be

the referent of 'that man' according to the rules of English.

But there
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is also a pointing gesture (or what seems to be a pointing gesture) and
other,
•

more

devices.

subtle,

gestures.

These

gestures

are

also

referring

39

If we take all the referring devices together, the linguistic as
well as the non-linguistic ones, we find that they do, together, determine a unique referent.

If that is the case, then there is no need for

a principle of disambiguation which takes into account the speaker's
intentions.

So even if Wettstein is right in thinking that the referent

in this case is not the man the speaker had in mind, a limited intentionalist theory of demonstratives may be correct.

Intentions may not

have as large a role in determining referents as some theorists have
supposed. 40

Other non-linguistic

referring devices,

determine a

devices may,
referent

along with

regardless

linguistic

of the speaker's

intentions.
We have considered aud dismissed two objections to intentionalist
theories so far.

One objection was that the determinants of reference

must have some connection with the cues the audience relies on to identify the referent and this seems impossible if private mental contents
are determinants of reference.

We answered this objection by noting

that the cues the audience relies ·on enable the audience to make reason-

3 9

I agree with Wettstein that these 'cues' are actually referring
devices--that they are capable of determining or co-determining a referent.
I am not sure I would call what the speaker did on this occasion
pointing. I suspect that for a gesture to count as a case of pointing,
the speaker must do it deliberately--she must intend to single out some
object with the gesture. To overcome possible objections of this sort,
let us assume that the speaker was actually pointing at Smith, not just
stretching his arm.
40

See, for example, Bertolet, _Q£. cit.
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ably

good inferences

about

what the

speaker had

successful communication is not a matter of chance.
tion was

that the referent of some

disambiguation (e.g.,

in

mind,

so

that

The second objec-

referring devices which require

'that man') is not the individual the speaker had

in mind, so the speaker's intentions do not determine the actual referent of a referring device of that type.

We answered this objection by

appealing to non-linguistic referring devices.

These devices, such as

pointing at someone and looking him straight in the eyes (while saying
"that"), together with linguistic devices, may be capable of determining
a unique referent, so that there is no need for disambiguation.
absence of these auxiliary referring devices,

In the

however, the speaker's

mental contents do seem important for determining the referent of 'that
man'

and even more so for determining the referent of 'that' when no

predicate is added.

If someone were to say out of the blue "That man is

self-destructive" or "That is self-destructive" without any accompanying
demonstrations, the expressions 'that man'
referred.

and 'that' could still have

It certainly seems plausible that the individual to whom they

referred is the one the speaker had in mind.
Perhaps the most serious objection to the kinds of intentionalist
theories we. have been considering is that the satisfaction relation is
more problematic than other types of relations that account for the data
equally well.

The intentionalist accounts in question view the refer-

ence relation as

a satisfaction relation between mental contents and

objects in the world.

Alternative intentionalist accounts view refer-

ence as a "causal" relation between objects and the world.
We have looked at satisfaction accounts of 'having an object in
mind' and found that they are problematic.

For one thing, they require
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that a speaker have some uniquely denoting description or representation
for each individual that she refers to.

It is unlikely that speakers do

have such descriptions in mind whenever they refer to an individual.
Another short-coming of satisfaction theories of having an object in
mind is that they cannot account for cases in which the speaker has radically mistaken beliefs about,
nonetheless has that object
leave open

or

representations

in mind.

the possibility of

of an object,

but

Finally, satisfaction theories

fortuitous

satisfaction.

That

is,

a

speaker may have a uniquely denoting representation of an .object (e.g.,
a representation of an antelope) which is not satisfied by the thing the
speaker 'has in mind' (e.g., a rock that looks like an antelope), but is
satisfied by some other object about which the speaker knows nothing
(e.g., an antelope hidden behind the rock).

The. weight of the evidence

goes against the theory that a speaker has an object

Q in mind if (and

only if) she has a mental representation g (either linguisitic or nonlinguistic) such that

what

Q and only Q fits or satisfies R.

The failure

of satisfaction theories adequately to account

is

in

choice.

involved

'having an object

in mind'

presents

for

us with a

We can either give up intentionalist accounts of disambiguation

or develop an alternative account of 'having an object in mind'.

The

reason intentionalist accounts looked attractive in the first place was
that they seemed to make sense of the fact that when we are not sure
what a use of a referring expression refers to, we look to what the
speaker had in mind.
things we
refers to.

But this fact may be misleading.

rely on to discover what a use of

There are many

a referring expression

It may be that these other factors are the real determinants

Of reference, and that the speaker's intentions to refer to some object
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are really unimportant.

Since 'having and object in mind' has not been

adequately explained and
question,

is difficult to explain without begging the

we might do· better to abandon it altogether and look for a

less problematic way of explaining how reference is disambiguated.

In

the next chapter we will consider some non-intentionalist accounts of
disambiguation.

These

accounts say that

features

linguistic devices

for

of the

context

utterance,

together with

referring,

reference.

What the speaker intends to refer to is irrelevant.

of

determine

CHAPTER IV

CONTEXTUAL THEORIES OF REFERENCE

We have looked at satisfaction accounts of 'having an object in
mind' and found that they are problematic.

For one thing, they require

that a speaker have some uniquely denoting description or representation
for each individual that she refers to.

It is unlikely that speakers do

have such descriptions in mind whenever they refer to an individual.
Another short-coming of satisfaction theories of having an object in
mind is that they cannot account for cases in which the speaker has radically mistaken beliefs about,
nonetheless has
leave open

that object

or representations of an object,

in mind.

the possibility of

but

Finally, satisfaction theories

fortuitous

satisfaction.

That

is,

a

speaker may have a uniquely denoting representation of an object (e.g.,
a representation of an antelope) which is not satisfied by the thing the
speaker 'has in mind' (e.g., a rock that looks like an antelope), but is
satisfied by some other object about which the speaker knows nothing
(e.g., an antelope hidden behind the rock).

The weight of the evidence

goes against the theory that a speaker has an object
only if?) she has a mental representation
linguistic) such that

g

Q in mind if (and

(either linguisitic or non-

Q and only Q fits or satisfies R.

The failure of satisfaction theories adequately to account
what

is

choice.

involved in

'having an object

in mind'

presents

for

us with a

We can either give up intentionalist accounts of disambiguation
83
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or develop an alternative account of 'having an object in mind'.

The

reason intentionalist accounts looked attractive in the first place is
that they make sense of the fact that when we are not sure what a use of
a referring expression refers to, we look to what the speaker had in
mind.

But this fact may be misleading.

There are many things we rely

on to discover what a use of a referring expression refers to.

It may

be that these other factors are the real determinants of reference, and
that the speaker's intentions to refer to some object are really unimportant.

Since

'having an object

in mind'

has not been adequately

explained and is difficult to explain without begging the question, we
might do better to abandon it altogether and look for a less problematic
way of explaining how reference is disambiguated.
we will consider some non-intentionalist

In the next chapter

accounts of disambiguation.

These accounts say that features of the context of utterance, together
with linguistic devices for referring, determine reference.

What the

speaker intends to refer to is irrelevant.
Alternatives to intentionalist theories of disambiguation generally look to contextual features of the use of referring expressions.
These features might include gestures made by the speaker, the preceding
conversation, the audience, the physical environment of the speaker, and
so forth.

The contextual theories we will be considering are those

which hold that features of the context of utterance directly determine
reference.
For these contextual theories to be adequate theories of reference
disambiguation, they must tell us how the contextual features of a use
of a referring expression systematically contribute to the determination
of reference when combined with linguistic referring devices.

An ade-
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quate account cannot just tell us how an audience uses these contextual
clues or cues to understand what is being referred to, for in a theory
of disambiguation we · are

interested

in explaining how

reference

determined, not in explaining how reference is communicated.

is

The fact

that an audience relies on certain contextual cues to discover which
object is being referred to does not entail that these cues are what
determine reference any more than the fact that an audience looks to
what a speaker 'had in mind' entails that intentions to refer to the
object one 'has in mind' are what determine reference.

These facts sug-

gest a way of explaining how reference is determined, but they do not
prove that reference is determined in that way.
With these constraints in mind, let us look at some current contextual theories of reference according to which reference is not determined (or disambiguated) by what the speaker had in mind.
tionalist

account

of

disambiguation

proposed by Mark Norris Lance.

1

for

proper

names

A non-intenwas

recently

Lance argues that the context of utter-

ance, particularly the audience to whom a sentence containing a proper
name is addressed, is an important determinant of reference.

According

to Lance, the audience is part of a subcommunity of an entire language
community,

for

our purposes--the English-speaking

community.

Within

these subcommunities, names that are ambiguous for the English language
community as a whole, are not ambiguous.

Lance argues his case as fol-

lows.
The statement 'Dick is wearing a green tie' when put before the English language community at large, can be given no truth value for it

1

"Reference Without Causation," Philosophical Studies, 45 (1984), pp

335-351.
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contains an ambiguous term. Only by considering the context within
which it was uttered, in particular the other people to whom it is
intended to communicate information, can it be given a truth value.
When I am speaking as a member of the linguistic community consisting of my high school friends, 'Dick' refers to a certain balding
bicycle racer. When I am speaking as a member of the philosophical
community of Ohio State, it refers to someone else. 2
The referent of a use of an ambiguous proper name, then, is determined
by which community the proper name was uttered within.

We could formu-

late a reference rule for proper names as follows:
S refers to x with ·~· (or a use of 'N' refers to x) if and only i f
x is a possible referent of ·~·, and-~ is speaking as a member of
~ommunity Q in which ·~· is (typically) used to convey information
about x and only about x.
There seems to be something right about this proposal.

We do find

that when we use names which have a number of possible referents and
there is no question about who· is meant,

usually there

is only one

likely bearer of that name within that conversational context.

However,

there are problems with Lance's way of accounting for this fact.
One problem is that even in very limited communities there can be
more than one possible referent of a proper name.

In the philosophy

department at Loyola there are three Davids.

Now, when I say to one of

my colleagues in the philosophy department,

"David was in California

last weekend," it at

least seems that

'David'

refers

Lance's account of disambiguation cannot explain this.

to one David.
In fact, rather

than explain it, Lance chooses to deny what seems to be obvious, namely,
that I referred to a particular person.
is this:

His answer to such an objection

"I might have intended to refer to one particular person but

there is a difference between intending to do something and doing it." 3

2

Ibid. , p. 348.
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His response to me, then, would be that I had failed to refer to any
particular person and that, since my use of the name 'David' was irremediably ambiguous, no truth value can be assigned to my statement.

The

only justification he gives for his claim that such uses are ambiguous
is that, "reference for me is a social matter.

My intentions, so long

as they are not communicated to the rest of the linguistic community, do
not carry any semantical weight." 4
I do not find Lance's response very convincing.

Surely we can

believe that reference is a social matter without requiring that for
every actual reference there must be an audience to whom the reference
is sucessfully communicated.

That is much too strong a requirement.

If

it were true, it would be difficult to explain how a new name could be
introduced into a sub-community by one person.

As long as the audience

did not know whom this person was talking about, he would not actually
be referring.

Further, our intuitions tend to support the claim that

'David' referred to one particular person in the sentence "David is in
California this weekend," and that this statement has a truth value.
The audience would not dismiss this statement because it lacked a truth
value.

Instead it might ask me which David I meant, or it might take

'David' to have referred to the David about whom it is reasonable for me
to believe that he was in California.

If we are

looking at actual

social institutions and social practices, we should conclude that the
audience does take this statement to have a truth value, and it does
take the name 'David' to have referred even when it is not in a position

3

Ibid. , p. 348.

4

Ibid.
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to know to what or to whom the name was referring.
There are further problems with Lance's account of disambiguation.
Lance himself admits that the notion of a community is vague.

The basic

idea is that using a name in a community should be understood in terms
of transfers of information among members of the community.

There is

some question as to whether this notion can be made precise enough to be
of much use in a theory of disambiguation.
However, even if we suppose that communities can be identified in
some way, there is still a question of which community is relevant for a
particular use of a name.

Each one of us belongs to many sub-communi-

ties of the kind Lance identifies

(e.g.,

the community of his high-

school friends and the philosophical community at Ohio State).
these sub-communities

are nested within

Some of

larger sub-communities.

For

example, the philosophical community at Loyola University is part of a
larger philosophical community.

Within the philosophical community at

Loyola there is a smaller community of moral philosophers at Loyola.
The community of moral philosophers at Loyola is part of a larger community of moral philosophers in Chicago, and an even larger community of
moral

philosoph~rs

in the Mid-west, etc.

For the sake of the argument,

assume that Lance is correct in saying that the referent of a use of a
name is determined, in part, by the speaker's relationship to a certain
community (i.e., the speaker is speaking as a member of that community).
What community are we to take a speaker to be a member of whep she uses
a name?

Suppose someone is a member of Loyola's philosophical commu-

nity, a member of the community of moral philosopers at Loyola, a member
of the community of moral philosophers specializing in business ethics,
etc.

Suppose also that 'Dick' refers to one person within the philo-
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sophical community at Loyola, and to another person within the community
of moral philosophers who specialize in business ethics.
uses the name 'Dick', ·to whom does she refer?
depends on which

~ommunity

community is that?

If our speaker

According to Lance, it

she is speaking as a member of.

But which

Since the speaker belongs to both communities, mere

membership cannot provide the principle.
munity membership of the audience.
speaking to two people.

Perhaps it depends on the com-

Let us assume that our speaker is

One of them, ~, is a member of Loyola's philo-

sophical community but not a member of the community consisting of specialists in business ethics.
nities.

If we say that

The other,

~', is a member of both commu-

the speaker is speaking as a member of the

community to which her audience belongs, then we will have to conclude
that she is making two statements here.

To

A' she makes a statement

that is ambiguous, and therefore has no determinate truth value.
her statement is about the person referred to with the name
the philosophical community at Loyola.

For

~,

'Dick' in

Clearly, this cannot be correct.

The speaker does not make two statements with two different truth values
just because there are two people with different community memberships
in her audience.

5

We might want to say that the speaker is speaking as a member oi
community f if and only if she intends to speak as a member of f, or she
intends her audience to take her to be speaking as a member of f, but
this seems to needlessly complicate matters. Why not just take her to
be referring to the Dick she intends to refer to?
A more promising tack would be to look to the context to discover
which community is relevant. For example, if the conversation had been
about business ethics, the relevant community would be the community of
specialist:s in business ethics.
If the conversation was about departmental politics, the relevant community would be t:he philosophical community at Loyola. But the context will not always tell which community
is relevant, and the speaker may abruptly change the subject.
5
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If we recognize the fact that sub-communities often either overlap
or are contained in one another, we find that Lance's account of disambiguation will not get us very far.

The purpose of the theory is to

explain how uses of ambiguous names refer to only one potential referent
of that name.

What we end up saying is that most (or at least, many)

uses of ambiguous names do not refer to only one person or thing.
Because we often cannot identify which community a speaker is speaking
as a member of, the number of ambiguous references remains quite high.
This is one reason to reject Lance's account of disambiguation.

It is

not a conclusive reason, since it is possible that many uses of names
are irremediably ambiguous.
Another reason to reject Lance's account of disambiguation is that
it does not jibe with actual linguistic practices.

When someone uses an

ambiguous name, we do not usually try to find out which community that
person is speaking as a member of in order to understand to whom the
name she uses refers.

For example, if I say "I saw a book that was ded-

icated to Cathy," you are not likely to ask yourself which community I
might be speaking as a member of in order to discover to whom 'Cathy'
refers in my sentence.
Before we dismiss Lance's account of disambiguation we should consider what seemed right about it.
is

ambiguous

for the

We admitted earlier that a name which

entire E11:glish-speaking community is often not

ambiguous within a smaller community.
·like 'John'

This is true not only for names

and 'Bill' but also for more completely specified names,

such as 'Kelly Mink'.

My friend Kelly has informed me that there are 13

Kelly Minks in the United States.

That means that in the

can English-speaking community the name

is

ambiguous.

entir~

Ameri-

There are at
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least 13 possible referents of the name in American English.
less, when I use the name,

Nonethe-

and when I hear others use the name, the

question of which Kelly Mink is being referred to never even arises.

In

some sense, there is only one Kelly Mink that it could refer to.
Lance would explain the fact that there is only one Kelly Mink
that my use of 'Kelly Mink' could refer to by relativizing the reference
potential of the name to a community.

According to Lance, in the commu-

nity to which I belong, 'Kelly Mink' is used to convey information about
a certain Kelly Mink and only about him.

Because this is true of . my

community, when I use the name, it refers to that Kelly Mink.

We could

argue that the reference potential of 'Kelly Mink' is not relative to a
given linguistic sub-community, for it is clear that anyone who knows
that there are 13 people named 'Kelly Mink' in the United States, also
knows that 'Kelly Mink' can be used to refer to 13 different people.

On

the basis of what I know about the bearers of the name, 'Kelly Mink', I
can refer to one of the other 12 Kelly Minks.

I can say, for example,

"Kelly Mink is a woman," and my sentence will be true, even though the
Kelly Mink about whom information is typically conveyed in my linguistic
community is not a woman.
We can better explain the fact that within certain sub-communities
of English-speaking people a use of an ambiguous proper name seems not
to require disambiguation with an intentionalist theory of disambiguation.

According to such a theory, the reason we do not usually consider

names such as 'Kelly Mink' ambiguous is that typically there is only one
person that the speaker is able to intend to refer to with the name, 6

6

Assuming that

intending

to

refer

to some

person

with a

name
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and only one person about whom the speaker is likely to have anything to
say.
Lance's observation that if he uses the name 'Dick', speaking to
his high-school friends,

'Dick'

refers to someone different from the

person he refers to when he uses the name 'Dick' at Ohio State, can be
explained in a similar way.

When he is among his high school friends,

who could be expected to know one Dick that Lance might want and be able
to talk about, Lance need not, for the purposes of communication, make
his intentions to refer to that person more explicit.

He expects his

audience to understand that the bicycle racer, Dick, was the one he had
in mind, because they would normally have no reason to suppose he had
another Dick in mind or would want to tell them about some other Dick.
But

'Dick'

Lance talks

probably does not always
to his high school

refer to the bicycle racer when

friends.

·"Dick is a person I know at Ohio State."

He could say,

for example,

Obviously, 'Dick' in this sen-

tence does not refer to the high-school Dick.

Nor will Lance's high

school friends take it to refer to that person.

From the context they

can tell that he is talking about someone else named 'Dick', someone
they probably do not know.

What makes it the case that he is talking

about someone else cannot be the fact that he is speaking to his high
school friends, or is speaking as a member of that community.
The phenomenon that Lance bases his theory of disambiguation on
can be better explained by intentionalist theories than by Lance's contextual theory.

In addition, Lance's theory does not account for many

cases in which someone seems to make a determinate reference.

Lance

requires that the speaker believes that this person bears this names.
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would haVe to say that in these cases the reference was ambiguous and
therefore the sentence lacked a determinate truth value.

Further,

if

Lance's account were· correct, we would expect people to use a certain
strategy to discover to whom a use of a name referred--namely, we would
try to ascertain which community the speaker was speaking as a member
of.

But we do not seem to use this strategy.

Instead, we try to ascer-

tain whom the speaker was thinking of or to whom she intended to refer.
These reasons together justify our rejecting Lance's account.
A stronger case can be made for

disambiguation

for

demonstratives

non-intentionalist accounts of

and

other

indexicals.

One

such

account is the contextual theory of demonstrative reference developed by
Colin McGinn.

7

McGinn argues that the reference of demonstratives is

determined in part by gestures, e.g., pointing.

He suggests the follow-

ing spatio-temporal reference rule for demonstratives:
the referent of a token of 'that F' is to be the first F to intersect the line projected from the pointing finger, i.e., the Fat the
place indicated--one might almost say geometrically--by the accompanying gesture. 8
He arrives

at this reference rule by considering cases in which the

speaker does not perceive the object to which he points and has only
very general knowledge of it (the speaker may believe that it is an F
and that it is located in a certain place).

In one of these cases a

factory inspector, while absent-mindedly looking away, gestures towards
a car and says, "That car is road-worthy."

Although the factory-inspec-

tor has no perceptual image of a car which the intended referent might

7

"The Mechanisms of Reference," Synthese, 49 (1981), pp. 157-186.

8

Ibid., p. 163.
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satisfy, 9 and even though the car itself is not causally related to his
utterance, the inspector still refers to the car he is pointing at.
McGinn's account of demonstrative reference includes 'paralinguistic' gestures among the determinants of reference.

I suspect that such

gestures are institutionalized referring devices, in the same sense that
some linguistic expressions are.

However, there are difficulties with

McGinn's account of how such non-linguistic devices operate.

First of

all, McGinn' s account can apply only to demonstratives which are accompanied by a sortal (e.g., 'that man' rather than simply 'that').

McGinn

says that the rule according to which the referent of a demonstrative
'that

F' is determined, determines the referent to be the first F which

intersects the line projected from the pointing finger.

I f we try to

generalize this rule to account for 'pure' demonstratives, for example,
the word 'that' in the sentence, "That has been watching us all night,"
McGinn's spatio-temporal account will not work.

We should have to say

something like, "The referent of 'that' is the first thing (or individual) to intersect the line projected from the pointing finger."

But the

first thing to intersect that line might be a speck of dust, a molecule
of oxygen or a mosquito too far away to be seen.

In most cases, how-

ever, such things would not be the referent of 'that'.

In addition, the

'thing' which first intersects the line could be described as many different 'things ' .

The thing in question could be a complete object, a

part of an object,

a property of an object, an activity, etc.

The

pointing itself is too indeterminate to be able to disambiguate refer-

9

A satisfaction theorist might say that he intends to refer· to the
car at which he is now pointing. This would be enough to fix the reference.
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ence.

But certainly we can and do refer to individuals with pure demon-

stratives like 'this' and 'that'.
McGinn might want to argue that a sortal is always implicit in
demonstrative reference.

When the sorta! is not explicitly stated, as

in the sentence, "That has been watching us all night" either we have to
say that the referent is ambiguous and so the sentence has no determinate truth value or we will have to find some principle according to
which the sortal is supplied.

Since in the case of the antelope-looking

rock it seems that there is a referent for the word 'that', we should
not accept the first alternative.
determining which sortal is

That means we must find some way of

to be supplied.

Spatio-temporal

factors

will be of little help here.
Another reason for

rejecting McGinn' s

account of demonstrative

reference is that it limits demonstrative reference to things which can
be pointed at.

But we are able to refer to things with a demonstrative

of the form 'that F'

even when the thing cannot be pointed to.

example, on hearing a

1

°

For

clap of thunder, one can say "That noise was

loud," even though one could not point to the noise.
Perhaps

McGinn's

contextual

theory is that it falls prey to the problem of fortuitous

'satisfac-

tion'.

the

most

serious

short-coming

of

Suppose our speaker had seen an antelope-looking rock and said,

"That antelope has been watching us all night 11 while pointing to the
rock.

As he points, an antelope is grazing several miles away but on a

line with the pointing.

10

On McGinn' s

account,

the

referent of

'that

Howard Wettstein makes this point in "How to Bridge the Gap
between Meaning and Reference, 11 Synthese, 58 (1984), pp. 63-84. See p.
77 for a discussion of McGinn.
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antelope' will be the first antelope to intersect the line projected by
the pointing finger; in this case, the antelope that is several miles
away.

But surely, 'that antelope' does not refer to some antelope that

the speaker has neither seen nor heard, which is and has been completely
out of view.
refers

It is clear that,

in this case,

'that antelope'

either

to nothing at all because the speaker has mis-spoken, or it

refers to the rock the speaker is pointing to.

It does not refer to

the antelope that just happened to be the first one to intersect the
line projected by the pointing finger.
Another version of a contextual theory of reference for indexicals
and demonstratives can be found in Howard Wettstein' s paper,

"How to

Bridge the Gap Between Meaning and Reference." 11 On Wettstein' s view,
there

are

contextual

cues

which

the

speaker

exploits

to

make

his

intended reference available to his audience.

Such cues include point-

ing to something and looking directly at it.

One can also narrow down

the field of possible referents of an expression by taking advantage of
the fact that one individual is the only one in view (e.g., one relies
on the fact that there is only one table in the room when one says, "The
table is too crowded, 11 ) .

Or one can take advantage of the fact that

some individual is prominent.

The cues that the speaker exploits (or to

all appearances exploits) not only help the audience to figure out what
the speaker

11

intends to refer to,

they actually determine reference.

Ibid.
This is the most complete and recent exposition of Wettstein' s contextual theory. For earlier discussions along a similar line
see Wettstein' s "The Semantic Significance of the Referential-Attributive Distinction," Philosophical Studies, 44 (1983), pp. 187-1% and
"Demonstrative Reference and Definite Descriptions," Philosophical Stud~' 40 (1981), pp. 241-257.
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Wettstein characterizes the cues which determine reference as follows.
One who utters a demonstrative is responsible, from the point of
view of the natural language institution, for making his intended
reference available to his addressee, and so he is responsible for
the cues that a competent and attentive addressee would take him to
be exploiting. The cues for which he is responsible, those that he,
to all appearances, exploits, are the cues that determine the reference. 12
There is much that is right in Wettstein's paper.

In particular,

it seems right to look at non-linguistic (but conventional or at least
institutionally

recognized)

cues

as

determinants

of

reference,

not

merely as clues which help the audience identify the object which is the
referent.
The intentionalist's alternative to seeing pointing, for example,
as a co-determinant of reference,

is to say that pointing merely pro-

vides a clue to the audience about which object is the referent.

The

referent was determined by the speaker's intentions to refer to that
object, or by her having that object in mind.
tionalist account is wrong,

To show that the inten-

we need to find cases in which the speaker

has one object in mind (and intends to refer to it) but actually refers
to something else--namely, the thing pointed to.
vided examples of cases like this.

David Kaplan has pro-

13

Suppose that without turning and looking I point to a place on my
wall which has long been occupied by a picture of Rudolph Carnap and
I say:
Dthat (I point as above] is a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century.

12
13

"How to Bridge the Gap Between Meaning and Reference," p. 73.

"Dthat," in Peter French, T. Uehling and H. Wettstein (eds.}, Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language (Minneapolis: The
University of Minnesota Press, 1979), pp 383-400.
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But unbeknownst to me, someone has replaced my picture of Carnap
with one of Spiro Agnew .... I have said of a picture of Spiro Agnew
that it pictures one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth
century. And my speech and demonstration suggest no other natural
interpretation to ·the linguistically competent public observer. 14
What we see in these cases is that pointing at some
F'

together can override the speaker's

~

intentions.

,

and saying,

I

that

Even though the

speaker intended to refer to Rudolph Carnap's picture, the actual referent was not the picture of Rudolph Carnap, it was the picture Kaplan
pointed to.

From cases of this kind, we should conclude that pointing

at F and saying 'that

F' do together determine reference.

Pointing at an F that is in view and saying, 'that
to determine a unique referent at least sometimes.

15

F' does appear

The pointing is not

merely a cue for the audience; it is actually a determinant of reference
which can override the speaker's intentions.
only cue that operates this way.

And pointing is not the

We can determine a unique referent

using other gestures in conjunction with ambiguous referring· devices.
For example, if I pick up a book and wave it in the air while saying,
"This book is a classic of Western civilization," my waving the book
co-determines a unique referent for

'this book'.

Had I picked up the

wrong book, my intention to refer to a certain book would be thwarted.
For example, I may have inadvertently picked up a volume of Copleston's
~

History of Philosophy.

that volume.

14
15

If I did,

then I inadvertently referred to

To this extent, Wettstein is correct in saying that "ref-

Ibid., p. 396.

It is not clear what kind of reference rule governs pointing. We
have already seen that a purely spatio-temporal one like McGinn's will
not work. Usually, we can point at something only if it (or some part
of it) is visible (over a period of time).
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erence is determined by the very features which make reference available
to the auditor." 16
Wettstein does not want to count every cue that helps the audience
identify the referent as

a determinant of reference.

semantically significant cues,

He limits the

the ones that count as determinants of

reference, to those which the speaker is responsible for.

According to

Wettstein, the cues the speaker is responsible for are those which the
addressee would take her to be exploiting.
Although I

agree with Wettstein

that

there are non-linguistic

determinants of reference and that these devices also serve as cues for
the addressee, I do not accept Wettstein's way of characterizing these
semantically significant cues.

17

Consequently, some of the cues which he

accepts as semantically significant I would not accept.
Wettstein says that the determinants of reference are those cues
which a competent and attentive addressee would take the speaker to be
exploiting, rather than those which the speaker actually does exploit or
intends to exploit.

The reason for holding a speaker responsible for

cues which an addressee would take her to be exploiting is not entirely
clear.

Wettstein introduces this stipulation after considering the case

cited above,

18

in which the speaker "walks up to Smith, stares straight

at him, extends his finger right in Smith's face, and says, 'That is a
self-destructive man' . "

16

What Wettstein notices in this case is that if

.QE. Cit., p. 64.

17

Note that semantically significant cues are those cues which actually determine (or co-determine) reference.
18

See pp. 40f.
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the speaker does all these things, then he refers to Smith, even if he
did not do these things in order to make his intended reference available to the audience. · In fact, in this case his intended reference was
not Smith at all.
to Smith.

Nonetheless, if one does all these things, one refers

That is the basic intuition.

But the intuition alone does

not count for much unless we can explain why this is the case.

Wett-

stein explains it in terms of what the speaker can be held responsible
for doing.

The speaker, whether he wanted to use these cues or not, did

use them and is thus responsible for using them.

In much the same way,

a speaker is responsible for saying something, or rather, producing certain sounds which constitute a sentence in the language of his addres~
see.

What the speaker says, strictly speaking, is a matter of what the

sentence he produced says.

It does not matter, "from the point of view

of the natural language institution," 19 whether he,meant them or not, or
whether he intended to say what he said.

We could try to explain the

fact that the speaker said what his sentence said in terms of the cues
an attentive

and

competent

addressee would

take the

speaker to

be

exploiting, just as Wettstein explains the fact that the speaker referred to Smith even though he did not mean to, by looking at what cues the
addressee would take the speaker to be exploiting.
that is unsatisfactory.

But to leave it at

The important question is: Why would the compe-

tent and attentive addressee take the speaker to be exploiting certain
cues?

I propose that the answer is that certain cues are conventional

means for referring.

19

They are part of the natural language institution

This is Wettstein' s phrase.
take when talking about reference.

This is a useful point of view to
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just as words and phrases are.

This means that anyone who uses these

devices is responsible for their 'effects', whether he intended them to
have these effects or.not, whether he intended them to be devices or
not.

Because the addressee (and the linguistic community as a whole)

can be reasonably expected to recognize these conventional means for
saying something or for referring, it will (or would) take the speaker
to be exploiting these cues.
We can formulate the distinction between semantically significant
cues

and cues which merely help the audience identify the referent

(without actually determining the referent)
devices.

in terms of conventional

If we do, there is no need to appeal to an audience to find

out which cues a speaker is responsible for.
competent and attentive addressee as

We may use the notion of a

a heuristic device to help us

determine which cues are conventional devices and which are not, but the
emphasis should be placed on the fact that there are publicly recognized, conventional means for determining reference.

These non-linguis-

tic devices are on a par with linguistic devices.

If one uses these

devices, either deliberately or inadvertently, then a referent is determined.
Not all cues that an audience relies on to identify the referent
of some expression are semantically significant.
that

a speaker exploits

(or appears

Further, not all cues

to exploit)

intended reference are semantically significant.

to communicate his
Some features of a

context of utterance may help us to communicate reference and to identify an intended referent,

and yet they may fail tci be conventional

means for determining reference.
What

kinds

of cues

should we count

as

conventional means

for
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determining reference?
mining reference

I propose that a conventional means for deter-

is one which, whenever used,

Pointing seems to be· a conventional means

said.

for determining reference,

since whenever one points to .an F and says 'that
F that was pointed to.

affects what is

£:' ,

one refers to the

Other gestures typically used in conjunction

with demonstratives (or quasi-demonstratives), such as waving an object,
picking it up and thrusting it into the air, etc., also affect what is
said, regardless of the speaker's intentions.
Earlier we mentioned other features of a context that a speaker
might take advantage of to communicate her intended referent.

For exam-

ple, we said that one may take advantage of the fact that there is only
one table in the room in order to communicate to one's audience the referent of 'the table' in the sentence 'The table has a wobbly leg'.

One

may also take advantage of the fact that one object is prominent to communicate one's intended reference.

These cues, however, do not seem to

be conventional devices for determining a referent.
important, sometimes they are not.

Sometimes they are

It is not the case that whenever

they are (or seem to be) used they affect what is said.
Suppose someone walks into a room which has one very large table
(a conference room or seminar room) and says, "The table has a wobbly
leg."

The addressee's first guess might be that the table in question

is the one in the room.

He might examine it to see if it wobbles, and

finding that it is quite stable, say "It doesn't seem to have a wobbly
leg."

The speaker could reply, "Oh, not that table.

other room where I was just working."

The table in the

In this discourse, the audience

could not respond that the speaker had actually said that the table in
this room had a.wobbly leg (as he could if the speaker had pointed to
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the table in this room).

Nor could he accuse the speaker of mis-using

generally recognized means for communicating reference.

The fact that

there is only one table in the room where the speaker says 'the table'
is only sometimes useful in communicating an intended referent.
cue, not a determinant of reference.

It is a

We do not, as a matter of fact,

hold a speaker responsible for exploiting such a feature of the context
of utterance, as we do hold her responsbible for saying certain words or
making certain gestures.
Similarly, we do not hold a speaker responsible for exploiting the
fact that one

K is

prominent when she says, 'the

F' or 'that

F'.

For

example, suppose the following conversation takes place in front of a
pig-pen containing several pigs.
S:

The pig over in that corner [points to a corner] is mine.

A: [Looks in the corner. There are three pigs, but one of them is
prominent.
It is black and big while the others are pink and
small; it is standing on its snout while the other two are lying
down.] It sure is a clever one.
S:
No, not that one. The little one lying over there with the
black markings on its snout.
The audience would not be justified in saying, "Well, that is not the
one you were talking about.

Strictly speaking, you said that the big,

black pig was yours, because it was the one which was prominent."

Com-

pare this conversation to a similar one in which the speaker said the
same thing, but had clearly pointed to the big, black pig.

In such a

case the addressee would be justified if he scolded the speaker for
pointing to the wrong pig and thus for mis-using the conventions of English.
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Features of the context such as the fact that there is only one
table in a room or that one pig stands out are cues that a speaker may
exploit on some occasions to communicate his

intended reference,

and

they can be used by an addressee to identify the intended referent, but
these features of the context do not have the 'force of law' characteristic of conventional devices.

The natural language institution does

not incorporate such features into its structure, and probably for good
reason.

It is unlikely that features of the context of utterance over

which the speaker has little or no control will be recognized by the
linguistic community as a whole as cues that determine what one says.
The reason for this may be a function of our notion of responsibility.
At least in English, the conventional devices which a speaker is held
responsible for exploiting are those which she can deliberately produce,
such as sounds and gestures.

We do not hold the speaker to a statement

which the speaker would have made had the reference rule incorporated
contextual features such as the fact that only one I was in sight when
the speaker said 'the

F'.

Of course, this line of argument is inconclusive.

We do have suf-

ficient control over our sound production to be held responsible for
producing certain sounds in certain contexts.

For example, I would be

held responsible for yelling "Fire!" where there was no fire.

Thus, we

could be held responsible for exploiting certain features of the context
of utterance in order to communicate our intended referent even though
we have no control over those features.

However, as a matter of fact,

we are not generally held responsible for such cues.
To show that such features of the context of utterance are not
part of the English-language institution, let us imagine a language in
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which these contextual features do determine reference.
guage, there is a reference rule of the form:
is

~'

if x is an F and x is the only

In this lan-

The referent of 'the

I in sight or prominent.

F'

If the

speakers of this language want to observe the conventions of their language,

they will have

to check

expressions with the form,

'the

their surroundings
F' .

before they

To use these expressions

use
car-

rectly, they have to determine, before they speak, whether there is only
one object or one prominent object of the kind they wish to refer to.
If there is, and if that object is not the one they wish to refer to,
they will

have to

intended referent.

find some

other expression

to communicate

their

If English were a language in which this reference

rule was incorporated, we would expect that conscientious speakers would
pay this kind of attention to the circumstances in which they speak.
But they do not.

English does not require that a speaker look to see

whether there is only one table in view or one prominent pig before she
uses the expression 'the table' or 'the pig'. These types of cues cannot
be counted as semantically significant.
The features of a context which we will count as determinants of
reference are those which can be incorporated into reference rules for
the language which hold under normal circumstances. 2 0 So far we have
accepted gestures accompanying demonstrative expressions as determinants
of reference.

Wettstein also suggests that grammatical considerations

should be taken into account. 2 1 For example, if someone says, "That is

20

These reference rules could be overruled in special circumstances,
for example in fictional contexts.
21

QE. Cit., p. 75.
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the author of an important paper on decision theory," the predicate
narrows the range of possible referents of 'that'.

Not just any indi-

vidual can, according to the rules of English, be the referent.
color green, for example, cannot be.
object.

22

The

The referent must at least be an

Similarly, the referent of 'that' in the sentence, 'The cat is

on that', cannot be any individual whatever.
something can be said to be on.

It must be an object that

We could say that the sentence in which

a referring expression occurs is a feature of the context of utterance
which helps

to determine reference because it narrows

the range of

potential referents.
The referent of some referring expressions can also depend on reference links

(or anaphoric chains. 2 3 For example, the referent of the

pronoun 'he'

in the following conversation is determined by its link

with the name, 'Garry Trudeau'.
S:
Garry Trudeau gave the most accurate protrayal of the
present state of higher education that I've seen all year.
A: Oh, I saw that. Yes, he certainly seems to have captured
what's going on in my classes.
The referent of this use of 'he' depends on its connection with the preceding sentence.

The context in which 'he' was used plays a part in

determining reference.

22

It could be argued that the referent must also be an agent, or
even a person, but that seems too strong. A speaker may have bizarre
beliefs and predicate something false of some object. English grammar
does not protect us from this kind of mistake.
23

For a more complete discussion of anaphora and anaphoric chains,
see Charles Chastain' s, "Reference and Context," in Keith Gunderson
(ed.), Language, Mind, and Knowledge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975), pp. 194-269.
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Of course, features of the context of utterance also play a role
· ·
th e re f erence o f pure in
· d ex1ca
· 1 s.
in d eterm1n1ng

The referent of 'I ' ,

for example, is normally determined by who uses it, 24 the context also
determines

the referent of

'here' ,

Since the

importance of the context

'there',

I

now I ,

'tomorrow' ,

etc.

for determining the referent of

these indexicals is almost universally recognized, there is no need for
us to say more about them here.
In the preceding discussion we argued that certain features of the
context of utterance should not be considered semantically significant.
We argued that the fact that someone addresses a statement to a particular audience does not determine the reference of a proper name.

We also

rejected contextual cues such as the fact that there is only one table
in the immediate surroundings when one says 'the table'.

We argued that

these cues do often guide the audience's interpretation of what is said,
but that they do not determine reference in the way that, for example,
certain gestures used in conjunction with a demonstrative do.
If we restrict contextual cues that determine reference to those
which are incorporated into the rules of language,

then we will find

that after we have taken all these cues into consideration, there are
still a number of sentences in which the referring expression remains
ambiguous.
The point of looking at contextual theories of reference was to
see whether they could serve as alternatives to the more problematic
intentionalist theories of reference disambiguation.

24

We have seen that

This reference rule does not hold when 'I' is used in direct quotation or in fictional contexts.
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some

features

of

the

context

(e.g.,

pointing

and

other

actually do determine, or at least co-determine, reference.
one says 'that
the

!'

while pointing to an

gestures),
When some-

f, the referent of 'that

F' is

f she pointed to. 25 By taking into consideration these conventional,

but non-linguistic devices for referring, we can explain how reference
is disambiguated in some cases.

But there are many remaining cases

where these cues, together with a referring expression, are not sufficient to determine a unique referent.
It seems that there are two likely responses the contextual theerist can give here.

He can either supplement the contextual theory with

an intentionalist one or he can argue that many times when there appears
to be a determinate reference, the reference is actually ambiguous.
David Kaplan clearly opts for the first
where the gesture and saying 'that'

alternative.

In cases

(or in Kaplan's special language,

saying 'dthat') is not sufficient to determine which object is the referent, the referent is determined by the speaker's intentions.

25

Thus, he

We have not considered cases in which the speaker says, 'that F'
but points to something which is not F. For example, when she says,
"that antelope" but points to a rock.
The initial response is to say
she refers to the thing she is pointing to. But this will not do. For
one thing, there is the problem of the indeterminancy of ostension. Any
time one points, there are numerous things that could be the referent of
the pointing.
We might resolve this ambiguity by placing a further
restriction on the pointing.
For example, we could propose that the
referent is the ~ which is pointed at and which belongs to the same general category as F. In the antelope case, the general category might be
'large, physical ~bject'. Thus in this case, the rock would be the referent.
But there is a further problem.
If the truth value of the
statement, 'That antelope has been there all night' depends on whether
the predicate is true of the referent, then the statement 'That antelope
has been there all night' will be true if and only if the rock has been
there all night. That seems to be wrong.
(Here we might want to distinguish what the speaker meant (or intended to refer to) from what her
sentence said.
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writes,
When I point at my son (and say 'I love dthat'), I may also be
pointing at a book he is holding, his jacket, a button on his
jacket, his skin,- his heart, and his dog standing behind him--from
the surveyor's point of view. NY point is that if I intended to
point at my son and it is true that I fove him, then what I said is
true. 26
Wettstein opts for the other alternative.

He argues that when the

available cues are not sufficient to determine a unique referent, the
referent is simply ambiguous.
If the speaker fails to make his reference available, his speech act
is defective, and not even the best intentions can repair the
defect. The speaker, strictly speaking, has not asserted anything
determinate, i.e., anything at all. 27
Earlier we saw that Lance had the same kind of response.

For him, also,

the speaker's intentions carried no semantical weight if they were not
communicated to the rest of the

linguistic community.

And when the

audience could not tell which David, for example, was in question when I
said, "David is in California this week-end," the statement containing
that name had no determinate truth value.
The

problem with contextual

theories

that do

not

incorporate

speakers' intentions into their account of disambiguation is that they
leave too many uses of referring expressions ambiguous,
sentences stating nothing determinate.

and too many

Surely, Kaplan states something

determinate when he points to his son and says, "I love dthat."

And it

seems just as clear that the person who points to a rock and says, "That
has been watching us all night" also says something determinate (and
false).

The same thing can be said of the statement "David is in Cali-

26

~·

0

cit., p. 396.

27

~·

0

cit., p. 75.
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fornia this weekend."

In all of these cases it at least seems as though

one particular thing is the referent.
Although contextual factors play a role in determining reference,
they do not, by themselves, account for all those cases in which reference seems to have been made to a particular object by means of ambiguous referring devices.

This fact suggests that contextual theories are

not adequate theories of disambiguation.

We should incorporate contex-

tual cues into our theory of disambiguation, but the theory requires
something more.
We would reject
then,

a non-intentionalist theory of disambiguation,

because such a theory cannot account

determinate

reference

expression and other,

seems

to

be made,

contextual,

determine a unique referent.

for many cases in which

even

determinants

though

the

referring

of reference fail

to

We find such a case when Kaplan points to

his son and says "I love that."

The word 'that' can, according to the

rules of English, be used to refer to any individual.

The possible ref-

erents of 'that' in the sentence, 'I love that', are objects, properties
of objects, actions, etc. 28 In addition, the possible referents of the
pointing gesture

are also

numerous.

We

can also

suppose that

the

expression is not referentially linked to some other referring expression in the preceding discourse.

The non-intentionalist theorist, find-

ing no way of explaining how a unique referent is determined in this
case, has

to deny that this

use of

'that'

refers

to any particular

The English sentence-form: 'I love ~' takes a wide variety of
objects.
All of the following are well-formed English sentenc.es:
'I
love Justin,' 'I love green', 'I love the way she stands,' 'I love ski•
I
1ng , etc.
28
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object.

According to him, it is irreparably ambiguous.

Al though the pure contextual theorists' conclusion flies in the
face of our intuitions· about this sentence, their position is not untenable.

The best defense for their refusing to acknowledge what seems

obvious,

for

example,

that

the

word

'that'

did

refer

to

someone,

requires making a clear distinction between what the speaker said and
what his sentence said.

Thus, a pure contextual theorist can say that

in the sentence we were considering, the speaker may have said that he
loves his son, even though the sentence he used did not.

The fact that

we would take the speaker to have said that he loves his son if we know
that he intended to refer to his son, does not mean that the sentence he
used says this.

If we are interested in understanding what the speaker

wants to say, as we generally are in everyday conversation, then we will
look to his intentions to find out what he meant.

This accounts for our

intuition that Kaplan did say something determinate when he said, while
pointing to his son,

"I love that."

But if we are interested in what

the referents of its referring expressions are, then we will find that
the sentence lacks a determinate truth-value because one of its referring expressions is ambiguous.
Clearly, there is sometimes a difference between what a speaker
means and what the sentence he uses to say it says.

This distinction is

especially important when the speaker mis-uses the conventions of the
language, either through sloppiness or because of mistaken beliefs.

For

example, if someone mistakenly believes that the person sitting in front
of her murdered Smith (and the person to whom she is talking knows that
the speaker believes this) then when the speaker says, "Smith's murderer
is insane," we might want to distinguish what the speaker meant from
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what the sentence said.

If it is true that the person sitting in front

of the speaker is insane, but false that Smith's murderer is insane, we
can account for our intuition that the speaker

'said'

something true

even though the sentence she uttered seems to be false, by making this
distinction.

When a speaker mis-uses the conventions of the language,

this is the best way to account

for conflicting intuitions about what

was said.
It

is

not quite so clear

that this distinction between what a

speaker says and what her sentence says should be made when the conventions of the language are observed,

as they are,

for example, in the

sentence "I love that" where the speaker points to his son (among other
things).

The motivation for making this distinction is not the same in

these cases.

In the former case (Smith's murderer), we needed to dis-

tinguish between what the speaker said and what her sentence said in
order to account for conflicting intuitions about the truth value of the
sentence/utterance.
about cases
that."

But we

like "the

do

not

have

such

one in which someone

conflicting

points and

intuitions

says,

"I

love

Suppose Kaplan's son is holding a book which Kaplan believes is

one he loves (it has the same cover and is approximately the same size),
but the book is,

in fact, one that he dislikes.

Kaplan points to the

book (and his son, and his son's jacket, etc.) and says, "I love that."
If we know that Kaplan intended to refer to the book,
that the sentence is
the

speaker

insane."

But

intuition to

said

false.

something

in this

case,

we want to say

This corresponds with our intuition that
true

when

there does

the effect that the

she

said

"Smith's

murderer

is

not seem to be a conflicting

sentence is not

false.

Here there

seems to be no reason to distinguish what the speaker said from what his
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sentence said other than an unwillingness to accept intentions as determinants of reference.

Without some further reason for rejecting inten-

tions as determinants< of reference, we should not accept a purely contextual theory of reference disambiguation.

CHAPTER V

THE CAUSAL THEORY OF NAMES

In the preceding chapters we rejected both satisfaction theories
and contextual theories of disambiguation.

Satisfaction theories were

problematic because they required the speaker to have a uniquely denoting description or representation in mind in order for a singular referring expression to refer to a particular individual.
tantly,

satisfaction theories

fortuitous

satisfaction.

Even more imper-

are open to counter-examples

Contextual theories were

involving

also problematic.

Although we accepted the contextual theorist's claim that certain features of a context of utterance are important non-linguistic determinants of reference, we did not accept the claim that these determinants
plus linguistic conventions governing reference potential were the
factors relevant to disambiguating reference.

o~ly

We argued that when these

factors are insufficiently determinate to determine a unique reference,
other

factors

play a

role.

We

suggested that

these other

factors

involve some kind of causal relation between the speaker and the referent.

1

1

It should be noted that our case against contextual theories is
provisional in the sense that it rests on intuitions about cases which
need not be shared and are certainly not decisive.
(For example, it
seems as though Kaplan refers to a determinate thing when we says, "I
love that." If he is thinking of his son, then "thc;t" refers to his
son.) Insofar as we want to accommodate these intuitions we need to go
beyond a contextual theory. In this chapter I will suggest how we might
114
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In this chapter I will develop an alternative account of disambiguation along the lines of a causal theory of reference.

This account

avoids the problems of satisfaction theories (especially that of fortuitous satisfaction) while accounting for the determinancy of reference
when conventional linguistic and non-linguistic (that is, contextual)
referring devices leave the reference indeterminate.
To develop this account I will first outline the basic tenets of
causal theories of reference, by concentrating on the causal theory of
names. 2 The reason for looking at causal theories of names first is that
the causal theory of reference was first developed as a theory of names,
at least with respect to singular reference.

The early formulations of

the theory set the stage for the development of causal accounts of other
types of referring devices.

By looking at these early causal theories,

we can find the motivations for, and basic insights of, causal theories
of reference in general.
One of the important features of causal theories is their recognition of reference chains or parasitic reference; another is the idea
that primary reference is

typically grounded in the referent.

Once

these ideas have been introduced in the context of the causal theory of
names, we will be in a position to expand the causal account to cover
disambiguation of other referring devices.
It should be noted that in the discussion of the causal theory of

do this. However, it will become clear through this discussion that it
makes no difference whether we accept a contextual or causal theory of
disambiguation for the larger issue of explaining how reference potential is determined.
2

This emphasis on names is not due to the belief that names are a
fundamental or basic device for singular reference.
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names, I presuppose a causal theory of how the reference potential of
names is determined.

I do so in order to illustrate the main features

of causal theories of· reference, features which characterize not only
the causal theory of names but also causal theories of disambiguation
for other types of referring devices.

One could hold a satisfaction

account of the reference potential of names and a causal account of
disambiguation.

3

Recall that the overall goal of this dissertation is to show the
proper role of speaker's
developing

an

acceptable

intentions in the theory of reference.
theory

of

reference

disambiguation

By

which

acknowledges speaker's intentions, we will see how and to what extent
the speaker's intentions are important for disambiguating reference and
thus provide one part of the answer to our major question: what is the
proper role of a speaker's intentions to refer in a theory of reference?
Our results in the next two chapters will have important implications
for the part of the theory of reference which accounts for reference
potential.
In this chapter I will develop the framework for a causal theory
of names.
Krip k e I s
0

The account I present here will be based primarily on Saul
II

'
II o f
•
picture
names, 4 b ut it wi 11 tak e into
account ob'Jections
0

0

0

to the causal theory that have been raised since the theory was first
proposed.

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to develop a complete

3

David Kaplan proposes such a theory in "Quantifying In," Svnthese,
19 (1968-1969), pp. 178-214; see especially p. 200.
4

See "Naming and Necessity," in G. Harmon and D. Davidson (eds.),
Semantics of Natural Languages, (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1972), pp. 2-53-355,
especially pp. 298-303. Kripke never developed a full-fledged theory of
names. He called his account a "picture" of how names work.
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theory of the reference of proper names.

What I hope to show is that

some version of the causal theory is a genuine alternative to satisfac·tion theories, and that it is the most plausible account of the reference of proper names that we have, even though the details have not yet
been completely worked out.
The insight causal theories of names have tried to develop is that
the reference of a proper name depends on the existence of linguistic
practices within a community rather than on the individual name-user's
beliefs about the referent.

Kripke expresses the basic idea as follows:

In general our reference depends not just on what we think ourselves, but on other people in the community, the history of how the
name reached. one, and things like that. 5
Keith Donnellan makes basically the same point, with a special emphasis
on the history of the name-using practice.
Suppose someone says, "Socrates was snub-nosed," and we ask to whom
he is referring. The central idea is that this calls for a historical explanation; we search not for an individual who might best fit
the speaker's description of the individual to whom he takes himself
to be referring ... , but rather for an individual historically
related to his use of the name "Socrates" on this occasion. 6
If we view the reference of proper names within

the framework of

name-using practices within a community the question, "how is the reference of a proper name determined?" can be broken down into two questions:

(1) How are the name-using practices within a community estab-

lished and preserved? and (2) Under what conditions is an individual

5

6

"Naming and Necessity," p. 301.

"Speaking of Nothing," The Philosophical Review, Vol. 83 (1974),
pp. 3-32. Reprinted in Stephen P. Schwartz (ed.), Naming, Necessity and
Natural Kinds, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 216-244.
See especially pp. 229f.
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name user participating in a certain name-using practice? 7 The first
question is a question about the reference potential of names; the second concerns

the disambiguation of

theory, a name

~.

names.

8

According to

the caus;:i.l

can be used to refer to an object o if there is a

practice of using that name to refer to o it can also be used to refer
to

b if there is a practice of using that name to refer to

~.

etc.

9

What a name can be used to refer to (in a given language) is determined,
then, by what practices are in effect in the linguistic community.

1

° For

example, the name 'Kelly Mink' can be used to refer to each of the 14
Kelly Minks in the U.S. because there are at least 14 distinct practices
involving that name in the American English-speaking community.
biguation of reference,

according to causal

theories is

11

Disam-

a matter of

7

A name-using practice is, basically, a practice of using a name to
refer to a certain individual. This may be one person's practice (e.g.,
a person's using the name 'St. Martin' to refer to Heidegger), or it may
be the practice of many people within a linguistic community (e.g., the
practice of referring to Handel with the name 'Handel').
8

The notion of a name-using practice only provides an explanatory
framework for a theory of reference for names; it is not part of the
actual account of how the reference of names is determined. An acceptable theory of names cannot explain the reference of names simply by saying there are name-using practices (or ways of using a name) within a
community, and people participate in these practices. This would not be
an explanation. It would however, permit us to see what needs to be
explained. To account for the reference of names we shall have to say
how name-using practices are established and what constitutes participation in such a practice. Once these questions have been answered, there
would no longer be any reason to incorporate talk about name-using practices into the theory.
9

We will leave the question of how practices are established and
preserved open for now.
10

It should be noted that new name-using practices are established
all the time. The reference potential of names is fluid.
11

There are probably others which involve people who are dead and
there will no doubt be additional Kelly Minks in the future.
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which practice the name, as it is used, is connected with.

For example,

the referent of 'Kelly Mink' in my statement "Kelly Mink is in charge of
the coffee today," is determined by which 'Kelly Mink' -using practice I
am participating in.

If my use is connected with the practice of refer-

ring to Kelly Mink-1, then I am referring to Kelly Mink-1, if it is connected with the practice of referring to Kelly Mink-2, then I am referring to Kelly Mink-2, etc.
Saying that

the

determination

depends on name-using practices

of

reference

for

proper

names

and participation in these practices

gives us the basic framework for a causal theory of names, but it does
not, of course, explain how reference is determined.

12

Within this gen-

eral framework there are many ways of explaining how reference is determined,

including the account given by satisfaction theorists.

To see

what is unique about causal theories, we should look at how such theories analyze name-using practices and participation in these practices.
Causal theories make two basic claims:

(1) A name-using practice

is established by a name-bestowing act which typically involves

the

object named, and (2) participation in a name-using practice involves an
appropriate causal (or historical) connection between a particular use
of a name and the name-bestowing act.

This connection can be direct, as

it would be for someone who was present at the name-bestowing "ceremony," or it can be indirect, linked to the original name-bestowing act
through its

connection with other uses which are thus

linked.

So,

according to the causal theory, the reference of a proper name is determined by (1)

12

what object(s)

See note 8 above.

that name has been given to

(reference
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potential), and (2) which name-bestowing act the use of the name is connected with (disambiguation).

13

To illustrate the difference between causal theories of names and
satisfaction theories, let us consider how a satisfaction theory might
answer our two questions: (1) How are name-using practices established
and preserved? and (2) Under what conditions is a person participating
in a certain name-using practice when she uses a name?

Satisfaction

theories would hold that there is a name-using practice in a community
if and only if there is a representation

(or set of representations)

which members of the community who use the name associate with the name,
and there is one individual who satisfies these representations (or dominantly satisfies them).

14

Presumably, a practice would be established

by setting up the association between the representations of the referent and the name, and it would be preserved if the representations associated with the name remained fairly stable or at least continued to be
satisfied by the same object.

A person would participate in a name-us-

ing practice if she associated with the name the same representations as
did the community (or a subset thereof which is satisfied by the same
object).

Some satisfaction theorists,

John Searle,

for example P .F. Strawson and

would include another condition for participating in a

practice, one which takes account of parasitic or derived reference.

15

13

This answer is still very general. We have yet to say, for example, under what conditions a name is given to a particular object, i.e.,
what constitutes a name-bestowing act. This would be a basic condition
for the name's referring to an object.
14

I have attempted to make this characterization general enough to
admit different interpretation of the conditions, and still do justice
to actual satisfaction accounts.
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According to them,
practice

a speaker would also participate in a name-using

if she associated with the name an identifying description

which makes reference to another person's use of that name and that person participates in the practice (in either of these two ways).

16

The

conjunction of these two conditions would give us the necessary and sufficient conditions for participating in a name-using practice.
Compare this account to the causal account.

According to the cau-

sal account, what a speaker (or even a community of speakers) thinks is
not as

important as what actually happened.

couple of things.

And what happened?

One thing that happened was an initial baptism.

object was given a name.

17

A

The

Another thing that happened was that this way

of using the name was passed from person to person within the commmunity.

18

This is how the practice is maintained.

A person participates

in a name-using practice only if her use of the name is causally or historically connected with the name-bestowing act either directly

(one

uses the name as a result of having witnessed the 'baptism'), or indi-

15

See Strawson, Individuals, (London: Methuen, 1959), p. 181n, and
Searle, Speech Acts, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp.
170 f.
16

We could formulate these conditions in terms of having an object
in mind. Remember, according to satisfaction theories, a person has an
object in mind if there is an object which satsisfies her representations.
17

Kripke uses the term 'initial baptism' in "Naming and Necessity,"
cit., p 302. The causal theory has sometimes been criticized on the
grounds that not all uses of names involve an initial baptism; sometimes, for example with nicknames, the name is just used and it sticks.
This criticism is, I think misguided. One should not think of the 'baptism' too literally. There are, of course, many ways that an object can
be given a name. The point is that the object is given that name.

.QE.

18

ted.

We will consider later how a way of using a name can be transmitOne condition is that the name is used. But more is needed.
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rectly (one's use of the name is connected to a use which is connected
with the name-bestowing act through however many other connections it
takes)·
It seems at first glance that these two accounts are quite different.

According to

satisfaction

accounts,

a name-using

practice

is

established by establishing a connection between mental representations
and a name, whereas according to the causal theory, a practice is established by a name-bestowing act.

The satisfaction theory claims that a

practice is maintained in a community if members of that community associate roughly the same group of representations with the name or associate different representations which are satisfied by the same object.
The causal theory maintains that the practice is sustained by members of
the community passing the way of using the name from link to link in a
chain of communication.

The two accounts also differ in how they under-

stand participation in a practice.

Satisfaction theories understand it

in terms of representations the speaker associates with the name: causal
theories understand it in terms of 'historical' or 'causal' connections
between the speaker's use of the name and the name-bestowing act.
Although these accounts seem very different on the face of it,
Searle has argued that Kripke and Donnellan' s versions of the causal
theory--the very ones from which we derived our characterization--are
simply variant forms of descriptivism, and thus a kind of satisfaction
theory.

19

19

We made a similar, but different claim earlier, namely that both
satisfaction and causal theories of disambiguation are intentionalist
theories; that is, they both analyze reference in terms of what speakers
'have in mind. '
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As far as the issue between descriptivism and the causal theory is
concerned there is no difference: Kripke's theory is just a variant
form of descriptivism.
But what about the causal chain? Doesn't
the causal theory_ require an external causal chain that guarantees
successful reference? The external causal chain plays no explanatory role whatever in either Kripke's or Donnellan's account. The
only chain that matters is a transfer of Intentional content from
one use of an expression to the next, in every case reference is
secured in.virtue of descriptive Intentional content in the mind of
the speaker who uses the expression. 20
Searle points out an important similarity between descriptivist
(what we called 'satisfaction') and causal accounts, namely that both
accounts recognize that

reference can be parasitic on other people's

uses of a name. 21 When we discussed the conditions for participating in
a name-using practice earlier we characterized the satisfaction account
in this way:
A person participates in a name-using practice if and only if either
(a) she associates some of the same representations with the name as
the members of her community do (and her representatons are satisfied by the same thing as those of other community members) or (b)
she associates with the name an identifying description which makes
reference to someone else's use of that name and this person participates in the practice.
Clause (b) is the relevant one for our purposes.

It says that one can

participate in a name-using practice (and thus refer to an object by
virtue of participating in that practice) by associating with the name a
description of the form 'the individual called that name by

S'.

Since

what you refer to with the name depends on what S referred to with the
name, your reference is 'parasitic' on the other person's.

20

The causal

Intentionality, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp.

244f.
21

Of course, there is a difference in emphasis. Satisfaction theories see this as just one way of participating in a practice, whereas
for causal theories, unless one was present at the name-giving, it is
the only way of participating in the practice.

•
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theory also defines participation in a practice in terms of parasitic
reference.

According to the causal theory, a person participates in a

practice if and only if her use of a name is derived in an appropriate
way

from a

name-bestowing

act,

usually through

intermediate

links.

According to the causal theory, a speaker's reference is typically parasitic on someone else's use, since for most of the names we use we were
not present when the name was given.
Even though both satisfaction and causal theories of names define
participation in a name-using practice in terms of parasitic reference,
their

accounts

still

seem

quite

different.

Satisfaction

accounts

require that the reference borrower associate a description of the form,
"The individual §.referred to with~", with the name she borrows.
sal accounts make no mention of such a description.

Cau-

However, Searle

argues that at least one account, Kripke' s ;' does involve such descriptions. 22 When Kripke discusses how a name is passed from link to link,
he notices that reference chains can be broken in a certain way.

One

may hear a name and decide to use it for something else. 23 For example,
I may overhear a conversation in which the name 'Herkimer Feingruber' is
used, decide I like the sound of the name, and use it as a name for my
goldfish.

Even if there is a chain of communication linking my use of

the name to the naming of Herkimer Feingruber (the person), my reference
is not parasitic.

I do not refer to the Herkimer Feingruber that the

people from whom I learned the name referred to.

To account for such

cases, Kripke suggested that reference is parasitic only if the receiver

22

Ibid., p. 244.

23

QE. cit., p. 302.
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of the name intends to use it with the same reference as the person from
whom he learned it. 24 Searle interprets this requirement to mean that
at each link·in the chain of communication the speaker must have the
intention, "when I utter 'N' I mean to refer to the same object as
the person from whom I got the name 'N' ." 25
This

looks

very much

like

the descriptivist 's

requirement

that the

speaker associate with N an identifying description such as "the object
to whom the person from whom I heard

'N'

referred."

It looks as though

satisfaction theories and Kripke's causal account analyze participation
in a

name~using

practice by parasitic reference in almost the same way.

Some causal theorists have claimed that their account of parasitic
referen~

differs from that of satisfaction theorists because the latter

requires that the borrower keep track of her borrowing, whereas the causal theory does not. 26 But Searle has argued that this is not a real
difference either.

There is no reason a speaker cannot associate with

the name 'N' the description "the object called 'N' by the person from
whom I learned the name (whoever it may have been)."
There seem to be two reasons for supposing that satisfaction theeries require a reference borrower to keep track of her borrowing.

One

of these reasons is that according to satisfaction theories, reference
succeeds only if the description associated with the name is satisfied
by only one individual (otherwise the reference will be indeterminate).

24

Ibid., p. 302.

25

.QE.

26

Cit., p. 244.

Kripke makes this claim about Strawson's account of parasitic reference in "Naming and Necessity," p. 299. Devitt makes the more general
claim in "Singular Terms," The Journal of Philosophy 71 (1974), pp.
183-205; see especially p. 203.
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In other words, the description must be an identifying description.

For

a description which makes reference to someone else's reference to serve
as an identifying des.cription,

it must be sufficiently detailed to be

satisfied by only one ·object.

Very general descriptions will usually

not satisfy th.is requirement.

For example, the description, "the man

called 'Jones'," or "the man called 'Jones' by members of this community," is not uniquely satisfied, for there are many men called 'Jones'.
The description must be more specific if it is to link the speaker's use
of the name with a particular Jones. A description which included the
source of one's name use would supply the required identifying content.
This

reason,

however,

is

not

convincing.

Granted

that

the

description must be satisfied by only one individual, there may be a
number of ways of supplying the content even when one has forgotten from
whom she learned the name.

One could supply an identifying description

such as: "the individual called 'N' by the person from whom I learned
the name," or one could specify the place or time when one heard the
name.

Any of these descriptions could be sufficently detailed to iden-

tify a referent as long as there was only one object which satisfied
them.
Kripke hints at a second argument to show that one must, given a
satisfaction account, keep track of reference borrowing.
is directed at Strawson's account of reference borrowing.

This argument
Strawson, in

a footnote, observes that one can include reference to another person's
reference in an

identifying description.

If one's

description is of

this kind, Strawson continues, then "the question whether it is a genuinely identifying description turns on the question, whether the· refer-
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ence it refers to is itself a genuinely identifying reference. 112 7 The
borrowing may go from one person to another to yet another, but it must
eventually end up with. an identifying description, if the descriptions
which included reference to other people's references are to be genuine
identifying descriptions.
Kripke's gloss on Strawson's remarks is as follows:
I may then say, 'Look, by 'Goedel' I shall mean the man Joe thinks
proved the incompleteness of arithmetic'.
Joe may then pass the
thing over to Harry. One has to be very careful that this doesn't
come round in a circle .... If you could be sure yourself of knowing
such a chain, and that everyone else is using the proper conditions
and so is not getting out of it, then maybe you could get back to
the man by referring to such a chain in that way, borrowing the references one by one .... However, al though in general such chains do
exist for a living man, you won't know what the chain is. You won't
be sure what descriptions the other man is using, so the thing won't
get back to the right man at all. 28
The conclusion Kripke draws is that if you cannot keep track of your
reference borrowing through all the links, then "you cannot use this as
your identifying description with any confidence." 29 In other words, you
cannot be sure that your description is satisfied by only one person or
that it is satisfied by the 'right' one.

30

Let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that Kripke is right.
Suppose, that is, that if we do not keep track of reference borrowing,

2 7

Quoted in "Naming and Necessity" from Strawson' s, Individuals, p.

181.
28

Ibid., p. 298.

2

Ibid.

'3

3 0

It is not clear what 'the right man' would mean here.
Kripke
seems to assume that the speaker intends to refer to someone who may or
may not be the one Jones thinks proved the completeness of arithmetic.
But in that case I am not sure his reference would be parasitic. Why
not just associate one's own identifying description with the name?
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we cannot use an identifying description which contains reference to
another's reference with any confidence.

Does it follow then, that sat-

isfaction theories must require that the borrower keep track of his borrowings?

This

would

only

follow

if

satisfaction

theories

were

to

require that for a name to refer to something (or for a use of the name
to refer), the speaker must not only (1) have an identifying description
which she associates with the name, but also (2) she must be sure (or
know) that the description is an identifying description, and perhaps,
even further

(3)

that she

must know of

whom it

is

an identifying

description.

But there is no reason for a satisfaction theorist

to

accept anything stronger than (1): the speaker must associate an identifying description with the name.

According to the satisfaction theory,

in order to refer with a singular term, there must be one (and only one)
object which satisfies the associated description, but it is not necessary that the speaker be sure that there is only one thing that satisfies the description in order for her to refer.

Neither does she have

to know what satisfies her description.
These two reasons are the most likely justification for the claim
that satisfaction theories
reference borrowing.

require that speakers keep track of their

Neither of them supports .that claim.

I do not

believe we can convincingly argue that the difference between causal
theories and satisfaction theories is that causal theories alone do not
require that the speaker keep track of her reference borrowing.

On

either account, a speaker can refer to someone with a name by relying on
someone else's use of that name, even though the speaker has forgotten
where she got the name from.
There is, . however,

an

important difference between satisfaction
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accounts

which incorporate

reference borrowing

Kripke sums up the difference in this sentence:

and causal

accounts.

"On our view, it is not

how the speaker thinks he got the reference, but the actual chain of
~ommunication, which is relevant." 31 Even with respect to reference bor-

rowing, satisfaction theories are vulnerable to counter-examples which
exploit the speaker's mistaken beliefs.

Suppose, for example, I use the

name 'Tom Jones', knowing nothing about this Tom Jones except that I
heard someone mention him. I am convinced that it was Ralph who had used
the name, so I associate with the name 'Tom Jones' the description "The
person Ralph called 'Tom Jones'." However, it turns out that I am confused.

It was not Ralph who used that name;

it was a friend of his.

Ralph has never used that name in my presence.

According to the satis-

faction account, I would not be referring to anyone, because no one satisfied the description I associated with the name.

According to the

causal theory, I would be referring to the Tom Jones I heard someone
refer to with that name.
We can alter this example slightly to illustrate the problem of
fortuitous satisfaction.

Suppose Ralph had called someone

but I had completely forgotten about that.

'Tom Jones'

My use of the name was based

on remembering an episode totally unrelated to Ralph's use of the name.
According to the satisfaction theory,

I would be referring to the Tom

Jones Ralph talked about, the one I remember nothing about, and not to
the Tom Jones I heard and remembered someone talking about. This seems,
at best, implausible.
According to the causal theory, it does not matter what descrip-

31

Ibid., p. 300.
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tions the speaker associates with the name.
actual chain of communication.
name~

she learned the

What does matter is the

The speaker may be mistaken about whence

her identifying description may be tainted by

these mistaken beliefs, nonetheless she may still borrow her reference
from someone else, namely the person from whom she actually 'borrowed'
the name.

This is the real advantage of the causal account of reference

borrowing.
I want to argue that the requirement that the speaker intend to
use the name to refer to the same thing as the person from whom she
learned the name minimizes this difference.
the same thing with 'N'

as the person from whom one learned 'N' must

take some particular form.
specific,

(e.g.

The intention to refer to

One could, presumably, make this intention

"I intend to refer to the same 'Tom Jones'

as Ralph

did"), or general (e.g., "I intend to refer to the same 'Tom Jones' as
the person from whom I heard 'Tom Jones"').
ries are pretty much alike.
counter-examples.

In that case, the two theo-

Both are subject to the same objections and

If my intentions are specific, then I fail ·to partic-

ipate in the practice (and thus fail to refer to Tom Jones), if they are
general I succeed.
Making participation in a practice depend on the speaker's intentions to refer to the same object as the person from whom one learned
the name referred to minimizes the difference between causal and satisfaction theories.

32

It also goes against the basic insight of causal

theories that it is not just what the speaker thinks that is relevant,

32

There are, of course, further important differences which we will
discuss later.
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but

also

what

has

actually

happened

which

determines

reference.

further, mere intentions to refer with a name to the same thing as the
person from whom one learned the name does not guarantee that one is
participating in that practice. 33 For all these reasons, Kripke's explanation

of

what

constitutes

participation

in

a

practice

should

be

revised.
Kripke proposed that speaker's intentions play a role in the linking of one use of a name to another to take care of cases in which a
person hears a name which refers to one thing (e.g., Herkimer Feingruber, the person) and uses that name to refer to something else (the
goldfish).

Obviously,

this person is not participating in the same

practice as the person from whom she leerned the name.

Nonetheless her

use of the name is derived from (or is causally/historically related to)
that other person's use of the name.

The causal theory claims that a

necessary condition for participating in a name-using practice is that
one's use of the name be 'causally' or 'historically' linked to the use
of that name by someone who is participating in that practice.
that people sometimes

The fact

fulfill this condition but nonetheless are not

participating in the name-using practice shows that this is not a sufficient condition.

Something more is needed.

Kripke suggested that the

additional condition should be that the speaker intends to refer to the
same thing as those from whom her use of the name is derived.

We have

already seen that this condition introduces descriptive elements into
the account of reference.

33

We will now argue that these two conditions

The detailed argument for this claim will follow in the next paragraphs along with suggestions for an alternative account of participating in a practice.
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are not jointly sufficient for participation in a name-using practice.
Having established that the speaker's intentions to conform to the practice are not able to do the job they were supposed to do, I will propose
a different analysis of participation in a practice.
Gareth Evans offered the most convincing argument against Kripke's
account.

34

Evans informs us that the name 'Madagascar' was originally

used to refer to part of the African mainland.

Marco Polo heard this

name from a group of Malay or Arab sailors and used it, presumably with
the intention to refer to the same thing as the sailors from whom he
heard it.

However, Marco Polo believed that these people were using

'Madagascar' to refer to an island off the coast of Africa.

Because of

his mistake, the name has come to refer to an island off the coast of
Africa.
If Kripke' s

account of proper names were correct,

'Madagascar'

would not be the name of an island, instead it would refer to a part of
the African mainland.

For if intentions to refer with a name to the

same thing as the person from whom one learned the name guaranteed that
one is participating in a particular name-using practice, and if participation in that practice determined the reference of one's name uses,
then Marco Polo would have been referring to a part of the African mainland with

'Madagascar' and the people who learned the name

from him

(including ourselves) would also have referrred to a part of the African
mainland

wit~

the name 'Madagascar'.

But this is not true.

We refer to

an island off the coast of Africa with the name 'Madagascar', and it is

34

~.

"The Causal Theory of Names," Aristotelian Society Supplementary
47, pp. 187-208. Reprinted in Schwartz, .Q.p. cit., pp. 192-215.
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most likely because of Marco Polo that we do so.
Some theorists have argued that cases of this sort show that causal theories are fundamentally misguided.

35

Causal chains linking a name

to a referent, they would argue, are not what determines reference.

If

a speaker has mistaken beliefs about the referent of a name, as Marco
Polo did about 'Madagascar', then what he is referring to will be different from what other members of his community refer to with that name.
This is because the referent of the name is determined not by the chain
of communication, but by the speaker's intentions, by what he thought he
was referring to.
Reflection on the Madagascar case (and on similar cases where two
individuals are inadvertently or maliciously switched) reveals there is
someting wrong with the causal theory of names as presented by Kripke.
It

could be

that

the whole

approach

is

wrong;

that the

thoughts are terribly important in determining reference.

speaker's

However, it

might also be the case that the approach is fine but some of the details
are problematic.

Given the difficulties which competing theories face,

I am inclined to opt for the second alternative: Kripke may have gotten
some of the details wrong, but his general approach is a move in the
right direction.

36

If we assume that the general approach of the causal theory is

35

See for example, Searle, Intentionality, pp. 237-240. Evans makes
a more modest claim. He argues that such cases show that "the intentions of the speakers to use a name to refer to something must be
allowed to count in determination of what it denotes." Ibid., E· 202.
3 6

We should not be too surprised to find that this is the case.
Kripke explicitly recognizes that what he has given is not a complete
theory of reference for proper names. He is instead suggesting a new
approach, a new "picture" of how their reference is determined.
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correct, how can we account for the 'Madagascar' case and others like
it?

Let us suppose that there was a practice of using

1

Madagascar{' to

refer to a part of the African mainland and that this practice was in
effect in the community to which the sailors belonged.

Further, let us

suppose that were a person to participate in this practice, she would be
referring to that same part of the African mainland.

Thus, had Marco

Polo been participating in the practice, he would have been referring to
some part of the African mainland.

If he did not refer to the African

mainland, as appears to be the case, then he was not participating in
the practice, regardless of his intention to refer to the same thing as
the sailors.

Our question is: How do we account for this fact, asssum-

ing that the causal theory is basically correct, and that it is not what
the speaker intends to refer to but his connection with a practice that
determines reference.
Before answering this question, I would like to make a few observations about this particular case.
case

involves

two separate

First, it should be noted that this

linguistic

communities:

the community to

which the sailors belonged and the European community to whom Marco Polo
passed along the name.

3 7

This already makes the case atypical.

Sec-

ondly, it is not clear at exactly what point 'Madagascar' began to refer
to an island off the coast of Africa.

We can say, with some degree of

assurance, that before Marco Polo heard the name, it did not refer to an
island and that after the name was introduced in Europe it did refer to

37

Although there are problems in giving identity conditions for linguistic communities, we can assume that these linguisitic communities
are distinct, since they have different languages (as defined by their
grammar, vocabulary and history) and there is virtually no contact
between members of each.

135
an island.

What it referred to in the intervening time is not so clear.

Did 'Madagascar' refer to an island when Marco Polo used that name for
the first time?
way.

Suppose his first contact with the name took place this

Marco Polo and some sailors were sitting around after dinner tell-

ing sea stories.

One of the sailors says to his friend: "Hey, remember

the time we landed on/in Madagascar?
to get out of there alive."

That was some trip!

The two sailors reminisce, as sailors will,

about the good old days in Madagascar.
Madagascar far from here?"

We were lucky

Eventually Marco Polo asks, "Is

To what does Madagascar' refer in this sen-

tence? (Suppose Marco Polo had not yet formed any hypotheses about what
Madagascar referred to.)

Most likely it refers to the place the sailors

were talking about when they used 'Madagascar' in the previous conversation.

Suppose that on the basis of their answers to this and other

questions, suppose Marco Polo comes to the conclusion that 'Madagascar'
is the name of an island off the African coast.
the is land with the name

'Madagascar'

Perhaps he even marks

on his charts.

The next day,

Marco Polo asks another sailor, "Have you ever sailed to Madagascar?"
(What does

'Madagascar'

refer to here?)

The sailor answers,

Then Marco asks for more information about Madagascar:
ited?"
it

"What do the people there do?"

is easy to see what

'Madagascar'

etc.

"Yes."

"Is it inhab-

We should not pretend that

refers to in all these different

uses (the sailor's and Marco Polo's).

There are two likely possibili-

ties: either (a) 'Madagascar' refers to part of mainland Africa whenever
the sailor uses it and to the island whenever Marco Polo uses it, or (b)
'Madagascar' refers to part of mainland Africa, regardless of who uses
it, but Marco Polo thinks it refers to an is land (and forms a nu·mber of
mistaken beliefs because of this).

Thirdly, we should note that this
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case would not be so clear-cut if Marco Polo had died among the sailors
(and all his documents concerning Madagascar had been destroyed).

What

is obvious is that ou·r name 'Madagascar', which we got from Marco Polo,
refers to an island off the coast of Africa.

If this practice of refer-

ring to an island off the coast of Africa with the name 'Madagascar' did
not exist, we would be stuck with the uncertainty noted above:

Did 'Ma-

dagascar' refer to one thing when Marco Polo used it and to another when
the sailors used it? or did it always refer to part of the African mainland, no matter who used it?
Now, how can we explain the Madagascar case within the framework
of the causal theory of names?

In general terms,· we will say that at

some point Marco Polo failed to participate in.the practice.

Since he

intended (or we can assume that he intended) to refer to the same thing
the sailors who used the name referred to, we cannot attribute his failure to participate in the practice to 'bad' intentions, as we could when
I called my goldfish 'Herkimer Feingruber'.
What is common to the 'Madagscar' case and the 'Herkimer Feingruber'

case is that in both cases

lished.

a new name-using practice is estab-

It is perfectly consistent with the main thrust of the causal

theory to say that because this new practice has been established, the
name can now be used to refer to two different things, and which thing a
particular use of it refers to depends on which practice it is connected
to.

What I would propose is that the causal theory should analyze par-

ticipation in a name-using practice in this way:

a person participates

in practice P'N' if and only if (1) her use of 'N' either derives from
the name-bestowing act or is derived from a use which ultimately goes
back to the establishment of the practice (the name-bestowing act) and

•
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(2) she does not establish a new practice with 'N'.

This new criterion

for participating in a practice does not appeal to the speaker's intentions to participate ·in that practice.

What it says is that, whether

she intends to or not, a speaker participates in a particular name-using

~

~

~

~-

practice P'N' if and only if her use of 'N' is derived from another use
which is 'historically' or 'causally' connected with the name-bestowing
act,

unless she establishes

a new practice with

'N'.

Whether this

analysis is different from a satisfaction theory and to what extent this
account makes a speaker's intentions important for determining reference
depends on how we analyze 'establishing a new practice'.

Under what

conditions is a new name-using practice established? 38
To develop this account we should first make a distinction between
official names and unofficial names.

Official names

are those names

which are given to individuals according to generally recognized and
accepted guidelines.

Within a society there are naming institutions,

institutions for giving official names.

These institutions say who can

give a name to whom and under what conditions.

For example, in the

United States (and probably in most Western societies) we now name human
beings by putting a name on a birth certificate.

Names are typically

given only to infants and only by the infant's legal guardians.

3 9

The

choice of names is not totally up to the parents.

The child's surname

must usually be the surname of one of its parents.

The method of giving

38

Note that my analysis of participation in a name-using practice
does not complicate matters for the causal theory, since this question
has to be answered anyway.
39

It is interesting to note that when there is no legal guardian a
pseudo-name such as 'Baby Doe' is given until a guardian is found.
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an official name is to write the infant's name on a birth certificate,
sign it, and register the birth with the state in which the child is
born.

If the child was born in a hospital where there is a possibility

of mixing up the babies, the infant who is so named will be the one who
has literally been tagged with the parents' surname.
wise,

institutionalized means

for naming

planets, etc.), species, and pets.

places

There are, like-

(cities,

countries,

These institutions specify who can

name an individual and under what conditions.

Further, it is a feature

of official names that members of the society in which that institution
exists are under some obligation to recognize the name as the name of
the person to whom it was given.
With official names the speaker's intentions are not important.
What is important is that the name-giver fulfills the requisite conditions and performs the requisite acts.

If I had inadvertently written

the name 'Aristotle' on my son's birth certificate, signed the document
and filed it with the state of North Dakota, my son's name would have
been 'Aristotle', whether I had intended to name him 'Aristotle' or not.
And if I had signed the birth certificate intending thereby to name the
neighbor's child

'John',

I would not have named the neighbor's child

'John'.
Unofficial names

fall

into many

different

classes.

There

are

nicknames which are derived from official names according to well-known
formulas.

For example,

nickname for

'Jack'

'Patricia', etc.

is a nickname for

'John',

'Pat'

is a

Other nicknames can be derived from an

official name in an original way, as 'Ike' was derived from 'Eisenhower'.

Some nicknames are given on the basis of an outstanding feature of

the bearer, e.g.,

'Red' for a red-head.

What distinguishes unofficial
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names from official names is that the procedure for giving the name is
much less strict, and there is no obligation to recognize the nickname
as a name of the person or thing to whom it was given until the name has
caught on.
on.

There is no guarantee, that is, that the name will catch

4 0

Whether a person is participating in a particular name-using practice depends in part on whether she establishes a new practice with the
name.

One can establish a new practice by performing those actions

under those circumstances which a name-bestowing institution requires or
by introducing a new unofficial name.

In both the 'Madagascar' case and

the 'Herkimer Feingruber' cases, the speaker established a new practice
by participating in a naming institution.

As the discoverer of an here-

tofore unnamed island (at least unnamed within the European community),
Marco Polo was entitled (within that community) to name the island. 41
The institutional acts Marco Polo performed most likely involved reporting the discovery of the island (identifying the island by conventional
means, either by depicting it on a map or by giving its coordinates and
perhaps a description) and calling the island 'Madagascar'.

Similarly,

I am entitled, as a pet goldfish owner, to name my goldfish.

In this

case, my deciding that he should be called 'Herkimer Feingruber' is sufficient to make that his name, whether anyone actually calls him that or

40

It should be noted that there are some constraints on establishing
an unofficial name-using practice. For example, no practice will exist
With the name if it is not consistently used as a name for an individual
over a period of time.
41

Note that he was not entitled to name the island for the members
of the community to which the sailors belonged.
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not. 4 2 Here the speaker's intentions are important.

I make 'Herkimer

Feingruber' the name of my goldfish by intending to use that name in the
future to refer to my goldfish.
are not sufficient.

But the speaker's intentions to refer

The speaker must fulfill the role required by the

pet-naming institution--she must be the pet owner or be given permission
by the pet owner to name the pet.

I cannot name my neighbor's bull ter-

rier by deciding to call it 'Miss Piggy' unless the pet-owner authorizes
me to do so. 43 'Miss Piggy' could, however, become the dog's unofficial
name.
Causal theories provide a good account of official names.

What

the name can refer to depends on what individual it was given to in
accordance with the prevailing name-giving institution.

If all names

were official names we could say that uses of a name which are derived
from (or causally connected with) a name-giving act refer to the individual to whom the name was given, unless the use is itself a name-giving act.

Here a speaker's intention to refer to a particular thing with

a name is neither necessary nor sufficient for the name to refer to that
thing.

A particular speaker's intention to refer to the same thing as

the person from whom she learned the name is not even required.

Unless

she establishes a new official name, her use would be parasitic and she
would refer to whatever the person from whom she learned the word referred to. 44

42

I may decide to change his name so that 'Herkimer Feingruber' is
no longer his name. To some extent the name of a pet is up to the whims
of his owner.
43

Naming pedigreed dogs is more difficult.
on a document and registered with the kennel.

The name must be written
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Name-using practices involving unofficial names present a problem
for the causal theory.

According to this theory, what a use of a name

refers to is ultimately determined by the name-giving act which originates the name-using practice.

With official names, this name-giving

act is usually a discrete, identifiable event, (e.g., the name was given
when the birth certificate was signed, when the discovery was reported,
etc.).

With unofficial names the case is more difficult.

Except for

those rare cases in which the speaker decides, in first using the name,
that this shall henceforth be his name for a certain object, the unofficial name is not given in a discrete act.

Instead, it gradually becomes

a name by virtue of being consistently used to refer to the same object.
Usually there is no one name-giving act.

There seem to be several acts

which together constitute the name-giving.
I have argued that with official names, intentions to refer to a
particular individual with a name play a very small role in determining
the reference of the name.

44

This cannot be said of unofficial names.

Granted, sometimes the intention to refer to a particular object
with a name, if it is the intention of a specially situated person and
if the object fulfills certain requirements, does determine the referent
of a name.
For example, my decision to name my pet goldfish Herkimer
Feingruber is sufficient to make it the case that my pet. goldfish is
named Herkimer Feingruber. If what makes my goldfish the referent of
this name is my intention, however, not just any intention will do. An
intention to name the goldfish that looks thus and such (followed by a
representetion of the goldfish) will not work, since the goldfish that
looks thus and such may not be my pet goldfish. It may be a goldfish I
am not entitled to name.
I cannot give the official name ostensively
either, by pointing to a goldfish and forming the intention to call this
goldfish Herkimer Feingruber. For suppose, unbeknownst to me, my children had traded goldfish with the neighbors for a day, My decision to
call that goldfish 'Herkimer Feingruber' would not make 'Herkimer Feingruber' the name of that goldfish. My intention will be sufficient for
that goldfish's being officially named Herkimer Feingruber' only if the
goldfish is actually one I am entitled, by the naming institution, to
name.
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The establishment of an unofficial name-using practice takes time and
usually the willing cooperation of other speakers.

With official names,

individual speakers do not decide whether they will recognize a particular name as the name of some person.

As long as they live in the soci-

ety in which this instituion is in force, the force of the institution
is exerted on their particular name-using practices. 45 With unofficial
names there is no such institutional force to back up a name-using practice.

If using an unofficial name to refer to a certain individual

becomes a practice it does so through the force of habit rather than the
force of law.
While the causal theory of names is well suited to explain how the
reference of official names is determined, special difficulties arise
when we try to account for unofficial names. 46 It seems that the introduction of unofficial names into a community will involve a speaker's
intentions to refer much more than the introduction of official names.
We may be tempted to analyze these intentions in terms of satisfaction.
Moreover, participating in a practice of these sort, especially in the
early stages of its becoming a practice, seems also to involve intentions to use the name in a certain way.

With respect to unofficial

names, it may seem that satisfaction accounts are more likely to be cor-

45

An individual or group can opt out of the society by becoming hermits or forming a cult cut off from the rest of the society.
But as
long as these people maintain some ties with the society the pressure of
its naming institutions is hard to escape, since official names tend to
be tied up with one's social identity.
4 6

It could be argued that accounting for unofficial names is far
more important than accounting for official names, since official names
seem to be a cultural modification of unofficial names. The question of
how words hook up with the world is more likely to be answered in the
account of unofficial names.
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rect and that causal mechanisms are unimportant.
The general idea behind the causal theory of names is that the
reference of a partic"Lilar use of a name typically depends on what nameusing practice the speaker is participating in.
on where her use of the name came from.
original name-giving act,

This, in turn, depends

By tracing her use back to an

and seeing to whom or what that name was

given, we discover the referent of her use of the name.

With unofficial

names there is not one name-giving act, but many uses of the name which
together constitute a name-giving.

It

is

incumbent upon the causal

theorist to give an account of this kind of name-giving.
One thing that has to be recognized is that there can be unofficial name-givings that do not catch on, that do not result in a new
practice.

For example,

I may use the name 'Pig-face' to refer to the

neighbor's bull terrier once or twice, thus giving that name to that
dog.
again.

Later I decide that this name is too nasty

As long as no one picks up the name from me, I do not establish

a name-using practice.
to the

and I never use it

Nevertheless 'Pig-face' seems to have referred

neighbor's dog the times I did use it.
Another thing to note is that until the practice is established,

the referent of an unofficial name can fluctuate.

Imagine this case.

I

hear a dog barking, and say to my son, "That dog sure is obnoxious.

I

wish those people would take better care of it.
Piggy routing around in the garbage."

Just today I saw Miss

Suppose I am using 'Miss Piggy'

to refer to the bull terrier I saw routing around in the garbage (her
official name is 'Spike') and this is the first time I am using the name
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this way. 47 The next day, on his way to school, my son sees a bull-terrier who looks like Spike, but is actually Spike's sibling, Rover.

He

says to his friend "There goes Miss Piggy," borrowing the name from me.
His friend then starts using the name 'Miss Piggy' to refer to Rover.
Other kids pick up the name from him and after a while it is common
practice to refer to Rover with the name, 'Miss Piggy'.
Here, before the practice is established, borrowing the name does
not guarantee that one will refer to the same thing as the person from
whom one heard the name; even if one does intend to refer to the same
thing, it does not always happen.

My son may have intended to refer to

the same dog with 'Miss Piggy' as I did, but he did not actually refer
to the same dog.

However, once the practice is established, mistaken

beliefs about the referent have much less influence on the practice.

r't,

after 'Miss Piggy' has become an establihsed name for Rover, I see

Spike and say, "There goes Miss Piggy," my unconventional use of 'Miss
Piggy' will very likely be corrected (especially if there are children
around).

Someone may gently point out that Spike is not Miss Piggy.

So

even with unofficial names the causal theory seems to be on the right
track.

Cases of this sort illustrate the need for a more subtle analy-

sis than has been presented so far.

With unofficial names, merely trac-

ing an unbroken chain of communication back to its first link will not
tell us what the referent of the name is.

The history of the use of an

unofficial name along with some account of how the referent of the first
use was determined, will not tell us what that use of the name refers

47

For the culturally deprived, 'Miss Piggy' is the name of a television celebrity.
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to.

What we need to find is that use (or those uses) that established

the practice.

These are not necessarily the first uses.

What we might look for is the first string of uses which were
derived from each other and which all referred to the same thing. 48 If
we take this approach we shall have to give an account of how the reference of a name is determined when there is no name-using practice for
that name or when the use of the name is not part of some established
practice.
uses.

One might be tempted to give a satisfaction account for these

For example, one might say that the reference of my use of 'Miss

Piggy' in the story developed earlier was the object I intended to refer
to with the name 'Miss Piggy'.

And further, it was because I intended

to refer to something that participants in the existing 'Miss Piggy'-using practice do not refer to with 'Miss Piggy{ that I failed to participate in the existing practice.

But this explanation will not work.

For

suppose I had seen a dog routing around in the garbage and took it to be
the dog that belongs to the occupants of apartment 1-C (about whom I
have a great

many beliefs,

including the belief that

it

is

called

'Fido').

On the basis of this information I form the intention to refer

to Fido,

the neighbor's bull-terrier,

who barks

at nights

and runs

freely around the neighborhood, etc., with the name 'Miss Piggy'.

As it

happens, however, the dog I saw routing around the garbage was not Fido
at all, but Spike (another sibling).

When I said,

"I saw Miss Piggy

routing around in the gargage," the dog I actually referred to was not
Fido, but Spike.

48

How do we explain this?

This is a suggestion which I hope will make the causal theory of
names more plausible. It is not within the scope of this dissertation
to develop a full account of the establishment of unofficial names.
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A satisfaction theorist may simply deny that I referred to Spike
with the name '~Iiss Piggy'.
dent justification.

But this denial seems to have no indepen-

If the satisfaction theory is correct, then the qog

I referred to is the one which satisfies the representations I associate
with the name.

But that is assuming the satisfaction theory is correct.

A more subtle satisfaction theorist might accept the intuition that I
referred to Spike and explain my reference by making minor adjustments
in his theory.

For example, Searle might explain my reference to Spike

rather than Fido by weighting the representations.

My representation of

the visual experience in which the dog was presented to me is more
important than other representations I may have of the dog.

Reference

is still determined by which object satisfies a certain mental representation (or Intentional content).
At least some causal theorists would explain how the reference of
my use of 'Miss Piggy' was determined in terms of my intentions to refer
to the dog I had in mind. 4 9 However, their account is different from
satisfaction accounts.

Rather than explaining

'having an object

in

mind' in terms of mental representations (or perceptual presentations)
which the object satisfies, these causal theorists would say that the
object the speaker has in mind is the one that caused her mental state
or caused her use of the name.

50

The success and plausibility of satis-

faction theories can be explained by the fact that usually the represen-

49

For example, Michael Devitt, "Singular Terms"
nation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).
50

QE. cit., and Desig-

The causal analysis of having an object in mind is mentioned here
to show that causal theories are different from satisfaction theories
even respect to unofficial names. In the following chapter we will discuss the causal account of having an object in mind more fully.
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tation (or presentation) which the speaker has of an object is satisfied
by the object which caused it.

But the object which satisfies the rep-

resentation and the on·e which causes the speaker to have such a representation do not always coincide.

It is in those cases where the repre-

sentations are not satisfied by their causes but by something else that
fortuitous satisfaction creates difficulties for satisfaction theories.
The intuitions of contextual theories, which say that knowing the
context of an utterance is sufficient to enable one to know what a
speaker was referring to, can also be accomodated by the causal version
of 'having an object in mind'.

A detailed description of the context in

which a name is used often gives us sufficient information about what
object caused the speaker to 'have~ in mind'.

Further, this informa-

tion may put us in a better position to know what the speaker was referring to than the speaker himself is in.
Before closing this chapter on the causal theory of names, there
is one more aspect of the reference of names that must be dealt with.
We claimed earlier that the reference of a use of a name is determined
by which

practice the speaker

is participating in.

This,

in turn,

depends on (1) whence the speaker learned the name and (2) whether the
speaker was giving the name to a new object.

51

Some name-givings are the

result of the speaker being in a certain position and doing certain
things which result in the establishment of a new official name.

In

these cases, what the name refers to depends on the particular situation
and the name-giving institution.

51

The intentions of the speaker to refer

(2) was proposed as an alternative to Kripke's requirement that
the speaker intend to refer to the same thing as the person from whom
she learned the name.

148

to a particular object can be totally irrelevant.
be given by just about anyone to

Unofficial names can
In giving an

just about anything.

unofficial name to something, the speaker's intentions seem quite impertant, for it seems to be at least a necessary condition for giving a
name that the speaker intend to refer to a particular object (the one
she has in mind) with that name.

But this is not a sufficient condi-

tion, at least not when the speaker's use of the name is causally connected to or derived from some other use of the name.

52

When a person

uses a name for which there is already a name-using practice in the community and her use is connected to that practice (she heard the name
from someone who participated in the practice), opting out of the practice requires more than intending to refer to something with the name.
A person would not be giving a new name to some object if she intended
to refer to the thing which happened to be the same object that the person from whom she learned the word referred to.

Neither would she be

giving a new name if she had mistaken beliefs about the referent of a
name and so thought she was referring to one thing (the thing she had in
mind), even though she had no intention of giving something a name.
example,

I may get Spike and Rover mixed up.

'Spike~, intending to refer to Rover, I

When

I

For

use the name

am not giving Rover a new name.

'Spike' still refers to Spike and not to Rover.

Intending that a name

should refer to something different from what the person from whom one
learned the name referred to does not, by itself, constitute a name-giving.

52

For a use of a name that is causally connected to an existing

If a person simply makes up a name, e.g., 'Charles Bon' and
intends to refer with it to the thing she has in mind, this may count as
an unofficial name-giving.
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name-using practice to be a name-giving act, it seems necessary that the
speaker do something to separate this use from the practice.

What seems

to be required is that· the speaker intend to use the name in a new way.
To do so, she must be aware that what she intends to refer to with the
name is different from what the person from whom she learned the name
referred to with that name.

So a double intention is necessary, the

intention to refer to ~ with 'N', and the intention to use 'N' differently than it is usually used.
head.

This turns Kripke's requirement on its

A speaker need not intend to refer to the same thing as the per-

son from whom she learned the name in order to participate in the nameusing practice.

Instead, in order to fail to participate in. the prac-

tice one must intend not to use the word to refer to the same thing as
the person from whom one learned the name.
There is one more problem.
about the referent of a name,

Sometimes when there

is

confusion

an unofficial name can be given to an

object on the basis of this confusion.
of a set of twin Irish Wolfhounds.

For example, suppose you buy one

When you pick out your puppy, you

indicate your preference for the one which has been officially named
'Romulus'.

A friend of yours buys the other puppy, Remus.

conditions for the sale is that you keep the official names.
pose that while you

~re

One of the
Now sup-

signing the papers and paying for the puppy, a

mischievous semantic theorist, trying to make trouble for causal theorists, switches the puppies so that you take home Remus and your friend
takes Romulus.

You call your puppy 'Romulus', it learns to respond to

that name, and everything is going fine until one day, about two years
later, the semantic theorist shows up.
friend,

"I'm worried about Romulus.

He hears you saying to your

He seems to have lost his appe-
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tite."

The semanticist then comes over and says "No, you are wrong.

Romulus has as good an appetite as ever.
his appetite."

Remus, however, may have lost

Then h·e goes on to explain his little experiment, con-

eluding, "So you see, if the causal theorist is right, when you use the
name 'Romulus' you do not refer to the dog you've known since he was a
puppy, you are really referring to your friend's dog." 53
Cases like this do pose a problem for the causal theory.

Even

though no one intended to give a new name to either of the dogs, a new
name was given.

The dog whose official name was 'Remus' is now named

'Romulus', and Romulus is Remus.

To handle such cases, we should first

recognize that the dogs now have two names each. 54 The official names of
the dogs have not changed.

That is why you could respond to the seman-

ticist 's story by saying, "You mean Romulus is really Remus?"
names refer to the same dog.
status as an official name.

The two

One refers to the dog by virtue '>of its

The other has become an unofficial name.

A

practice of referring to that dog with that name has been established.
What is tricky about such cases is that no one deliberately introduced
new names for the dogs .

There were no intentional name-giving acts.

Yet the names were given.
In this kind of case, the unofficial name is not given in a single
act, but becomes that name over a period of time during which the name
is used repeatedly to refer to the object.

This seems obvious if we

consider the difference between the case of the mischievous semantic

53

Since you were obviously not referring to your friend's dog, it is
easy to draw the conclusion that the causal theory must be wrong.
54

This fact is sometimes ignored by mischievous semantic theorists.
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theorist and a similar case involving an innocent mix-up.

Suppose the

person who sold you the dog inadvertently gave you the wrong puppy.

You

take the puppy home, play with it, call it 'Romulus', make statements
about it using the name 'Romulus',

etc.

The next day,

the previous

owner, having realized his mistake, calls you and tells you that he gave
you Remus by mistake and arranges a switch.
would not have become a name for 'Remus'.

In that case,

'Romulus'

When you talked about Ramu-

lus, strictly speaking, your statements were not about the puppy you had
taken home.
lus'.

(You may have been talking about Remus when you said 'Ramu-

But 'Romulus' did not refer to Remus.

Here speaker's reference

is different from the semantic reference.)
It may not be possible to identify the exact point at which the
name 'Romulus' became a name for Remus, 55 so there will be a number of
uses of the name where we are not certain what the referent actually is,
though we may know what the intended referent is.

56

I do not find this

an unacceptable implication of the theory.
Let us sum up our discussion of the causal 'theory of names.

The

basic idea is that there are name-using practices in a community, based
on original name-givings.

Those who participate in a particular prac-

tice refer to the object that was given that name when the practice was
established.

A name-using practice can be established by an institu-

55

Maybe it becomes the name at the point where, if the owners were
informed of the mix-up, they would not be willing to start using the
official name.
56

You may not be too sure about the referent when the dog-seller
switched the dogs for a day. The number of times the mistake is made
can be reduced in the example, until your intuitions match mine: (Suppose the dog-owner gave you the wrong dog, but caught you before you
went out the door.)
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tional name-giving act.

!rt that case, it is only by looking at the par-

ticular institution, at its requirements for someone's giving a name to
an individual by performing a certain act, etc. that we can discover
what the referent of the name is.

The referent is determined by the act

performed according to an institution.

An unofficial name can be estab-

lished by a string of uses of a name, in which each speaker intends to
refer to the same object with the name (whether or not he or she knows
that she is intending to refer to the same object).
name is, then, the one which 'caused'

The referent of the

each of the speakers to have a

certain object in mind which she intended to refer to.

57

A use of a name typically refers to that thing which was given
that name when the practice from which this use derived (or to which it
is causally or historically related) was established.

Or in more gen-

eral terms, the reference of a derived use of a name is determined by
which practice the use is derived from or which one the speaker is participating in.

A use of a name

is derived from a practice if the

speaker uses that name to refer to some object on the basis of having
heard the

name

from

someone who was

participating

in the

practice

(either by deriving the name from some other use or by establishing the
practice).

One can fail to participate in a practice even though one's

use of a name is derived if either (a) one establishes a new official
name with this use or (b) one intends not to use the name to refer to
the same object as the person from whom one learned the name and intends
to refer to some object which actually is different, or (c) one's use is

57

point.

See Chapters Six and Eight for a more extensive discussion of this
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derived from the establishing of an unofficial name-using practice.
The causal theory explains how reference is disambiguated as follows.

Suppose someone- says "Romulus has really grown."

potential of

the name "Romulus"

is determined by

The reference

name-giving acts.

'Romulus' can refer to anything that has been given that name.

What it

refers to in this sentence is determined by which name-giving act (or
acts) this use of the name is derived from.

By tracing the use of this

name back to an original name-giving, one discovers the referent.
Sometimes the chain of communication can be observed from the outside, simply by looking at who learned the name from whom.

This would

be more likely to be true of unusual names (e.g., 'Paris', 'Madagascar")
and full names (e.g.,

'John D. Jones',

'Cliff Wirt'), than with names

that are common (e.g., 'Mary Smith') or with first names such as 'Bill'.
This is because the speaker is more likely to have been exposed to only
one 'Cliff Wirt'-using practice, and so his use, if it is derived, can
only be derived from that practice.

Many times, however, not even an

omniscent observer of history could tell, without further information,
what a name, as it is used in a particular sentence, refers to.

58

A per-

son may have been exposed to two different practices involving the same
name.

It is not possible to see, from the outside, which of these prac-

tices her use of that name in a particular sentence is derived from.
Nonetheless, if the causal theory is correct, the reference of her name
is determined by which practice her use is,

in fact,

connected with.

The fact that we cannot always tell what practice her use is connected

58

this .

Donnellan suggests that an omniscent observer of history could do
C.QE. cit. ) .
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with is no more an objection to the causal theory than the fact that we
cannot always tell what object satisfies the descriptive content in a
speaker's mind is an objection to satisfaction theories.

The important

point is that reference is determined by which practice (and ultimately,
by which name-giving act or acts) the use is connected with.
figure out which one that is, is a different question.

How we

59

When we turn to referring devices other than proper names, two
aspects of the causal theory of names as we have developed it will be
significant.

Reference borrowing, or chains of communication, will be

used to explain how the referents of some referring devices are determined.

For other referring devices, typically those which initiate a

reference chain, the causal analysis of having an object in mind will be
used to explain how reference is determined.

59

The speaker may not even know.

CHAPTER VI

CAUSAL THEORIES OF DISAMBIGUATION

In our discussion of the causal theory of names we saw that the
referent of certain uses of a name

could be determined by the links

between those uses and other uses which ultimately derived from namegiving acts.
links

The general idea was of a reference chain in which later

derived their

names,

reference

uses of the same name

linked.

from
(or

the first

link.

In

the case

of

tokens of the same name-type) were

When we expand our account to cover other types of referring

devices, we will use the notion of reference chains to explain how the
reference of some uses of other types of referring devices are determined.

In the expanded account the terms to be linked need not be uses

of

same referring device which

the

practice as they were with names.
of names

together constitute

a

term-using

What we export from the causal theory

is the idea that the reference of some uses of a referring

device can depend upon the connection between that device and some other
use of a referring device.
We

shall

define

a

reference

chain

as

a

sequence

of

referring

devices linked in such a way that if one of them refers to something,
then all of them refer to that thing.

1

1

Chastain calls these reference

This definition is taken, with some modification, from Charles
Chastain' s paper on reference chains, "Reference and Context" in Keith
Gunderson (ed.), Language, Mind and Knowledge: Minnesota Studies in the
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chains "anaphoric chai~s."

In such chains there is one device that

refers to an object independently.
!!!..ary referring device,
reference.

We shall call this device the pri-

and reference made with such a device primary

Other referring devices in the chain refer only by virtue of

their connection with the primary

referring device.

We

shall call

devices that have this place in a reference chain secondary referring
devices and reference made with them, secondary reference.
The account of disambiguation for referring expressions other than
names should spell out the general conditions for referential linkage
and tell us how the reference of ambiguous primary referring devices is
determined.

Spelling out the conditions

for

referential

linkage is

analogous to spelling out the conditions under which one's use of a name
is derived from another use of the same name.

Explaining how the refer-

ent of an ambiguous primary referring device is determined will follow
the lines of explaining how early uses of unofficial names get their
referent.

The referent, very roughly speaking, is that possible refer-

ent which·the speaker 'had in mind' in using the term.

Secondary Reference and Disambiguation
The basic issues we will address in this section are (1) to what
extent do linguistic conventions leave the reference of secondary referring devices indeterminate and thus necessitate a theory of disambiguation;

and (2) what kind of reference rule should the theory give for

Philosophy of Science, Vol. 1 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1975), pp! 194-270, see especially p. 204f.
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disambiguation of secondary reference.
reference

potential,

we

noted

that

In our previous discussion of
linguistic rules

or

conventions

determined a set of possible referents for referring expressions.

For

example, the linguistic conventions governing the use of the English
word 'he' determine the set of possible referents consisting of male
agents.

If we consider the sentence, "He recently proposed a bill in

the city council," and try to discover how the referent of the word "he"
is determined, we find that the linguistic convention by which a set of
possible referents is. assigned to the word 'he'
quite indeterminate.

leaves the reference

Any male creature could be the referent of 'he' . 2

But this is only one of the linguistic conventions governing the use of
the word 'he'.

2

There are other, syntactical,

linguistic rules which

It could be argued that 'he' in this sentence could only refer to
male human beings, since only human beings can propose bills in the city
council. However, as I argued earlier (see Chapter Four), semantic constraints on possible referents do not prevent us from making false or
silly statements. 'He' in the sentence, 'He recently proposed a bill in
the city council,' could, according to the rules of English, be used to
refer to an animal.
In fact, the sentence may even be true. Suppose,
for instance, that to show his contempt for the council, the mayor
appointed a donkey to the city council. Suppose also that during a seesion of the council the donkey gave to the council president a piece of
paper on which a bill was written and on which his hoofprint was stamped
(as a signature). Under these conditions it could truly be said that
the donkey recently proposed a bill to the city council.
It could also be argued that 'he' in this sentence could properly
be used to refer to a female agent, since there is a generic sense of
'he'. Certainly 'he' in the generic sense can apply to women as well as
to men, but only in certain kinds of sentences--namely, those which have
universal import. In those sentences 'he' means any arbitrarily chosen
person, and it refers to no one. Since we are not dealing with such a
sentence here, we need not worry about this sense of 'he'. However, I
might concede that 'he' could refer to a female animal.
If the donkey
who proposed the bill were a female, we might still properly say 'He
proposed a bill.' I have no clear intuitions about such a case.
At any rate, the important fact is that the set of possible· referent for 'he' is quite large when we consider only the sentence in which
it occurs.
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also have a bearing on the reference of 'he'.

Consider the following

paragraph.
Chicago's 49th ward alderman, David Orr, is trying to expand renter's rights. He recently proposed a bill in the city council.
In this passage, the referent of 'he'

'He' refers to

is determinate.

David Orr, Chicago's 49th ward alderman.

Often, especially in written

works, syntactic conventions which determine the possible referents of
secondary referring expressions in terms of their referential links to
other expressions leave no question about what primary referring expression a secondary referring device is to be linked with.

3

In those cases

there is no further need to explain how the referent of the secondary
expression is disambiguated (unless it is linked to an expression which
is itself ambiguous).

For example, in the following sentences syntacti-

cal rules alone determine which secondary referring devices are linked
to which primary devices.
Maria and Mark were both students of mine.
He only took one.
In this paragraph 'she'

She took two courses.

can only correctly be linked to

'Maria', and

'he' to 'Mark'.
Syntactic rules determine the reference potential of referring
devices other than pronouns.

In the following paragraph there are sev-

eral reference chains involving a variety of referring devices.
At eleven o'clock that morning, an ARVN officer stood a young prisoner, bound and blindfolded, up against a wall. He asked the prisoner several questions, and when the prisoner failed to answer, beat
him repeatedly. An American observer who saw the beating, reported
that the officer "really worked him over." After the beating, the

3

Discovering these rules is a task for linguistics. We need only
note that there are such rules and that they affect the reference potential of secondary referring devices.
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prisoner was forced to remain standing against the wall for several
hours. 4
Here we have one reference chain linking 'an ARVN officer',
'the ot°ficer' ; another linking 'a young prisoner',
'
I
prisoner
,

I

h im
' I,

I

h im
' I , an d

I

'he' , and

'the prisoner' , 'the

th e prisoner
'
I
; and so f ort h .

Linguistic rules alone are not always sufficient to tell us which
referring expression is linked to which others.

Consider the following

conversation between Smith and Jones.
"I saw Myra [Jones' wife] and Norma going into the Pump Room today,"
says Smith.
"That woman!
afternoon."
'That woman'

She told me she was going to be home working all

and 'she' seem to be referentially linked to some other

referring expression, but the linguistic rules cannot tell us which one.
(Presumably, they would narrow down the possibilities to either 'Myra'
or 'Norma'.)

Something other than linguistic rules that determine ref-

erence potential determine the

reference of

'that woman'

and

'she'.

Here, the same alternative accounts of how reference is disambiguated
resurface.

The reference of Jones'

expressions might be determined by

his intentions to refer to the same thing as 'Myra' or 'Norma' referred
to.

Or perhaps some feature of the context of Jones' utterance makes it

the case that his expressions are linked to either 'Myra' or 'Norma'.
Or Jones' referring expressions might refer to 'Myra' or 'Norma' depending upon which one prompted or caused his utterance.
At first glance each of these alternatives seems plausible.

4

This paragraph is quoted by Chastain,
Schell's, The Village of Ben Sue.

~·

cit.,

How-

from Jonathan
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ever,

if we vary the example or elaborate upon it somewhat, it will

become clear that a

contextual account will not do.

One contextual

theory, that of Colin McGinn, would propose that the relevant feature of
the

context

dev~ces.

is

the

spatio-temporal

relation

between

the

referring

According to this account, the expression in question is ref-

erentially linked to the immediately preceding one.
this would be 'Norma'.

5

In our example,

However, when you read this example, it is quite

likely that you did not conclude that 'that woman' referred to whomever
'Norma' referred to.

6

It is also not likely that the only thing you took

into account was the spatial or temporal order of the names.
Although spatial or temporal order may not be the important feature of the context, there may be other contextual factors which do, in
fact, disambiguate the reference.

In this example, the feature of the

context that does seem to be important is that one of these names refers
to Jones' wife.

5

This fact and what Jones said are what would guide you

McGinn, "The Mechanisms of Reference," Syn these,
157-186. See especially p. 169.
6

49

(1981), pp.

McGinn would protect his claim from counter-examples of this kind
by saying that his account is an "idealization." However, I do not see
how this will do much good. It shifts the ground away from ~ounter-ex
amples based on sound intuitions about language as a way of testing any
account of reference determination. But if we accept McGinn's account
as an idealization, why should we not accept other accounts as idealizations? Then they will be immune to counter-examples also.
What we
would be left with, given the acceptability of such idealizations, would
be intuitions about 'normal' ca~es, or about 'basic' structures and
mechanisms. Given the choice between my intuitions about what constitutes a 'normal' case or a 'basic' structure and my intuitions about the
reference of terms in a particular English sentence, I would put my
trust in the latter. I suspect this is true for most people. If we are
going to have a justified theory of reference, we would do well to justify it on the basis of intuitions about particular expressions ~n particular contexts and stay away from intuitions about 'normal' cases and
idealizations based on them.
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in your interpretation of the sentence.

But does this feature of the

context really determine to which of Smith's expressions Jones' expressions are linked?

Suppose it does not matter to Jones where his wife

is, but Norma had promised him that she would finish a project she was
working on at home by 5:00 that afternoon, and he believed it would take
the whole day.

In that case, we would take this fact to be important

for interpreting Jones' utterance.

However, even if we do take into

account what matters to Jones, this will still not be sufficient to
disambiguate the reference of 'that woman'.

For suppose it matters to

Jones where his wife is and it matters where Norma is, and suppose that
both women had told him they were going to be at home that afternoon.
In that case, both women would be likely referents, but the context cannot tell us which is the actual referent.

In cases like this, reference

seems to depend on whom the speaker meant, or which name he intended to
link his utterance with.
Syntactic rules along with other linguistic rules
referring expressions can be linked to which others,
tell us which ones are actually so linked.

a referential link, there is none.

7

tell us what

but they do not

Sometimes where there can be

A speaker can, for example, use a

pronoun out of the blue (i.e., deictically) in the middle of a conversation.
C: I saw General Westmoreland on T.V. last night. He really looked
old and tired. Sometimes I almost feel sorry for him.
R:

7

Well, he brought it on himself.

He did it again!

For example, in English 'he' can be linked with a man's name, or
With a definite description of a male, etc.
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'he'

last

This

could

belong

to

Westmore 1an d i - 'h e I - 'h'1m I - 'h e I , b ut it need not.

chain

the

'General

Suppose that while this

conversation was takiri"g place, R had been rummaging through his desk
looking for his pen.

On finding it, he says "He did it again!"

As it

happens, someone had borrowed the pen, not for the first time, and left
the cap off, not for the first time.

When he said "He did it again," R

intended to refer to the person who borrowed the pen.

It seems quite

likely that this person is the referent of 'he' in this sentence.
By considering cases of this sort we discover that what a theory
of disambiguation for secondary referring devices

should provide are

.reference rules which state the conditions under which the expressions
of a particular language which could (according to linguistic conventions for that language) be linked to other expressions, actually are so
linked.

There are two types of problem cases: (a) cases in which there

are two different referring expressions to which an expression could be
linked (e.g.,

'Myra' and 'Norma'); and (2) cases in which an expression

could be linked to another, yet is not so linked.

The analogs to these

cases in the causal theory of names are (1) cases in which there are two
different practices with the same name from which a use of a name could
have derived (e.g.,

'Romulus' could be derived from the practice which

originated when the official name was given or from the practice that
was established after the dogs were switched); and (2) cases in which a
use of a name was derived from another use connected to a practice
(e.g.,

the practice of referring to a person with the name 'Herkimer

Feingruber') but does not refer to the same thing (e.g., the name refers
to a goldfish).
A theory of disambiguation for secondary reference should tell us
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under what conditions expressions that
linked.

could be linked actually are

We find the same kinds of answers here as we did in the casual

theory of names.

We might say that the expressions are linked whenever

the speaker intends to refer to the same thing with both expressions.
This intention may make reference to the expression in question.

For

example, Jones may have had the intention: "I intend to refer with 'that
woman'

to the person which 'Myra'

referred to."

This is similar to

Kripke's requirement for non-deviant causal chains which says that the
speaker must intend to use a name to refer to the same thing as the person from whom he learned it.

Here we say that the speaker must intend

to refer to the same thing as some other expression referred to.

This

answer may also be one part of a satisfaction theorist's answer.
The general answer we would expect from a satisfaction theory of
di~ambiguation is that, in cases of this sort, the referent of a refer-

ring expression is determined by what the speaker intended to refer to.
This intention to refer involves identifying the referent by means of
some uniquely denoting intentional

content.

This

content may be an

identifying description which makes reference to the reference of some
other term (e.g., "the person S referred to by 'Myra'), but it need not.
Jones may have associated with the expression 'that woman' the identifying description "the person who is my wife"
An intentionalist account of reference chains which says that the
referent is determined by (1) linguistic rules which determine reference
potential and (2) the speaker's intentions to refer to an object with an
expression,

will

not

work.

For

suppose

someone

says

friends, Chris and Pat, are coming to visit this week-end.
now returning from their honeymoon.

to

you,

"My

They're just

They got married two weeks ago."
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y 0 u say, "Whom do you know better, the bride or the groom?"

did not know Chris and Pat.
was a woman and Pat

a

Suppose you

On hearing the names you assumed that Chris

man.

When you said, 'the groom' you intended to

refer to the person 'Pat' referred to in the previous sentence, and you
intended to refer to the person 'Chris' referred to with 'the bride'.
However, you were wrong.

Pat is the bride and Chris is the groom.

If it were necessary,
to be referentially
to the same

in order for two expressions,

~-1

and

~-2,

linked, that the speaker intend to refer with E-2

thing as

~-1

referred to, then in the preceding example,

'the bride' would not be referentially linked to 'Pat' and 'the groom'
would not be linked with 'Chris'.
sions are so linked.

But it seems clear that the expres-

The speaker's mistaken beliefs do not affect the

reference of her expressions in this case.
Nor is intending

to refer with E-2 to the thing referred to with

E-1 sufficient to link the two.
Ralph:

Consider the following conversation:

I just saw Cynthia in the hall.
looking for her?
in the hall.]

Weren't you

[He sees another woman, Vicky,

Excuse me, I have to go talk to

her. [He nods his head in the direction of the
hall as he says 'her', then leaves the room.]
Cliff:

[Calling after Ralph]

Tell her to come back

here when you've finished.

I want to ask her

about a book she borrowed.
Ralph:

[From the hall] Vicky borrowed a book from you?

We can safely assume that Cliff intended to refer to Cynthia with 'her',
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yet 'her' in this context referred to Vicky. 8 Even though Cliff intended
to link his expression to the name 'Cynthia', it did not refer to Cynthia, but to Vicky.

9

It may be that our requirement that the speaker intend to link
E-2 to E-1 is overly restrictive.
more general.
with

Rather than requiring that the speaker intend to refer
~-1

E-2 to the same thing as

that the speaker intend to
course.

10

The speaker's intentions should be

referred to, we might simply require

link his discourse with some other dis-

By changing the requirement in this way, the preceding

er-examples can be avoided.

count-

In that case the speaker's intentions to

refer are not important, what is important is his intention to link his
whole discourse to another one.

Such an explanation avoids the kinds of

counter-examples we have raised, but it presupposes that speakers actually intend to link one discourse to another.
evidence that they form such intentions.
to be linked automatically.

It is difficult to find

In fact, the discourses seem

Another, perhaps less serious, difficulty

with this type of account is that it would leave some cases ambiguous
(e.g., the 'Myra' 'Norma' case).
An alternative account of refrence linking which does not involve
the speaker's intentions to refer or to link would look to the 'causes'

8

That is why Ralph's closing remark makes sense. We may accuse him
of being too literal, but the basis for his literal interpretation is
what we are worried about in semantics.
9

We might want to argue that syntactic considerations are important
here. Cliff's {'her' could only refer to what Ralph's 'her' referred
to, because of certain rules governing the use of pronouns.
10

We should have to then give some account of the units of discourse. These might be sentences, paragraphs, or conversationsal units
segmented in terms of speakers.
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of the speaker's utterance.

We would see what utterances prompted the

speaker to say what she did in order to see what she was referring to.
An expression

E-2 wou1d be linked to another

~-1,

if and only if E-1

was in some appropriate way causally responsible for the speaker's using
E-2.

For example, if it was because Jones heard the name 'Myra' that he

said "That woman!", then 'that woman' would be referentially linked to
Or again,

'Myra'.

if Cliff's use of

'her'

was prompted by Ralph's

statement, "Excuse me, I have to go talk to her," then his use of 'her'
would refer to whatever 'her' referred to in Ralph's statement.

This

account seems more plausible than the hypothesis that one forms intentions concerning linkage in the course of a conversation or within a
discourse.

In the course of an actual conversation, connections between

expressions seem more a matter of promptings than of intentions.
One difficulty with a causal-genetic account of reference chains
arises

when

we

try

to

specify

the

appropriate

causal

relations.

Clearly, Cliff's saying 'her' was prompted by Ralph's saying 'her', but
to some extent it also seems to have been prompted by Ralph's saying
"Cynthia".

What is it about the causal relation between Ralph's saying

'her' and Cliff's saying 'her',
saying 'Cynthia'

as opposed to the one between Ralph's

and Cliff's saying 'her', that makes the former the

appropriate causal relation?

Perhaps we could simply make a distinction

between the proximal cause and more distant ones.

We could postulate

that one feature of the appropriate causal relation is that the expression

11

E-1 is a proximal cause of ~-2.

11

McGinn' s contextual
reference rule for reference chains (E-2
should be linked with the immediately preceding expression of the appropriate kind) is quite similar to the rule that ~-2 is linked with the
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A more serious problem for causal-genetic accounts has been discovered by Colin McGinn.

McGinn argues that the causal-genetic approach

to reference chains will not work.

He imagines a case where a causal

relationship is not even necessary for a reference chain to be established:
[S]uppose I believe on general grounds at ! that you will say at t
+ 1 "That man is drunk" at a party, and suppose I know that at t +
1 my hearing will be blocked. Neverthelss I plan to say at t + 2
"He will soon be thrown out," intending my pronoun to be anaphorically linked to your demonstrative.
It seems to me that I could
succeed in this plan, even though my own utterance was not causally
linked to the utterance to which it is referentially chained (certainly the other people at the party will take my pronoun to be so
chained). 12
McGinn seems to be on to something here.

It does seem that the

plan could succeed even though the utterance "He will soon be thrown
out" was not directly caused or prompted by the prior utterance.

13

Fur-

thermore, the plan could fail and lead to some interesting and perhaps
unfortunate results.

Suppose that McGinn's belief that I will say 'That

man is drunk' is mistaken.
dent of the APA."

I actually say "That man is the new presi-

McGinn, thinking that I had said "That man is drunk,"

says "He will soon be thrown out."

I would guess that the other people

at the party would take 'he' in McGinn' s sentence to be referentially

expression which is the proximal cause of ~-2, since this expression
will, in most cases, be the immediately preceding one. However, it will
not always be. For example in the 'Myra' 'Norma' case, the speaker's
utterance could have been prompted by the first name that was used.
Thus, we would not accept McGinn' s reference rule.
It may happen to
work for most cases, but, the spatio-temporal factor is not the important one.
12

13

Ibid., p. 169f.

It may have been indirectly prompted, via my belief that you would
say that.
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linked to 'that man', and I suspect that it would be.

But why?

McGinn suggests that it is the speaker's intention that his term
co-refer to the one in the preceding discourse that determines whether
the term will be linked. As I said before, the reservation I have about
his answer

is that

it is not clear that people typically have this

intention when their expressions are linked.

When I write a paragraph

containing reference chains I certainly am not aware of forming intentions to link expressions; nor am I aware of forming such intentions
when I am carrying on a normal conversation.

Of course, the fact that I

am not aware of forming such intentions does not mean that I do not do
so.

I may do so habitually, so that I do not notice; I may sub-con-

sciously intend to link my expressions to other pieces of discourse.
It seems clear from McGinn's example that reference links do not
depend on there being a direct causal relation between an expression (or
utterance) and a speaker's use of a word.

The expression (or larger

utterance) need not have any causal impact on the speaker, and yet the
speaker's expression may be referentially linked.

14

However, abandoning

this type of causal account need not force us to accept an intentionalist one.

Indeed, to do so would be a mistake, for reference chains can

exist where the speaker has no intentions to link, in fact, where the
'speaker' has no intentions at all.

This point can be illustrated by

considering exchanges of sentences between human beings and computers or
computer programs.

14

In the case McGinn cited we could argue that there was
causal connection between E-1 and ~-2 via the speaker's
about E-1.
However, when ~-1 is very different from what
predicted, there seems to be no causal link between E-1 and

an indirect
predictions
the speaker
E-2.

•
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One such program,

"Eliza," was designed to key in on important

words or phrases and to formulate appropriate responses.

For example, a

person might say to Eliza "I had a very strange dream last night.
dreamt my room was infested with rats.
·
Eliza
wou ld ma k e a response sue h as

I

What do you think that means?"
"Wh a t

d o you th in
· k

i' t

means?"

Although Eliza has no intentions to link her referring expressions to
the human speaker's, her expressions are linked.
the

links

speaker.

depend

on

causal

relations

15

between

Nor does it seem that
an

expression

and

a

One might be tempted to explain Eliza's reference linking in

terms of causal relations between a prompting word or expression and
Eliza's expression.

However, we can imagine cases in which this rela-

tion breaks down and Eliza's expression is still referentially linked.
Suppose, due to some kind of failure in the main computer, your sentence
"My mother is coming to visit next week," is lost, and by coincidence,
due to a quirk in the program, Eliza says right afterwards, "Are you
angry with her?"

Even though the causal relation has broken down, 'her'

would still be linked with 'my mother'.

If reference links depend nei-

ther on context, nor on causal relations, nor on the speaker's intentions to co-refer, what do they depend on?
I would propose that we analyze reference chains in much the same
way as we analyzed participation in a name-using practice.

In the case

of names, we said that a use of a name is linked to a prior use, unless

15

Eliza's ability to carry on a 'conversation' (that is, to produce
sentences appropriate to the conversational context) is largely a matter
of exploiting the possibilities for reference linking. This ability may
be derived from the programmer's intentions to link Eliza's discourses
to those of her conversational partners, but this intention is of·a different kind than the intention which would accompany each linked use of
a referring expression in normal conversation or writing.
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a new primary reference is made.

With other types of reference chains I

propose that expressions which could, according to semantic and syntactic rules,

be referentially linked,

and which satisfy certain other

structural conditions are referentially linked unless a new primary reference is made.

The structural conditions would be conditions under

which it is possible to link referring expressions.

Although we cannot

specify all these conditions here, we can mention some of the most obvious.

For example, it is quite clear that some expressions cannot be

linked: my expressions cannot be referentialy linked to what someone in
a different part of the city is muttering solely to herself (unless one
of us is telepathic).

On the other hand, my expressions can be linked

to what someone within earshot says.
room as

This might be someone in the same

I, or someone in a different city calling

someone whom I can hear on the radio or T.V.
linked to discourse in printed media.

long-distance, or

My expressions can also be

To generalize, the possibility of

linkage, at least across speakers, seems to exist only when there is a
certain kind of relation between the speaker and· the utterance.

It

exists only when the person whose expressions are to be linked is in a
position in which one would be able to take in the discourse either by
hearing it or seeing it or otherwise receiving it.

16

I suspect that when

we spell out the conditions under which a person would normally be able
to take in a discourse, we will find that these conditions involve some
kind of causal relation between the expression and the speaker.

16

Circum-

This is, then, a contextual requirement. I will not even attempt
to specify the exact conditions under which linkage is possible.
I
suspect they are quite complicated.
In addition, there may be special
circumstances for deaf people, for example.
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stances in which a speaker can link his referring expressions will be
those circumstances

in which a

speaker would typically

affected by a preceding segment of discourse.

be causally

Circumstances in which no

referential linkages are possible are those· in which a normal person
would not be causally affected (for example, when she is too far away to
have heard what someone just said, or when the area is so noisy that she
could not have heard, etc.).
At any rate, reference links will require that a speaker be in a
certain position with respect to an expression.

When a speaker is in

this position and uses expressions which semantically and syntactically
can be

linked to

expressions

in

the preceding

discourse,

then

the

expression is so linked, unless the speaker does something to break the
chain. So rather than asking under what conditions an expression which
could be referentially linked actually is linked, we should concentrate
on the conditions under which an expression which could be referentially
linked fails to be.

Here, as with the case of names, I would suggest

that the referential chain continues unless it is interrupted by a new
primary reference.
Thus, I would argue that reference chains should be explained in
terms of linguistic rules, context, and primary reference.

The linguis-

tic rules would be rules of syntax as well as rules governing reference
potential.

These rules of reference linkage apply only in certain con-

texts, namely in those circumstances in which the person whose express ions are to be linked is in a position to be causally affected by the
expressions with which hers are linked whether she is actually causally
affected by it or not.

Reference chains are broken only when there is a

new primary reference.

To illustrate what we mean let us examine the
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reference chains in one of our test conversations.

Consider the conver-

sation that went like this:
Ralph:

I just saw Cynthia in the hall.
looking for her?
in the hall.]

Weren't you

[He sees another woman, Vicky,

Excuse me, I have to go talk to

her. [He nods his head in the direction of the
hall as he says 'her', then leaves the room.]
Cliff:

[Calling after Ralph]

Tell her to come back

here when you've finished.

I want to ask her

about a book she borrowed.
There are possible reference chains in Ralph's speech which would link
'Cynthia'-'her'-'her'.

However, the last 'her'

gest that the reason it

is not linked is

towards Vicky and saying

is not linked.

I sug-

that, by nodding his head

'her', Ralph made a new primary reference.

When Cliff says 'her' under the appropriate conditions

(he could have

and did hear Ralph) his expression can only be linked with Ralph's second 'her'

according to syntactical rules, and it is so linked because

Cliff does not make a new primary reference.

17

In conversations where the syntactic and semantic rules seem to
permit links with two different expressions, I would suggest that there
is no reference chain.

So in the conversation between Smith and Jones

where Jones said "That woman!", 'that woman' is not referentially linked

17

Whether this analysis will ultimately be correct depends on
whether we can satisfactorily explain primary reference.
Notice also
that I assume here that the syntactic rules state that a pronoun is
linked to the immediately preceding one, thus agreeing with McGinn.
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with either 'Myra' or 'Norma'.
determined

independently,

in

The referent of 'that woman' will be
whatever

way

the

referent

of

primary

expressions is determined.
At first glance, this answer may seem implausible.

After all, it

seems that if 'that woman' refers to anything it refers to either Myra
or Norma, and thus would be referentially linked with one or the other
To see what is wrong with this objection,

name.

let us look at some

analogous cases.
Suppose you are at a party and are in a position similar to the
one that McGinn imagined.

You are talking to someone, and at time ! you

believe that this person will say at!+ 1, "That man is drunk," and you
plan to say at t + 2, "He will soon be thrown out."
person says instead,
soon be thrown out."

Now suppose this

"Those two men are drunk," and you say,

"He will

Your 'he' wi 11 not be 1 inked to 'those two men' .

There may be an apparent connection between the expressions, especially
if 'he'

refers to one of the men that

'those two men' refers to, but

this connection is not based on referential linkage.

The reason there

is no linkage is that, syntactically, one may not link 'he' with 'those
two men'.

I suspect there is a similar constraint on linking a singular

referring expression with a conjunction of such expressions, for exam-ple, for linking 'he' with 'Smith and Jones'.

For imagine you are in

the situation in which you hearing will be blocked at

t + 1, and you

believe at ! that Rogers will say at ! + 1 -"That man is drunk," but he
actually says "Smith and Jones have just been appointed to co-chair the
task force on education."
out."

You say, at

! + 2, "He will soon be thrown

The people to whom you are speaking would be puzzled about whom

You meant.

They would have no more reason to take you to have referred
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to either Smith or Jones, than to assume that you were talking about
someone else.

Your sentence doesn't fit in with the preceding one as it

would have had you said, "They will soon be thrown out.

18

Primary Reference
Up to now we have discussed how the reference of one referring
expression can depend upon the reference of some other referring expression.

We shall now look at how a causal theory might explain the refer-

ence of expressions whose reference is determined independently.

Such

expressions would include primary expressions in a reference chain and
first uses of unofficial names.
In this section we will be concerned primarily with explaining how
the reference of an ambiguous primary referring expression is disambiguated.
that

We shall restrict our attention to those referring expressions
already

have an established

reference potential.

19

As

a first

approximation we will say that the reference of a referring expression
of this

kind is

determined by

which possible

referent the

speaker

18

This answer suggests that linguistic rules for reference chains
are quite strict. Although the proof that they are must come from an
adequate account of anaphora by linguists, the reader can get some indication of the constraints on reference linking by playing a little
game. Have six people independently write sentences containing expressions that can be linked (e.g., 'a man'-'he'-'the man'-'him), then try
to put these sentences together into a coherent paragraph and look at
what can be linked to what.
19

Since first uses of unofficial names are not governed by rules
which establish reference potential, we shall not discuss them here. To
explain how these names refer we need to talk about how reference potential is determined. See Chapter Seven.

175
intended

to

refer

intentionalist

to.

one. 2 0 We

The

account

will

explain

of

disambiguation

will

semantic reference

be

(what

an
the

expression referred to) partly in.terms of the speaker's intended reference (what the speaker intended to refer to with that expression).

Our

account will be a causal, intentionalist one, as opposed to a satisfaction intentionalist account.

As a rough approximation, we can say that

the referent of an ambiguous referring expression will be determined by
a certain kind of causal relation between the referent and the expression, via the referent's effect on the speaker.
To give a general idea of how this causal explanation accounts for
disambiguation, let us contrast this explanation with those of satisfaction and contextual theorists.

Recall the earlier example in which a

person, looking at an antelope-shaped rock says, "That has been watching
us all night."

A satisfaction account would say that the referent of

'that' is the object that satisfies the mental content which the speaker
associates with the word.

A contextual account would say that the ref-

erent of 'that' is the object which the speaker demonstrated, for example, by pointing, or nodding his head, or by looking up, and that in the
absence of such demonstrations (and other semantically significant contextual clues) the reference is indeterminate.

A causal account would

say that the referent of 'that' is the potential referent which caused
the speaker to have a certain object in mind when she said 'that' . 21 The
potential referent which caused the speaker to have an object in mind,

20

See Chapter Three for a definition of an intentionalist theory of
disambiguation.
21

Recall that we have already said that some contextual factors do
co-determine reference.
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in this example, is the rock.

Thus, according to the causal theory, the

rock is the referent of 'that'.
We will begin our assessment of the causal theory of disambiguation with a summary of two different versions of it.

One version, the

one developed by Michael Devitt, gives a straightforwardly causal analysis of primary reference. 22 The other, developed by Charles Chastain,
analyzes primary reference in terms

of a speaker's knowledge of an

. t 23
Ob JeC
·

Devitt argues that the reference of ambiguous referring expressions is determined by what the speaker had in mind. 24

For example,

ambiguous definite descriptions such as 'the book' and 'the table'
the sentence "The book is on the table,"

in

refer to the objects the

speaker had in mind, 2 5 so do ambiguous demonstratives, with or without
an accompanyihg demonstration, and other indexicals such as 'he', 'she',
'it', etc.

Insofar as Devitt analyzes disambiguation in terms of what

the speaker had in mind, his theory is an intentionalist one.
not,

however,

a satisfaction account,

for

the

relation

It is

between the

object and the speaker's mental states is not that of satisfaction or
fit.

According to Devitt, having an object in mind is to be analyzed in

22

See "Singular Terms," The Journal of Philosophy, 71 (1974), pp.
183-205, and Designation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).
23

Chastain explains the connection between his theory and the causal
theory on p. 256, 2£. cit.
24

When we talk about ambiguous referring expressions in this section, we will be referring only to primary referring expressions.
25

Note: Devitt uses the term 'designate' in almost the same·way we
have been using 'refer'. For our purposes we can take the terms to mean
the same thing.
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terms of a causal relation between an object and the speaker's state of
mind.

His analysis of having an object in mind is as follows:

[T]here is an object which a person has in mind if and only if there
is a certain sort of causal connection between his state of mind and
the object. 26
Having an object in mind fs not, of course, a sufficient condition
for reference.

For an expression in some language to refer to some

object, the speaker must use an expression which can (in the sense of
reference potential) be used to refer to the object he has in mind.
Further, his using that expression must be causally related to his having a certain object in mind.

Because there is this connection between

the object and the expression, via the speaker's mental states, Devitt
sometimes speaks of the cause of the utterance or the cause of the
speaker's linguistic behavior.

For example,

in handling such cases as

Kaplan's "I like that [pointing in the general direction of his son],"
Devitt says,
What determines that one aspect and not another of the vaguely indicated environment is designated is that the speaker had that aspect
in mind. We look to what caused the behavior in order to remove
ambiguities. 27
Or again, when he is talking about ambiguous definite descriptions such
as 'the man' or 'the cat', Devitt says,
[The description] designates the object the speaker had in mind;
i.e., it designates the object that causally results in the use of
the description. Our earlier speaker designated this book and that
table because of their special place in the causal explanation of
his utterance. 28

26

Designation, p. 33. This causal connection can be indirect, as it
is with secondary referring, or direct. We will only discuss the direct
connections here.
27

"Singular Terms," p. 197.
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Devitt explains the causal relation between the object and the
speaker's mental state primarily as a perceptual

For example,

link.

when he is discussing· definite descriptions, he says,

"It would seem

that, for a speaker to have an object in mind, his use of the description must be based on a perception of it. " 2 9 And when he talks about
demonstratives such as 'this', 'that', 'I', 'you' 'he', 'she', and 'it',
when they are used "out of the blue," he says,
[I]t is clear that there is some causal link between the speaker and
the object in virtue of which he uses the demonstrative. He is perceiving the object ... or has recently perceived it. It is the causal
action of the object on him that led him (in part) to do what he
did. 30
The

virtues

of

Devitt's

account

are

as

follows.

First,

it

explains how reference is disambiguated when the expression and its context are not sufficient to determine a unique referent.

31

Secondly, it

helps to make sense of our ordinary practice of trying to find out what
a speaker had in mind when we are not sure what she is talking about.
Thirdly, Devitt's account can explain how a speaker refers to something
about which she has radically mistaken beliefs (including beliefs based
on misperception).
tion accounts.

This is where the causal theory surpasses satisfac-

Not only can it explain this, but the explanation is

such that it avoids the problem of fortuitous satisfaction, at least

28

Ibid., p. 195.

29

Ibid. p. 192. This perception need not be his own. His use of
the description may be based on what someone else who had perceived the
object said.
30

3 1

Designation, p. 43.

In this respect it is superior to contextual accounts, and on a
par with satisfaction accounts.

179
when the problem is due to the speaker's misperceiving or misremembering
the object.

32

Chastain's account of primary reference is similar to Devitt's in
many ways, but the terms of his explanation do not necessarily include
causal relations.

A more complete summary of Chastain' s account will

follow, but to orient the reader I will briefly draw some comparisons
between Devitt' s account
reference of

and Chastain' s.

an ambiguous

speaker had in mind.

singular term

Both accounts

say that the

is determined

by what

the

But whereas Devitt posits some kind of causal

relation between a speaker's mental states, the referents of his expressions,

and his expressions,

Chastain uses

the notion of referential

links between expressions in an overt context and elements in covert
(mental) contexts.

Both accounts reject the satisfaction model of hav-

ing an object in mind in favor of a model which downplays the speaker's
conception of the referent.

For Devitt the model is a causal one, usu-

ally involving an object's ability perceptually to affect a speaker.
For Chastain the model is an epistemic one; primary reference requires
that
other.

the
33

speaker

have

knowledge of

the referent

by

some means

or

This knowledge is often based on perception, but if there are

other means of having knowledge of an object--including non-causal ones,
these will also suffice for primary reference.
Chastain explains reference in terms of connections between ele-

32

Jaegwon Kim has argued that the problem arises for causal theories
in a different way. See "Perception and Reference without Causality,"
The Journal of Philosophy, 74 (Oct., 1977), pp. 606-620.
33

This knowledge of the object is not the same as knowledge about
the object. It is rather like 'having an object in mind'.
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ments in a context and objects.

A context, according to Chastain, is a

representational system containing elements or having a content:
In general anything which has content is a context, as I use the
term. Anything that has meaning or sense is a context.
Anything
which expresses something or { represents something is a context. 34
some examples may help to illustrate the notion of a context.

A lin-

guistic discourse is a context; its elements are words, phrases, sentences, etc.

A photograph is a context; its elements are silver depos-

its on photographic paper.

A picture is a context.

A map is a context;

its elements are symbols signifying rivers., cities, roads, etc.
visual field is a context.

A memory is a context.

A context may be overt or covert.
be an overt context.

tioned,

are

35

A sentence said out loud would

The same sentence can be simply thought.

case it is a covert context.
linguistic.

One's

In that

Some contexts, e.g., the two just men-

Others are "quasi-linguistic,"

for

example,

one's visual field, a map, or a photograph.
The analysis Chastain gives of singular reference

(in the most

general sense) is as follows:
[A] singular element in a context ~ possessed or produced by a person P refers to an object 0 i f and only if either (i) E in C is
referentially linked with a~ element E' in an antecedent context C'
and E' in c' refers to 0 or (ii) P has knowledge of 0 via E in C.
36

A primary referring expression in an overt discourse (e.g.,

34

'that

.QE. cit., p. 195.

35

Those who are concerned about the ontological status of such contexts and their contents (mental images, mental pictures) are advised to
read Chastain's defense of them. See Ibid., p. 195 and pp. 243ff.
36

Ibid., p. 251. Thus, we could have two kinds of primary reference: primary overt reference and primary covert reference.
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couple'

in the

sentence

"I

saw

that couple

again

today, 11 )

may

be

referentially linked with another referring expression in a covert discourse.

For example, before I said "I saw that couple again today," I

may have said to myself:
There's Kelly. Last week he told me about this strange couple who
spend all their time visiting the restaurants along Sheridan Road.
Yesterday he pointed them out to me.
According to Chastain 'that couple' in the overt discourse would refer
to whomever 'this strange couple who spend all their time visiting restaurants along Sheridan Road' refers to in the covert discourse if the
two

expressions

are

referentially

linked.

37

The

expression,

'this

strange couple who spend all their time visiting restaurants along Sheridan Road',

in the covert context,

could, in turn, be referentially

linked with an element in another covert context, in this case it is
most likely a memory context.

Thus, the expression 'this strange couple

who spend all their time visiting restaurants along Sheridan Road' could
be linked to an element in the memory context, perhaps an image of the
couple.

What this image refers to

is not,

as a satisfaction theory

would say, the couple who satisfies or fits the image most closely, but
rather the couple which is causally related to the image.

One could

misremember the couple in such a way that some other couple who also

3 7

I will discuss Chastain' s account of the mechanisms of linking

below.
Sometimes Chastain talks as if there is always a covert discourse
to which an ambiguous referring expression is linked. At one point he
says of 'the cat' and 'the mat' in the sentence "The cat is on the mat,"
that they "denote no cats or mats uniquely.
Instead, they get their
reference via linkage with singular terms in covert discourses," (p.
236). However, there is no reason to suppose that this step is· necessary.
The expressions could just as well be linked to elements in a
perceptual or memory context directly.
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spend all

their time visiting

restaurants

along Sheridan

Road more

closely resembles the image than the couple one's memory is based on.
Nonetheless,

the mental

image refers

(in the general sense)

couple which is causally related to the image.

to the

That couple is the one

about whom I have knowledge through the image in the memory context.
A memory may also be referentially linked with an overt discourse.
For example, before Kelly ever pointed out the strange couple, he may
have talked about

them.

I

may remember Kelly's

talking about this

couple, and some element in my memory context may refer to these people.
Once again, it is not because my description or image is uniquely satisfied by a certain couple that the remembered description refers to that
couple, but rather because this description is referentially linked to
Kelly's overt discourse which, in turn, is referentially linked to his
memory context.

The primary reference in this case is not made in my

memory context but in someone else's.

The reference of all of these

elements is the object which is causally linked to the appropriate elements in Kelly's memory context.
Ambiguous referring expressions may also be disambiguated by virtue of their links with a perceptual context.

For example, one might,

on seeing the couple, say "There's that couple again."

The expression

'that couple' may be referentially linked to one's perceptual context
which contains the perceptual image of two people.
refers

to

depends

on which elements

in the

What 'that couple'

perceptual

context

the

expression is referentially linked with and what objects those elements
Yield knowledge of.

The object which the speaker has

knowledge of

through the perceptual image is the one which is causally responsible
for the elements in the perceptual context.
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Earlier I said that Chastain analyzes primary reference in terms
of knowledge rather than causation.

This is true only for the most pri-

mary of primary referring devices.

Some primary

~eferring

devices, for

example, the expression 'that couple' i_n an overt context, are only primary relative to that context.

They are not referentially linked to

other expressions

in that context

linked to them).

However,

expression is

the

(though other expressions

referent of this

referentially linked to elements

may be

expression,

in a

if the

covert context,

depends on the referent of those elements, so relative to the covert
context, the primary referring expression in the overt context is a secondary referring expression.

According to Chastain, the mechanisms for

linking expressions in overt contexts to elements in covert contexts is
to be explained in terms of causal connections between contexts.

Thus,

his account of primary referring expressions in overt contexts is much
like Devitt's.
Recall that in Devitt's account, there were two causal relations:
one between a speaker's use of an expression and her having an· object in
mind,

and another, between the object a

speaker's having that object in mind.
sal

relation between a

speaker has in mind and the

For Chastain also there is a cau-

speaker's use of an expression

(the primary

referring expression in an overt context) and her 'having an object in
mind'.

While Chastain does not use the expression 'having an object in

mind', we could easily translate

'having an object in mind'

language of mental contexts and elements in these contexts.

into the
According

to Chastain, the reference of a primary referring expression in an overt
context is

determined by its causal

covert (or mental) context.

connection with an element

in a
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If an ambiguous primary expression in an overt context has

a

determinate referent, we would expect this referent to be determined by
a causal link between this expression and some element in a covert context.

To this extent, Chastain's account of primary reference is a cau-

sal one.
erences

His account of reference for the most primary of primary ref(e.g., the reference made with mental representations) is not

strictly a causal one.

For this kind of primary reference, when the

referring element is not referentially linked to any other element, this
primary element refers to an object
O via E in C.

0 if and only if f has knowledge of

(Chastain makes one exception to this rule:

with "terms

in referentially isolated linguistic contexts" the speaker need not have
knowledge of the referent. 38 In such contexts there is no "alternative
route to the thing referred to," "there is nothing left but denotation
to fix the identity of the referent. 11 )

39

If the context is a perceptual

or memory context, then the object of which the person has knowledge via
E is the one to which E is causally related in the appropriate way. 4

0

One can also have knowledge of an object that is not perceived at all.
For example, one may detect the presence of a burglar by seeing the mess

38

Ibid., p. 237.
The sentences, "Shoot the first man who comes
through the door," and "Our one-millionth customer will receive a
month's free grocieries," are Chastain' s examples of referentially isolated linguistic contexts. Presumably, "The largest whale alive weighs
over 2, 000 pounds," is also such a context. What seems to be important
here is that in such contexts, the only way the speaker can refer to the
object is by using that particular description (p. 236).
39

40

Ibid., p. 238.

It should be clear
knowledge of that this
pressed to say what the
that there is an object,
object it is.

from this analysis of the object a person has
type of knowledge is not propositional.
If
person knows, we might venture that she knows
though she may be mistaken about what kind of
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he made and discovering that objects are missing.

One knows of the bur-

glar by inference from the evidence one does perceive.
responsible for

the evidence is not

If the thing

a burglar, but instead a sloppy

detective, then one knows of the detective even though one believes of
this person that she is a burglar.

Or again, a person who is allergic

to cats may enter a room and detect the presence of a cat by the fact
that she begins to sneeze.

Although she does not perceive the cat, she

knows of him through his effects.

If she says "You must have a cat.

I'm allergic to it," then 'a cat' and 'it' refer to the cat which the
speaker knows of via its effect on her.

41

Here again, if what caused her

to sneeze was not a cat, but a lion, she would be referring to the lion
who was causally responsible for the sneeze.
We can summarize Chastain's account of disambiguation in this way.
The reference of most

(overt)

referring expression is determined by

their referential links to elements in covert contexts. 42 Truly primary
reference (primary reference that is primary relative to all contexts)
almost always occurs in a perceptual or memory context.

In these con-

texts, the element which refers, refers to some object by virtue of a
causal relation between the object and that element.

43

Both Devitt and Chastain hold that reference is disambiguated by

4 1

If there are two cats, does 'a cat' refer to both? to the one
which is causally responsible for her sneezing? I am not sure that the
analysis works at this level.
42

The only exception Chastain makes is for expressions in referentially isolated linguistic contexts. See note 38 above.
4 3

Chastain leaves open the possibility of our having immediate,
non-perceptual knowledge of some kinds of objects. If we do, then causal relations would not be important for such knowledge.
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what the speaker had in mind when she uttered the ambiguous referring
expression.

Both ultimately analyze having an object (or at least any

object that exists in space and time) in mind in terms of a causal relation between the object and the speaker's state of mind.

Devitt ana-

lyzes primary reference in terms of a causal relation between an object
and a state of mind (such that the person has that object in mind) and
another causal relation between the state of mind and a use of a referring expression to refer to an object.

So, for example, in the antel-

ope-rock case, where the speaker says, "That has been watching us all
night," the referent of 'that' is the object which caused the speaker's
perceptual experience, which experience, in turn, led the speaker to say
what she did.
Chastain analyzes primary reference in an overt linguistic context
in terms of reference links with elements in covert contexts. 44 The elements in ordinary covert non-linguistic contexts (namely perceptual and
memory contexts) refer to an object by virtue of a causal connection
between the object and that element.

So, for example, in the antelope-

rock case, the word 'that' is referentially linked to an element in the
perceptual context (e.g., the antelope-rock percept). 45 This element of
the perceptual context is causally connected with the rock in the appropriate way.
The most important advantage causal theories of primary reference
have over satisfaction theories is that they involve a real

44

45

(that is,

These reference links receive a causal analysis.

The mechanisms of referential linkage may be causal or, perhaps, a
combination of causal and quasi-syntactic factors.
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physical) connection between the object being referred to and the person
doing the referring.

This connection blocks the possibility of fortui-

tous satisfaction based on the speaker's mistaken beliefs, her misperceptions, or her faulty memories.

The object a speaker has in mind,

accoring to causal theories, is not the one which satisfies her description of the object or the one which fits her conception of the object.
One's conception (or perception) of an object can be radically mistaken
and one can, nevertheless refer to that object, and have that object in
mind by virtue of a causal connection between the object and the speaker's state of mind.
Both Devitt and Chastain explain how the reference of ambiguous
referring expressions is determined in terms of a prior act of referring.

46

This prior act of referring may be accomplished by means of lin-

guistic devices, as, for example, when an overt discourse is linked to a
covert discourse.

Or it may be accomplished through 'quasi-linguistic'

means, for example, by means of a mental image or a perceptual experience.

The reference of the referring expression in the overt discourse

will be determinate only if the reference of the corresponding covert
referring device is determinate.
For

both Devitt

and

Chastain,

perceptual

experiences

play

an

important role in explaining how the reference of ambiguous linguistic
expressions is determined.

46

A large class of ambiguous referring expres-

Referring is here used in the broad sense in which not only linguistic expressions refer, but other things as well. Chastain's account
of referring by virtue of having an object in mind is less problematic
than Devitt's in that his analysis of any kind of reference (speaker's
or semantic) involves the same three terms: a person who refers; an
object that is referred to; and a means for referring.
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sions are linked, directly or indirectly, to perceptual contexts.

The

reference of these expressions depends on what the perceptual element to
which they are referentially linked refers to.

The mechanisms by which

the elements in a perceptual context refer to an object are causal.

The

basic idea here is that an element in a perceptual context refers to the
object which stands in a certain causal relation to that element, rather
than to the object which fits or satisfies the content of the perceptual
experience.

So, for example, Chastain writes:

Denotationism is, of course, false for perceptual contexts. What
counts is the causal pathway along which information passes from the
object perceived to the perceptual context; it is this which determines the identity of the thing which is seen, heard, touched,
smelled, etc. The information may be degraded or contaminated in
transit or distorted by the perceiver, but still it is that object
which is perceived and not some other which, quite accidentally happens uniquely to fit the content of the perceptual context. 47
I think that an account of disambiguation along the lines suggested by Chastain and Devitt has some good points.

There are aspects

of such accounts that are problematic.
One aspect of these accounts, especially of Chastain's, which I do
not accept is the easy rejection of denotationism.

While I accept the

argument that denotationism is false for elements in perceptual and memory contexts, I think it is much less clear that denotationism is false
for referring expressions in a language.
to

abandon denotationism

refer.

even

for

Chastain, however, is willing

explaining how

these

expressions

He believes an expression can refer to something which it does

not denote, "if there is an alternate route to the thing referred to,"
(p.

238).

47

For example, in the sentence 'Smith's murderer is insane,

Ibid., p. 248f.
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Chastain seems to think that the expression,

'Smith's murderer', can

refer to someone who is not denoted by 'Smith's murderer.'

In fact,

from what Chastain says, we can infer that only in the absence of alternate routes to the referent

is

the reference of

determined by the denotation of this expression.

'Smith's murderer'

Were Chastain correct,

reference potential would not be determined solely by linguistic rules
which specify an expression's denotation.

Rules of reference linkage

would also have to be incorporated into the account of reference potential.

Thus, the reference rule for a definite desciption would not only

say that the possible referents of an expression of the form,
are those things which are

E:,

'the F'

it would also have to include a clause

about what the description could refer to given certain reference links
with elements in covert contexts.
quely denoting expression could,

If Chastain were right, even a uniaccording to the rules

refer to something other than the object it denotes.

of English,

It would follow

that even uniquely denoting expressions can be ambiguous.

The mere fact

that an expression uniquely denoted an object would not be sufficient
for determinate reference, since it could be the case that this expression was referentially linked to some other expression.
This claim is false.

It would be one thing to say that what the

speaker intended to refer to when she said 'Smith's murderer' was not
the person who actually murdered Smith.

Chastain provides us with a

helpful way of discussing speakers' intended reference.

Our speaker may

have covertly referred to some person not denoted by 'Smith's murderer'
by some means other than the expression 'Smith's murderer'.

She may

have referred by means of a perceptual image or a remembered image to
someone she believed was Smith's murderer but who actually was not.

It
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does not follow, however, that the expression the speaker used to communicate her intended referent refers to someone other than the person it
denotes.

Given our second criterion of adequacy for reference rules.

we should reject Chastain's account of reference potential for definite
descriptions.

If the account of reference Chastain proposes

entails

that the English expression 'Smith's murderer' can refer to someone who
is not denoted by the expression, then it fails to meet criterion two:
A theory of reference is adequate only if it is such that for any
statement of the form '~ is ~', if what the theory identifies as the
referent of the statement actually is P then the statement must be
true. 48
If Chastain's theory identifies the referent of the English expression,
'Smith's murderer', in the sentence "Smith's murderer is insane," as the
person the speaker believes is Smith's murderer, say Jones, but who is
not Smith's murderer, then his theory fails to meet this criterion.

For

the English statement, "Smith's murderer is insane," could be false even
if Jones (the person the theory identifies as the referent of the English expression 'Smith's murderer') is insane.
who murdered Smith is not insane.

Suppose that the person

It is quite obvious that the English

statement, "Smith's murderer is insane," would be false.
In this chapter we are primarily concerned with disambiguation and
not with reference potential.

However, my disagreement with Chastain

about reference potential will lead to disagreement about what referring
expressions the theory of disambiguation applies to.

I would argue that

there is no reason to explain how the referent of a uniquely denoting
expression is disambiguated.

48

See Chapter Two.

Chastain would not.

I would also say that
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a uniquely denoting expression is always a primary one; Chastain would
not.

In fact, Chastain holds that a definite description cannot begin a

reference chain;

it must

always be

linked to some other expression.

This seems to be true for ambiguous definite descriptions such as 'the
man I .

If a person came upon a sequence of sentences beginning with an

ambiguous definite description, she would, justifiably, assume that she
had missed something, or that the speaker was linking his expression to
some element in a covert context.

Consider the following sequence of

sentences:
The man began to jump up and down, flailing his arms. He could not
be calmed even by the most soothing and reassuring facts.
In reading this paragraph, we feel we have missed something.
The situation is different however, when the definite description
is uniquely denoting.

We need not look at the preceding page or wonder

who the writer may have had in mind when we read the sequence:
Smith's murderer began to jump up and down, flailing his arms. He
could not be calmed even by the most soothing and reassuring facts.
Recall that Chastain had to make an exception to his reference
rule in the case of expressions in referentially isolated linguistic
contexts.

The reference of expressions such as 'the first man to walk

through the door' and 'the largest whale in the ocean' was determined,
according to Chastain,

by their denotation.

Chastain seems to think

that what is special about these expressions is that they occur in isolated linguistic contexts.
not clear.)

(Exactly what what makes them isolated is

I would argue that what is special about these expressions

is that they uniquely denote their referent.

In such cases there is no

reason to inquire of the speaker what he intended to refer to, even when
there is some object other than the one denoted which he intends to
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refer to with that expression.

There is no need to ask the speaker for

clarification because it is already quite clear who or what the referent
is.

If the speaker says, in English, "The next person to walk through

the door will be carrying a book," it makes no difference to the reference of the expression,

'the next person to walk through the door',

whether she has a particular person in mind or not.
refers to the next person who walks through the door.

The express ion
If the person

believed it would be Smith and knew that Smith would be carrying a book,
her English sentence will still be false if someone other than Smith is
the first person to walk through the door and this person fails to be
carrying a book.

This will be the case even i f Smith walks through the

door an instant later.
If we are careful to make the distinction between what a speaker
intends to refer to (where her intended reference is the reference of
some element in a covert context) and what her uses of English expressions refer to, there is no reason to reject denotationism as a theory
of how the reference potential of English expressions is determined.
What seems to motivate anti-denotationist accounts of reference potential are cases of charitable and justified interpretations.
ple, we may know that Smith's murderer is not insane.

For exam-

We may also know

that Morgenstern believes that Jones is Smith's murderer.

When Mor-

genstern says 'Smith's murderer is insane,' we may give her credit for a
true belief (namely, that Jones is insane).

We may even give her credit

for informing us of something true (namely, that Jones is insane).
we are justified in doing so.

And

But the fact that we give Morgenstern

credit for these things does not mean that we give her credit for· uttering a true sentence.

It is quite clear that her sentence is false in
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this case. 49
The same arguments that show that the reference potential of uniquely denoting descriptions

is determined by their denotation can be

used to show that the reference potential of ambiguous definite descriptions is determined by their denotation.

The express ion,

'the antel-

ope', can no more refer to a rock than 'Smith's murderer' can refer to
someone who is not

Smith's murderer.

The sentence

'The antelope

is

standing still,' will be false if it is not the case that some antelope
is standing still.

The speaker may believe something true, and may say

this sentence on the basis of this true belief, but the sentence is not
true.
The notion of reference links between expressions in overt contexts and elements in covert contexts can help us to explain how the
reference of ambiguous referring expressions is determined, but we have
no reason to think that the reference potential of referring expressions
in a language is determined by these links.

50

We shall accept Chastain's

account of reference links as an account of disambiguation, but reject
his view of reference potential.

On my view, uniquely denoting expres-

sions require no disambiguation.

Any links between these expressions

49

We are not likely to correct the sentence probably because to do
so would be impolite.
We would, however, correct her statement under
certain conditions, when it matters whether the sentence is true.
If
Morgenstern were a court-appointed psychiatrist testifying under oath,
the council for the defense would be remiss if he did not ask her to
modify the statement. Similarly, a court reporter would (and should) be
corrected for such sloppy and prejudicial usage.
50

Links between referring elements in covert contexts and sounds or
symbols (as physical objects) may help to explain how expressions come
to have a denotation in the first place. That is a different matter.
See Chapter Eight.
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and elements in mental contexts are irrelevant to the reference of the
expressions.

Further, on my view, if a speaker intends to refer to a

particular object by means of some element in a covert context she may
succeed in referring to a quite determinate thing via that

element.

Nonetheless, the referring expression she uses may fail to have a determinate reference.

If the speaker intends

to refer to a determinate

thing but that thing does not belong to the set of potential referents
of the ambiguous expression she uses, the reference of that expression
remains ambiguous.

For example,

if the speaker covertly refers to a

rock by means of an element in her perceptual field,

and says "That

antelope has been standing very still," the expression 'that antelope'
does not refer to the rock (if it did, we should have problems with
truth conditions).
If no

If it refers to anything, it refers to an antelope.

antelope is the intended referent, then the expression has no

determinate reference.
Another aspect of causal theories which is problematic is that
they seem to reduce reference to a purely physical, (i.e., causal) relation.

What is problematical about this reduction is that it seems it

will not work.

Putnam has argued that the problem with reducing refer-

ence to some kind of causal relation is that there are too many causal
relations.
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All kinds of objects are involyed in one's having a percep-

tual image, for example, of a rock.

To say which ones are relevant to

the reference of the perceptual image requires that one already have a
definition of reference.

51

1981).

£i!.

Reason, Truth, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University-Press,
See especially p. 66.
Jaegwon Kim makes a similar point, QE.
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At this point we should distinguish two distinct claims.

One

claim is that the intentionality or 'aboutnes' of perceptual states (or
experiences) can be fully explained on a causal model.
the claim that a perceptual state is about
if and only if

~

caused that state.

in a perceptual context is about

~

This would be

(or is a perception of

~)

A separate claim is that an element
~

rather than y if and only i f

rather than y, caused (at least in part) that state.

~'

This second claim

presupposes that there can be discrete elements within a perceptual context and that at least some of these elements refer, but it makes no
assumptions about whether reference of any kind can occur without an
established language.
intentionality

of

It is consistent with this claim to hold that the

perceptual

states

(their

being

about

something)

depends on the existence of a referential framework introduced only by a
fairly sophisticated natural language.

52

The second claim says only that

a necessary condition for a perception to be of a particular object
is that it is caused by

~·

o

Causal theories, including those of Chastain

and Devitt, provide evidence that supports the second claim; the first
claim is much more problematic.
Criticisms of causal theories that say there are too many causal
relations for reference to be just a matter of causality are generally
directed against claims of the first type; the claim that a certain kind
of causal relation is a necessary and sufficient condition for one kind
of reference

--the reference of elements

items in the world.

52

in a perceptual context to

I will discuss these criticisms in the next chap-

Such a framework may be necessary for the individuation of elements in the perceptual context.
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ter.

But we should note here what is at stake.

If this

claim were

true, then we would have a basic reference relation whose explanation
does not require any linguistic or semantic notions of reference, and in
terms of which these semantic notions could be analyzed.

Primary refer-

ence could ultimately be explained in terms of simple physical causation, and we could explain how words come to refer by showing how their
use is related to these basic referential devices and connections.
the next chapter I will argue that claims of this type are.false.

In
Gau-

sal relations between an object and a perceiver are n9t sufficient for a
perceptual state to refer to that object.
To explain how reference is disambiguated we need not claim that
certain kinds of causal relations are necessary and sufficient for reference.

We can assume that there are distinct elements in a perceptual

context and that they can refer, and only ask under what conditions they
refer to one possible referent rather than another.
elements in a perceptual

With respect to the

context, what we should take theories

like

those of Devitt and Chastain to claim is that the reference of percep-·
tual 'images,
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is determined by causal relations rather than by rela-

tions of satisfaction or fit.

Assuming that perceptual images can be

about or refer to things in the world, the set of things they can be
about is limited to the set of things that caused the perceiver to have
this perceptual experience.
lows:

We could argue for such as claim as fol-

The relationship between a referring device

and its potential

referents is such that if no potential referent is the referent of the

53

I will use the term 'perceptual images' as short-hand for elements
in a perceptual context.
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device, then nothing is.

If the referring device is a perceptual image

and the potential referents were those objects which satisfied or fit
the image, then if the image did not refer to any of the things which
satisfied it, it would refer to nothing.

However, one can in fact have

a visual image with the content described as, for example, an antelope
(which might be satisfied by some antelope), but which is not a perceptual experience of any antelope at all, but rather an experience of a
rock which, because of the lighting and the perceiver's position, looks
like an antelope.

If the reference potential of visual experiences was

determined by a relation of satisfaction between the object and the visual image, then we could not perceive rocks as antelopes.
experience would be an experience of nothing,

Our visual

if not of an antelope.

This conclusion is at best implausible.
On the other hand, if the reference potential of visual images is
determined

by which

results issue.

objects

caused the

image,

no

such

implausible

If nothing playing a causal role in the production of

the image is the referent of the image, then the image fails to refer.
There actually are cases when none of the things causing a visual image
are the referent of the image, for example, when someone is hallucinating.

In such cases the image refers to nothing.

This is exactly what

we would expect if the reference potential of the visual

experience

depends on causal connections between the image and the thing it refers

The advantage causal theories of primary reference have over satisfaction theories is that they involve a real connection between the
object being referred to and the person doing the referring.

This con-

nection blocks the possibility of fortuitous satisfaction based on the
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speaker's mistaken beliefs, her mis perceptions, or her faulty memories.
The object a speaker has in mind, according to causal theories, is not
the one which satisfies her description of the object or the one which
fits her conception of the object.

One's conception (or perception) of

an object can be radically mistaken and one can, nevertheless refer to
that object, and have that object in mind by virtue of a causal connection between the object and the speaker's state of mind.
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The account of disambiguation I propose explains how the reference
of referring expressions is disambiguated in terms of what the speaker
had in mind.

The reference potential of a referring expression as it is

used is not merely a matter of the meaning or denotation of the expression, taken out of context.

Referring expressions can be used in con-

junction with gestures which limited the range of potential referents of
the expression-demonstrative combination.

They can also be referen-

tially linked to other expressions such that their potential referents
are the same as the potential referents of the expression to which they
are linked.

These factors may be taken as co-determinants of reference

potential for an expression which is actually used, if the unit of analysis is the expression as it is used.

If the unit of analysis is the

referring expression token considered outside of any use of it, then we
might say that these contextual factors serve to disambiguate the reference.
Once we recognize referring expressions as devices which can be

,/~sed
'/

in conjunction with other referring devices

(either gestures or

other overt expressions) and recognize the role these other referring

54

At least up to a point.

There may be further constraints.
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devices play in determining the reference of the expression as it is
used, we find that many seemingly ambiguous referring expressions have a
quite determinate ref·erence.

However,

a significant number of cases

remain for which contextual factors and reference links do not uniquely
determine a referent.

In such cases, if there is a determinate refer-

ent, what the expression referred to is the potential referent that the
speaker intended to refer to, or the one the speaker had in mind.
To explain how the reference of these expressions is determined I
have adopted Chastain's model of reference links between the expression
and some element in a covert context based on a causal relation between
the two.

The elements in a covert context may,

in turn, be referen-

tially linked to other elements in other contexts, or they may be uniquely referring on their own and thus terminate the reference chain.
This approach presupposes that elements in a covert context (e.g., a
perceptual or memory context;
refer.

'words'

in a mentalese sentence, etc.)

I have suggested that the reference relation between these men-

tal elements and their referents is, in part, a causal one.

l

"'/

CHAPTER VII

REFERENCE RULES FOR SINGULAR TERMS

The general question throughout this dissertation has been:
what extent do intentions to refer determine reference?

To

In the preced-

ing chapters I discussed the role a speaker's intentions to refer play
in disambiguating the reference of the expressions she uses.

I argued

that the speaker's intentions to refer with a certain expression do codetermine what that expression refers to when the reference is
ous.

ambigu~

I concluded that the referent of an ambiguous English expression

is that potential referent which the speaker intended to refer to.

1

In the following chapters I shall discuss the role intentions to
refer play in a theory of reference potential.

When we are discussing

reference potential, or what some referring device could refer to, it is
important to note that there are at least three senses in which it can
be said that an expression could be used to refer.

In one sense, the

reference potential is relative to a natural language.

The expression,

'the blue pen', as an expression of English, could be used, in English,
to refer to one of the members of the set of blue pens.

In the preced-

ing discussion of disambiguation this was the sense in which we used
reference potential.

In the next chapters also we will be primarily

0

'/

1

Note that a number of factors were involved in determining potential referents: semantic, syntactic and contextual factors all set limits on the range of potential referents for an expression.
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concerned with reference potential relative to a

language.

There is

another sense in which we say an expression could be used to refer to an
object.

In this

sens~

reference potential is relative to a particular

speaker's idiolect. 2 'The blue pen', as an expression in someone's idiolect, could be used in that person's idiolect to refer to something
other than a blue pen.

A third sense in which an expression could be

used to refer to an object is in the sense that any physical object
(including expressions, mental states or events, and salt-shakers) could
be used to refer to some other object on a particular occasion.

In this

sense, reference potential is not relative to anything.
When we talk about the reference potential of expressions in English, what we are looking for are rules, presumably linguistic rules and
conventions, according to which the reference potential of particular
referring expressions is determined.

An example of a rule of this kind

would be the rule for definite descriptions in English which says, "the
potential referents of an expression of the form,
individuals which are F."

'the

£:', are those

This rule says how the reference potential of

any definite description in English is determined.

According to this

rule, the potential referents of the English expression,

'the blue pen'

will be blue pens.
Note that a theory of reference potential for expressions in a
language presupposes that there is such a thing as a language (even if

l

i

2

An idiolect is an individual speaker's language. Within an idio'.' lect words have a determinate reference potential, as they do within a
language, but the reference potential of the expressions in an idiolect
may be totally idiosyncratic.
This reference potential may be determined be the speaker's intentions to use the word in a certain way or by
the force of the speaker's past uses of the word, setting a pr~cedent
for future uses.
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this is understood as a theoretical construct or as an idealization of
actual linguistic practices), and tries only to describe the conventions
governing the correct use of referring expressions in that language.

A

theory of reference potential for expressions in a language is, basically, a description of correct usage of referring expressions in that
language.

If someone were to deny that there is such a thing as a lan-

guage, or that there is correct (and incorrect) usage, then this person
would deny the possibility of formulating an acceptable theory of reference potential for expressions in a language, for there would be nothing
to describe.
The same kinds of comments can be made about a theory of reference
potential for expressions in an idiolect.

Such a theory would presup-

pose that there were rules governing the use of expressions in the idiolect and try to describe these rules.

(A person who denies

the exis-

tence of natural ·languages may attempt to explain linguistic behavior in
terms of intersecting idiolects.)

Here also one presupposes that there

is correct and incorrect usage of expressions; in this case, however,
the standards of correctness apply only to expressions in the idiolect
and not necessarily to a shared language.
The most general theory of reference potential, the one that tries
to explain how any physical object could be used to refer, does not presuppose a language (either a natural language or an idiolect).

It asks

the more general question: Under what conditions can any physical object

-J

,/refer.
'/

usage;

This

theory is

it describes,

not

a description of correct

instead, the general conditions

(or

incorrect)

under which any

object can be used to refer to some other object.
In this chapter our main concern will be with reference potential
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for English

epressions

for singular

reference.

3

We shall

be asking

whether and to what extent intentions to refer determine the reference
potential of such expressions in a language (in this case, English).

To

ascertain the proper role of intentions to refer in a theory of ref erence potential we shall look at the reference rules for these English
expressions to see whether the correct rules contain reference to intentions

to

refer.

Since

the

reference

of

these

expressions

is,

by

hypothesis, determined according to these rules, it will follow that if
the correct rules mention intentions to refer, then intentions to refer
play some role in determining the reference potential of those expressions.

In this chapter I will argue that once we distinguish a theory

of disambiguation from a theory of reference potential, we find that the
reference rules for English expressions for singular reference need not
mention intentions to refer.
An adequate reference rule for (at least attributive uses of) definite descriptions, for example, would be:
x is a potential referent of an English expression of the form
'the f' (used attributively) if and only if x is an individual and
x is F.
The reference rule for demonstratives without a sortal would be:
x is a potential referent of the English expression
'that' if and only if x is an individual;

'this'

or

and for demonstratives with a sortal a reference rule like the following
will suffice:
i

x is a potential referent of an English expression of the form
'that F' or 'this F' if and only if x is an individual and x is F.

/

'/

For ease of exposition we will use the term reference pote~tial to
refer to reference potential relative to English unless otherwise indicated.
3
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Reference rules that do not mention intentions to refer also govern the
use of pure indexicals such as 'I', 'here',
well as pronouns such ·as 'he', 'you',

'today', and 'tomorrow', as

'it', 'they', etc.

Even the ref-

erence rule for names could be formulated without mentioning intentions
to refer.

For example, the reference rule for names might be:

x is a potential referent of 'NN' just in case x is an NN.

4

With each of these kinds of expressions not only can a reference
rule be formulated without mentioning anyone's intentions to refer, but
rival theories which do mention intentions to refer are wrong.

It is

easy to provide counter examples to intentionalist theories of reference
potential.

Suppose the claim is that the reference rule for the English

word 'I' (in ordinary contexts) 5 is as follows:
~
~

is a potential referent of the English expression 'I', spoken by
if and only if~ is the individual S intends to refer to with 'I'.

Ordinarily the persons we intend to refer to with the word 'I' is ourselves.

But suppose a person, let us call him Harry, believed he was

Napoleon, and when he used the word 'I' he intended to refer to Napoleon.

According to the proposed reference rule, 'I' in this case would

refer to Napoleon.

But clearly it does not.

"Unfortunately, I lost my last battle."

Suppose Harry had said,

If 'I' referred to Napoleon in

this sentence, and Napoleon did, in fact, lose his last battle, then the

4

This rule is suggested by Tyler Burge in "Reference and Proper
II
.Names, The Journal of Philosophy, 70 (1973), pp. 425-439. His version
I,, of the rule is formulated in terms of truth. Thus, he says, "O'Hara is
., true of any object y just in case y is an O'Hara," (p. 435).
Whether x is an NN will depend on whether the name 'NN' has been
given to x. W~ will discuss the conditions under which a name is given
to an individual later.
•

J

5

Extraordinary contexts would be fiction and direct quotation.
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English sentence would be true, but it is not.
Similar counter examples

can be constructed for

intentionalist

reference rules which explain how the reference potential of other kinds
of English referring expressions is determined.

In each case we simply

suppose that the speaker has a false belief about some individual and
that her intention to refer is based on this false belief.

When this

occurs, what she intends to refer to with some English expression,

~'

will often fail to be what our intuitions tell us the English expression
refers to.
Of course such exaggerated intentionalist theories are only a limitting case.

I know of no one who actually holds that the reference

potential of such expressions in English is determined by a particular
speaker's
expression.

intentions

to

refer

to something with

a

certain English

When intentions to refer are actually incorporated into the

reference rules for these expressions in English they are used either to
explain how reference is disambiguated or to otherwise supplement a
non-intentionalist rule.

I have already discussed theories of disambig-

uation at length, and have argued that intentions to refer do play some
role in disambiguating reference.

What we want to know now is whether

they also play a role in theories of reference potential for expressions
in English, and if so, what role they do play.
Some theorists have thought that intentions to refer figure in the
r,eference rules for a certa.in kind of definite description, namely, ref-

"

,(erential uses of definite descriptions.

In his paper, "Reference and

Definite Descriptions," Keith Donnellan proposed that there are two different kinds of definite descriptions: definite descriptions that are
used attributively;

and definite descriptions that

are used referen-
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tially. 6 In using a description of the form, 'the

F' attributively, the

speaker attributes to an individual the property of being
Cases' What

'the F'

In such

· d e t ermine
· d b y i't s d eno tat'ion.
re f ers t o is

potential referents of such uses
things which are F.

I·

of definite descriptions

The

are those

Definite descriptions· can also be used referen-

tially to single out an individual.

According to Donnellan, a speaker

may use a definite description, for example,

'the blue pen', merely to

enable her audience to identify her intended referent, without thereby
attributing the property of being a blue pen to the referent.
There are several different ways of understanding the importance
of this distinction for theories of reference potential for English.
One would be to say that it has nothing to do with the semantics of English.

7

If Donnellan' s

distinction does have something to do with the

reference potential of English expressions, we might formulate rules for
the reference potential of referential uses of definite descriptions in
any of the following ways:
(1) x is a potential referent of an English expression with the form
'the- F' used referentially by S, if and only if, S intends to refer
to x with 'the F'.
(2) x is a potential referent of an English expression of the form
'the- F' used referentially by S if and only if S believes xis F
and S intends to refer to x with-' the F'.
-

6

The Philosophical Review, 75 (1966), pp. 281-304.
Reprinted in
Schwartz (ed.), Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds, (Ithaca:
~,Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 42-65.
/

~tephen

7

This is Kripke' s position.
He argues that the distinction is
important only for pragmatics, not for semantics. See "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference," in French, Uehling, and Wettstein (eds.),
Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language, (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1977), pp. 6-27.
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(3) ~ is a potential referent of an English expression of the form
'the F' used referentially by S i f and only i f ! is K and S
intends to refer to ~ with 'the F 1 .
Any of these versions is a plausible interpretation of Donnellan's characterization of referential uses of definite descriptions.
Donnellan rejects our second reference rule for referential uses
of definite descriptions.

He argues that a person could use a definite

description, for example, 'the king'
believe is the king.

to refer to someone she does not

She may believe that he is a usurper.

What the

English expression 'the king' refers to in her sentence, "The king is a
usurper," is not the person the speaker believes to be the king.

This

argument is sufficient grounds for rejecting our second reference rule
for referential uses of definite descriptions.
The reference rule that Donnellan seems to support is (1):

The

referent of a definite description used referentially is the individual
the speaker

intends

description or not.

to

refer to,

individual

fits

the

In the preceding chapter we saw that Chastain also

accepted this reference rule.
erence rule was incorrect.
murderer is

whether this

insane."

In that chapter we argued that this refThere we considered the sentence "Smith's

We argued that,

if Jones is not the murderer,

then, even if the speaker did intend to refer to Jones with the expression 'Smith's murderer', the English expression itself does not refer to
Jones; instead it refers to the person who murdered Smith,

if anyone .

.;The problem with the intentionalist analysis of 'Smith's murderer'
1/that

it

fails

to

get

the

truth conditions

"Smith's murderer is insane." 8

8

This is also true of reference rule (2).

right

for

the

is

sentence

>
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This same argument cannot be used for the expression,
in the sentence "The king is a usurper."

'the king'

In this case, it seems that

the sentence would be true if the speaker intended to refer to a certain
person

(the usurper)

and that person was

a usurper.

Since we have

already established that a speaker's intentions to refer play some role
in disambiguating reference, and the expression 'the king' is ambiguous,
it may be that the plausibility of the intentionalist account in this
case is a result of the ambiguity of the expression.

However, even if

the expression were uniquely denoting, it would still appear that the
speaker's intention to refer to a certain person with that expression,
rather than the denotation of the expression, determined the referent.
Suppose someone who lived in Northumbria when it was a monarchy had
said, "The present king of Northumbria is a usurper."

Even if the usur-

per was not truly the present king of Northumbria, the English sentence
would be true if the person the speaker intended to ref er to was a usurper.
I

argued earlier that

the

reference potential of any ·definite

description was determined by its denotation.
be a counter example to this claim.

The present case seems to

Here, it seems that 'the present

king of Northumbria' could correctly be used to refer to someone who is
not actually the present king of Northumbria, and thus is not denoted by
this expression.

Nonetheless, given the number of cases in which an

Jntentionalist account of reference potential for definite descriptions
,/is wrong and denotationism is correct, I am hesitant to accept the former on the basis of an isolated counter example.

Rather than accept

'the present king of Northumbria' as a valid counter example to denotationism, we should examine this case more closely to see why it seems to
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work when other, similar examples do not.
'The present king of Northumbria' example is a counter example to
denotationism only if· ( 1)

'the present king of Northumbria' does not

denote the usurper and (2) the usurper could still be the referent.

It

would be difficult to deny that the usurper could be the referent.

If

he could not, then it would not be possible correctly to say, in English,

"The present king of Northumbria is a usurper," since we could

never correctly refer to the usurper with that expression.

But it is

clear that this is a correct English sentence and that the sentence is
true if the alleged usurper is actually a usurper.
were true,

If denotationism

and 'the present king of Northumbria' did not denote usur-

pers, then the sentence, "The present king of Northumbria is a usurper,"
would be analytically false, or at least it would lack a truth value.
We cannot dismiss this counter example to denotationism by denying
that the usurper could be the referent of 'the present king of Northumbria'.

If there is some ground for dismissing it, there must be some-

thing wrong with the claim that 'the present king of Northumbria' does
not denote usurpers.

I think there

is.

What is presupposed in the

argument against denotationism is that 'the present king of Northumbria'
denotes only those individuals who satisfy certain, very rigid criteria;
they must have a special kind of entitlement to the title of king.
Usurpers are people who have seized the title but lack the proper justi1 fication

for doing so.

1~ succession

For example, in a society where the rights of

are specified such that the proper heir to the throne is the

oldest living male descendant of the king and his official consort, the
only person entitled to claim the throne is the person who satisfies
this condition.

A person who seizes the throne but fails to satisfy
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this condition is a usurper.
To deny that usurpers are denoted by the expression 'the king' is
to suppose that 'the king' denotes only those rulers who are entitled to
be king.

If this were correct,

it would follow that even if someone

were to exercise all the powers, privileges and responsibilities of a
monarch, and even if he were to officially perform all those ceremonies
necessary for claiming the title of king, 9 he would still not be denoted
by 'the king' unless he was entitled by the customs and laws of his land
to claim that title.
kings.

That is,

'the king' would denote only rightful

This seems clearly false.

If a person officially performs all

the ceremonies necessary for claiming the title of king, exercises all
the powers, privileges and responsibilities of monarchy, and induces his
subjects to permit him to exercise these powers, then he is the king,
even though he may not be the rightful king.
tinction between kings and rightful kings;

In English we make a dis'the rightful king' denotes

fewer individuals than 'the king'.
If 'the present king of Northumbria' denotes not only the rightful
king but also the usurper, then Donnellan's purported counter example to
denotationism is not a counter example at all.

10

The weight of the evi-

dence goes against intentionalist accounts of definite descriptions in
favor of denotationist accounts.

I
,/
'/

9

10

We can conclude that the potential

For example, coronation by the proper authority.

I suspect that any half-way plausible counter example to denotationism can be explained away in a similar manner. For example, another
purported counter example is found in the sentence, "Jones' wife lives
in Los Angeles," where the woman the speaker intended to refer to-is not
Jones' lawful wife because Jones married her while he was still married
to someone else.
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referents of any definite description, those used attributively as well
as those used referentially,
description.

is determined by the denotation of the

Thus, we·reject proposed reference rule (1).

Reference rule (3),
x is a potential referent of an English expression of the form 'the
~' used referentially by ~ if and only if ~ is E and S intends to
refer to ~with 'the E',
accepts the truth of denotationism
futher condition for

~' s

(~

must actually be .£:), but adds a

being a potential referent of a referential

use of expressions of the form 'the F'.

11

To evaluate this reference rule, we should compare what it does
with what a straightforward denotationist analysis does.

We should see

whether and how this rule is better than a rule which does not mention
the speaker's intention to refer.
~

The speaker's intentions to refer to

with 'the ;[' may serve to disambiguate the reference of

'the F' .

Thus, when someone says, "The king is a usurper," the reference of 'the
king' is determined not only by the denotation of 'the king' but also by
the speaker's intention to refer to a certain person with 'the king'.
have already argued that this is the case.

However, we are concerned in

this chapter only with reference potential.
speaker's intention to refer to

I

We want to know what the

x with 'the F' contributes to a theory

of reference potential for expressions of the form 'the

E'.

We should accept the denotation-plus-intention reference rule, as
ppposed to a simple denotation rule, only if there are.cases in which

l
11

Howard Wettstein interprets the referential-attributive distinction this way.
See "The Semantic Significance of the Referential-Attributive Distinction," Philosophical Studies, 44 (1983), pp. 187-196
and "Demonstrative Reference and Definite Descriptions," Philosophical
Studies 40 (1981), pp. 241-257.
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what an English expression could refer to depends on denotation plus
intentions to refer.
referential

Since intentions to refer are used to distinguish

and attributive uses

of

definite descriptions,

we would

expect that there would be a difference between the reference potential
of attributive uses of definite descriptions (whose reference potential
is determined solely by denotation) and referential uses of definite
descriptions

(whose reference potential is purportedly determined by

denotation and intentions to refer).

So,

for example, the reference

potential of 'Smith's murderer' used attributively should be different
from the reference potential of 'Smith's murderer' used referentially.
The reference potential of both is, by hypothesis, determined by denotation, so if there is indeed a difference in reference potential between
the two,

it must be that the intentions-to-refer clause narrows the

range of potential referents for referential uses of definite descriptions.
What a referential use of a definite description could refer to in
English would be a subset of the set of things an attributive use of a
definite description
'Smith's murderer'

could refer to

in English.

For

example,

what

could refer to when it is used referentially would

have to be, under some conditions, only a subset of the set.of things
'Smith's murderer' could refer to when it is used attributively.
pose Mr. Spock is Smith's murderer.
~ively,

Sup-

'Smith's murderer, used attribu-

could only refer in English to Mr. Spock.

(An example of an

'!attributive use of 'Smith's murderer' would be if the coroner, on examining Smith's mangled body, said "Smith's murderer [whoever he may be]
is insane.") What could 'Smith's murderer', used referentially, refer to
in English?

It could refer to Mr.

Spock, but, by hypothesis, only if
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the speaker intends to refer to Mr. Spock.

Suppose the speaker does not

intend to refer to Mr. Spock with 'Smith's murderer', but intends to
refer to Jones.

Is it then the case that 'Smith's murderer' could not

refer to anyone, since the speaker lacks the requisite intention?

This

is what reference rule three requires, but this seems clearly wrong.
'Smith's murderer' could still be used in English to refer to Mr. Spock.
The speaker may not be able to use this expression correctly to express
his beliefs because he has false beliefs about the referent of Smith's
murderer, but these beliefs do not seem to affect the potential reference of the English expression,

'Smith's murderer'.

Even if no one

knows that Mr. Spock i.s Smith's murderer, and so no one ever .tntended to
refer to Mr .. Spock with 'Smith's murderer', the potential referent of
this expression would still be Mr.

Spock.

To conclude, intentions to refer seem to play no role in determining the reference potential of definite descriptions, not even in

d~ter-

mining the reference potential of definite descriptions used referentially.

Reference rules for definite descriptions as well as for the

other singular terms
refer.

i

l

'/

can and should avoid mention of intentions to

•

CHAPTER VIII

REFERENCE POTENTIAL AND INTENTIONS OF A GROUP

In the previous chapter I rejected specific reference rules which
mention a speaker's intention to refer.

I will now examine theories of

reference potential that attempt to explain how the reference potential
of English expressions is determined in terms of a group of speakers'
intentions to refer.
reference.

I will first discuss Gricean accounts of semantic

I will then examine accounts which try to explain the

refer~

ence potential of class terms in terms of some group of speakers' intentions to refer to all and only those objects that have certain characteristics by means of which objects of that kind are identified .
:•

.

While an individual speaker's intentions to refer may be irrelevant to a theory of reference potential for singular referring expressions in English, the intentions of some group of speakers may be impertant for determining the

reference potential of English expressions.

Such intentions may also provide the basis for the reference rules that
we have considered so far.

1

To examine the importance of intentions to

refer in determining the reference potential of class

terms,

I will

present the case for two different kinds of intentionalist explanations

l

i

1

Any denotationist analysis of singular terms must eventually
':,explain the reference potential of terms that occur in the predicate
position. If the potential referents of 'the king' are defined as any
individual who is a king, then it still remains to say what is potentially referred to by 'king'.
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of reference potential for these terms.

I will then discuss the objec-

tions to and shortcomings of these explanations.

Gricean Accounts of Reference Potential
The first kind of intentionalist account of reference potential
that I want to consider here tries to explain how the reference patential of expressions in a shared

language (or semantic reference)

is

determined in terms of speaker's reference ·(or the reference potential
of

expressions

in

an

idiolect).

Speaker's

reference

is,

in

turn,

explained in terms of occasion reference which involves a speaker's
intending to get another person to

identify a certain object.

This

account is based on a Gricean account of meaning, supplemented by an
account of convention along the lines developed by David Lewis. 2
Grice proposes that we base our analysis of conventional or timeless meani~g on an analysis of occasion meaning and speaker's meaning. 3
If we can elucidate the meaning of
'x meant something (on a particular occasion)' and
'x meant so-and-so (on a particular occasion)'
and of
'A meant something by x (on a particular occasion)' and
'A meant by x that so-and-so (on a particular occasion)'
this might reasonably be expected to help us with
'x means (timeless) something (that so-and-so)'.
Grice suggests that we analyze what a sentence in a language

2

See H.P. Grice, "Meaning, The Philosophical Review, 66 (1957), pp.
377-388 and "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning and Word-Meaning, Foundations of Language, 4 (1968), pp. 225-242, and David Lewis, Convention
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969).
3

"Meaning,
meaning here.

QE. cit., p. 43.

Grice is talking only about non-natural
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conventionally means in terms of what some group of speakers intend
to effect by that sentence.

'! means (timeless) that so-and-so' might as a first shot be
equated with some statement or disjunction of statements about
what people (vague) intend (with qualifications about 'recognition') to effect by x. 4
The qualifications about

recognition are supposed to tell us how

non-natural meaning differs from natural meaning.
that E if !

is intention-free evidence that E·

~

naturally means

For example, spots

naturally mean that the person on whom these spots appear has measles.

The spots are intention-free evidence that this person has

measles.

Non-natural meaning is a species of meaning which is such

that the meaningful item, !•

is evidence that E only because the

person who hears or sees ! recognizes that ! was produced with the
intention of effecting some change in the audience by means of the
audience's recognition of this intention.
Grice has revised and refined his position since the publication of "Meaning," but its general lines remain the same.

In a more

recent paper, Grice proposed that we explain timeless meaning for a
group in terms of timeless meaning within an idiolect.

Grice would

define the timeless

conventional meaning of the assertion 'It is

raining' as follows:

For group G, utterance-type X means the asser-

tion 'It is raining' equals, by definition, "At least some (? many)
members of group G have in their repertoires the procedure of utter-

4

Ibid., p. 46.
Grice adds
intended effect must be something
trol of the audience, or that in
of the intention behind ! is for
cause."

the further qualification that "the
which in some sense is within the consome sense of 'reason' the recognition
the audience a reason and not merely a
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ing a token of X if,

for some A,

they want A to think that U

believes that it is raining; the retention of this procedure being
for them conditional on the assumption that at least some (other)
members of G have,

or have had,

this procedure in their reper-

toires." 5
Grice incorporates an element from David Lewis' analysis of
convention into this definition in the clause that retention of the
procedure should be conditional on the assumption that other members
of the group also have this procedure in their repertoire.

This

clause is supposed to "get in the idea of aiming at conformity, and
so perhaps (derivatively) also that of correct and incorrect use of
X, as distinct from merely usual or unusual use of X. 116
Most theorists who take this approach to semantic meaning try
to explain the meaning of sub-sentential units in terms of a grammar
which specifies how sub-sentential parts are to be put together to
form meaningful sentences.

The analysis of meaning remains, essen-

tially, an analysis of sentence meaning.

7

Robert Cummins, however,

has proposed a Gricean analysis of the meaning of sub-sentential

5

This definition is taken from Grice's paper, "Utterer's Meaning,
Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning," .QE. cit., p. 233. Grice's definition is more general. It is formulated in terms of mood indicators and
propositional attitude signs which would cover any kind of English sentence. I have giv~n only a sample definition, derived from Grice's general one, in order to avoid complicating the exposition with an explanation of the technical symbols Grice uses.
The overall thrust of his
definition should be clear from this example.
6

7

Ibid., p. 233.

See for example David Lewis, Ibid., pp. 197-200; Jonathan Bennett,
Linguistic Behavior (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976·), and
Grice, Ibid., pp. 235-241. Grice attempts to give an analysis of adjectival meaning, (pp. 237-241), so in this respect he is an exception.
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parts. 8 Cummins defines conventional reference and meaning relative
to an idiolect in this way:
There is a convention whereby N refers to x in U's language if
(a) in the past U has uttered N only when he intended to identify ~' and (b) this fact is mutually known by u and his hearers, and (c), because of this mutual knowledge it continues to
happen that when Y utters N he identifies x.
There is a convention whereby P means 'red' -in y' s language if
(a) in the pasty uttered f only when he meant 'red', and (b)
this fact is mutually known to y and his hearers, and (c)
because of this mutual knowledge it continues to happen that
when U utters P he means (and is understood to mean) 'red' . 9
These definitions are formulated in terms of occasion reference and occasion meaning.
of intentions to refer.

Cummins defines both of these in terms
For example, y identifies x for

~'

on a

particular occasion if
U intends to get ~ to believe that y intends to predicate something of ~. and ~ recognizes this intention (i.e., comes to
believe of x that U intends to predicate something of~),
and U predicates P of x and means 'red' by f (on some occasion) if
U identifies x for A and utters P intending thereby to get A to
consider (of ~) whether x is red; relying on the Gricean Mechanism. 10
The Gricean Mechanism tells us how U's intention is supposed to be
effected.

Cummins explains the mechanism as follows:

recognizes Y's intention to get ~ to believe that f, and is
led by that recognition--through trust in y--to believe that P.

~

l l

8

"Intention, Meaning, and Truth-Conditions," Philosophical Studies,
35 (1979), pp. 345-360.
9

Ibid.

p. 352.

10

Ibid., p. 351.

11

Ibid., p. 346.
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Although Cummins does not define the conventional reference of
x or the meaning of

f for a group, we would expect his definition to

follow the general·lines of Grice's analysis of sentence meaning for
a group.

The members of a group would have a procedure for getting

an audience to do certain things (e.g. ,

to

identify !) and the

retention of this procedure would be conditional on whether other
members of the group have this procedure in their repertoires as
well.
A Gricean account of reference has

these features:

(a)

it

explains conventional reference in a language in terms of reference
in an idiolect (the speaker's language); (b) reference in the speaker's language is explained in terms of a uniformity in the speaker's
reference in the past and of the audience's knowledge of this regularity; and

(c) the references the speaker made in the past are

explained in terms of her intentions to get her audience to identify
some object by means of the audience's recognition of her intention.
To evaluate this type of theory I will first consider whether
it is possible to explain conventional reference in terms of occasion reference.

I will later, in connection with the second kind of

intentionalist account 9

raise some questions about the possibility

of explaining conventional reference in a shared language in terms
of conventional reference in an idiolect.
The move from the occasion reference of an expression to the
conventional reference of that expression in the speaker's idiolect
requires that the speaker has used this expression consistently in
the past when she wanted to identify the referent for her audience.
This follows from clause (a) of Cummins' analysis of the conven-

•
220
tional reference of
uttered

~only

~

in .Q's idiolect which says "in the past .Q has

when he intended to identify x."

I want to consider

whether it is possible to explain the reference of

N in U's idio-

lect in terms of consistent past intentions concerning the use of
N.

In particular, I will ask whether it is possible for .Q consis-

tently to use
idiolect.

N in this way if~ does not already refer to~ in .Q's

If this

is not possible, then Cummins'

explanation of

reference in an idiolect is circular.
Clause (b) says that for an expression to have a conventional
reference in U's idiolect, it must be mutual knowledge between U and
his hearers that .Q has consistently used this expression in the past
whenever he wanted them to identify a certain object.

For this to

be mutual knowledge, .Q must have successfully carried out his intention a number of times in the past.
knew that he only used
identify
~

~

N in the past whenever he wanted them to

only if he knew that his hearers had actually identified

in the past when he uttered

identify~

U would know that his hearers

~.

intending thereby to get them to

(and to believe something of it).

The project of explaining semantic reference in terms of idiolect reference and idiolect reference in terms of a speaker's reference on a particular occasion will be successful only if we can
explain how .Q could successfully refer on a number of occasions with
some expression without presupposing that any expression has a reference either in U's idiolect or in a shared language.

Somehow it

must be possible for .Q successfully to refer without the benefit of
a language and for .Q and his

audience to have beliefs about one

another's intentions and knowledge without the benefit of a Ian-
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guage.
Let us assume, then, that neither U nor his audience has a
language and ask under what conditions
x with

N on just one occasion.

~

could successful!y refer to

A sufficient condition for U' s

referring to ! on a particular occasion is that
U identifies x for A and utters P intending thereby to get ~ to
consider (of !) whether ! is red; relying on the Gricean Mechanism.
I will argue that this condition could not be fulfilled unless
(a) x already refers to
to

N in a shared

N in U's idiolect and (b} ! already refers

language.

12

If these arguments succeed,

then

unless we accept some non-intentionalist account of occasion meaning, we will not be able to explain semantic reference (or semantic
meaning) with a Gricean theory.
Suppose we try to explain occasion reference in terms of the
speaker's intention to get her hearers to believe that she intends
to predicate something of ! and she intends to get them to believe
this by means of their recognizing her intention.

If the speaker

utters some expression, then she will successfully refer with that
expression only if her audience recognizes the intention with which
that

expression was uttered.

It

could recognize this

intention

either by guessing that the speaker must have intended something and
guessing what this was or by reasoning that the speaker must have
intended something and this is what the speaker intended.

If the

audience is to reason to this conclusion, then it must have some

12

Note that these arguments apply to a Gricean analysis of sentence
meaning as well as to a Gricean account of reference.

222
grounds for believing that the speaker intended it to do something
(namely, to identify~).

The odds against an audience's correctly

guessing what I intend for them to do when I make a certain noise
are staggering.

Suppose I

say

'Glug gluck'

intending

that· you

should identify the table I am now writing at (and to believe of it
that it is brown) but I do not make my intention known in any way
other than by uttering 'Glug gluck'.
I

intended.

I am not likely to effect what

If I am going to have some chance of getting you to

identify the table I am now writing at, you will have to have some
reason for thinking that this is part of what I intend when I say
'Glug gluck'.

What reason might you have for believing that this is

what I intend?
I might tell you that this is what I intend, but to do so I
would have to rely on a shared language.

However,

if we want to

explain a shared language in terms of particular instances of successful communication, then we cannot presuppose that there is a
shared language in order to explain instances of successful communication.

If we do, our account will be circular.

The basis for your recognition of my intention that you should
identify a table when I say 'Glug gluck' might be that I have, in
the

past,

tables.

regularly

used

'glug'

in

certain

contexts

involving

If you could recognize the similarity between what I am

doing now (namely, uttering 'glug') and what I have done in the past
(namely, uttered 'glug'), and recognize the similarity between the
present context and the past contexts where I did the same thing,
then you might have some reason for thinking that I intended"you to
identify the table.

But this would involve two things:

(1) I must
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have uttered the sound

'glug'

regularly in the past in contexts

where a table was involved and (2) you must recognize the relevant
similarity between ·my past actions and my present ones, and the relevant similarity between the present context and the past ones.

So

in order to account for successful occasion reference such that we
could explain idiolect reference and reference

in a

language in

terms of occasion reference, we shall have to explain, in non-linguistic terms, both the basis for the regularity of the speaker's
behavior and the basis for the audience's recognition of regularities in the speaker's behavior in contexts which the audience can
recognize as similar in the relevant respect.

This will have to be

explained in order for us to understand how the speaker could suecessfully communicate her intention on even one occasion.
To explain how a speaker could consistently use a word to
refer to certain objects, we can either assume that this consistent
use is accidental, in which case the odds are against it, or we must
provide some bas is

for the consistency.

One plausible basis for

consistent use of a word is the speaker's intention to use the word
in a certain way.

13

Let us suppose that the basis for a speaker's

regular behavior is her intention to use the word 'glug' in a certain way.

13

The speaker sets up a correlation between the word and

If we hold that the speaker's consistent use of a word depends on
an intention of this kind, then it would seem that the word already has
a reference in the speaker's idiolect.
If Cummins' definition of idiolect reference is correct, then this would not be the case.
Cummins
requires an external justification for the speaker's continuing use of
the word in the intended way in order for a word to have a conventional
meaning in the speaker's idiolect. This justification is formulated in
terms of successful communication.
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objects via her intention to refer to these objects.

14

If the speaker's consistent use of the word 'glug' depends on
what she intends to refer to with the word 'glug', then she must
have an intention with the general form:
I intend to refer to objects that have feature Q, and only to
those objects, with the word 'glug'.
What we expect from a speaker's intention concerning the use
of the word 'glug' is that it should enable her to use the word consistently.

For the speaker to be able to do this, she must be able

to identify and re-identify tables.
for her re-identifications.

Feature Q provides the basis

It is that feature of the objects by

which the speaker is able to identify and re-identify the object(s).
Exactly what feature

Q is is a matter of dispute even among

advocates of intentionalist theories.

It might be a set of charac-

teristics which are necessary and sufficient for an object's being a
table.

For example, a person may intend to refer to objects that

have a relatively smooth extended surface elevated parallel to the
ground by a structure that supports the surface from below, and only
to those objects, with the word 'glug'.

Another possibility is that

the feature which objects must share in order to be called tables is
less well-defined.

For example, a person may intend to refer with

the word 'glug' to anything that resembles a mental image she has of
a table (this image may be a perceptual or memory image, or it may
be one formed by imagination).

14

The feature could also be:

looks

Grice suggests this approach when he attempts to explain the meaning of sub-sentential units.
(Ibid., p. 238f.) This is another role
that intentions to refer might play in a theory of reference.
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like (or is like) the thing that is now causing me to utter the word
I

glug 1

•

Q that

It seems unlikely that the feature

figures in a speak-

er's intention to refer to certain things with the word 'glug' is a
characterization of the

necessary and

something's being a table.

sufficient conditions

There are many class terms whose poten-

tial referents cannot be characterized in terms
sufficient

conditions.

'game' is such a term.

for

For

example,

of necessary and

Wittgenstein

suggests

that

Moreover, most of the time, even if there

are necessary and sufficient conditions

for something' s

being a

table, a person who consistently uses the term 'table', for example,
cannot say what they are.

Since she has such difficulty formulating

the necessary and sufficient conditions
table and yet

uses

for something' s

the term consistently and with

being a

ease,

it

is

unlikely that the basis of her consistent use is an intention to
refer with the word 'table' to all and only those things that satisfy these conditions.
Moreover, even if the speaker did

intend to refer only to

things satisfying certain necessary and sufficient conditions, the
theory of semantic reference would be circular if occasion reference.
presupposed either speaker's reference or semantic reference.

If

the necessary and sufficient conditions are specified in the words
of the speaker's idiolect or in a shared language,

then occasion

meaning would be explained (partly) in terms of reference in a language.

To explain occasion reference without circularity, we have

to find some more basic relation between the speaker's uses of· words
and the objects the words refer to in order to say what a speaker
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would refer to with the word 'table'.

To understand what a speaker

would refer to with the word 'table' without appealing to other linguistic items whose reference potential must, in turn, be explained,
we posit a more basic relation between the speaker's use of a word
to refer to certain objects and those objects.

Two different rela-

tions have been proposed as probable candidates: a relation of satisfaction (or,

with respect to mental

images--resemblance) and a

causal relation.
Suppose that a speaker formulates her intention to use the
term 'glug' in terms of the similarities between an image she has of
a table and other objects.

Her intention to refer might then be as·

follows:
I intend to refer with the word 'glug' to all and only those
objects which resemble the image I have of this table.
Putnam has argued that such an intention cannot be the ultimate basis for a speaker's ability to use a word consistently.

15

In

his argument Putnam considers whether it is possible for someone to
invent a language which refers to his own sensations as they are
given to him.

Suppose such a person is given a sensation X and

tries to give a name to sensations of that kind.
In effect, he intends that
entities which are similar
I f this is all he
respect in which something
intention is empty ... For
respect. 16

15

Reason, Truth, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1981), pp. 6Sf.
16

~ should apply to all and only those
to X.
intends - - i f he does not specify the
has to be similar to X... --then this
everything is similar to X in some

Ibid., p. 65.

•
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This same point can be made with respect to tables and images
of them.

17

Suppose that the person wanted to make up a language that

referred to physical objects.

He sees a table and forms the inten-

tion to refer with the word 'glug' to all and only those things that
are similar to (or resemble) the perceptual image he has of a table.
Here also, i f this is all he intends, if he does not specify the
respect in which the things must be similar, then his intention is
empty, for everything is similar to the image in some respect.

Sup-

pose that the table he perceives is brown and has round legs.

It

would follow that anything that is brown is similar to the image,
and anything that has round legs is similar.

Given all the ways in

which something can be similar to something else, one will not be
able consistently to use the word 'glug' on the basis of an intention to refer to all and only those things that are similar to, or
resemble, the image one has of a table.
The mere intention to refer to all and only those objects that
are similar to

~

will not provide a basis for consistently using a

term to refer to things of the same kind as X.

However,

if one

could, in one's intention to refer to things that are similar to
specify the respect in which something has to be similar to
the
term.

intention might provide a basis

~'

~'

then

for consistently using that

But then, Putnam argues, being able to specify the respect in

which two things must be similar requires either that the person

17

Putnam might not agree.
At one point he argues, with Berkeley,
that physical objects cannot be similar to mental entitites such as
images.
If physical objects cannot be similar to mental entities, I
should have to intend to refer to all and only those things whose image
is similar to the image I now have of a table.
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forming the intention already is able to refer to the objects for
which he is trying to introduce a new term or his ability must be
based on another intention to refer to a similarity that certain
things have.
If, on the other hand, he specifies the respect ... then,
since he is able to think this thought, he is already able to
refer to the sensations for which he is trying to introduce a
new term §, and to the relevant property of those sensations!
But how did he get to be able to do this?
(If we answer 'By
focussing his attention on two other sensations, ~, ~, and
thinking that those two sensations are similar in respect
if
and only if they are similar to Z, W', then we are involved in
a regress to infinity.) 18
-

B

Suppose, for example, that with the word 'dot' I intended to
refer to any and all objects that are similar to this,
respect to size and shape,

etc.

'. ', with

If I can specify these respects,

Putnam claims, then I can already refer to dots and to their relevant properties (though not necessarily with the word 'dot').

If we

try to explain how I am able to refer to dots and their properties
in terms of other dot tokens, then we are involved in a regress to
infinity.

For example, if I say that this token,

'

' is similar to

the original one with respect to size, shape, etc., only if they are
similar to <., .>,

then we must be able to specify the respect in

which<.,.> is similar to<.,.>.

If we try to specify the respect

in which they are similar in terms of other ordered pairs of dots,
then we have the same problem.

We can say<.,.> is similar to<.,.>

only if they are similar to < .. , .. >.

But then we would have to

specify the conditions under which< .. , .. > is similar to< .. , .. >,
and so forth.

18

Ibid.
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Of course the same thing can be said with respect to introducing a term for tables.

The conclusion is that the

intention to

refer with 'glug' t'o all and only those things which are similar to
or resemble a mental image of a table is either useless in guiding
linguistic behavior,

if the respect in which they must be similar

to, or resemble, the image is not specified, or else one's ability
consistently to refer to certain objects with the word 'glug' rests
on something more basic than an intention of this kind.

A person's

ability consistently to use the word 'glug' to refer to tables cannot ultimately be explained in terms of her intentions to refer to
all and only those objects that are similar to some image she has of
a table.
An argument of the kind that purports to show that consistent

use of a class term such as 'glug' cannot ultimately be based on a
speaker's intention to refer to things that are similar to or resemble a mental image, can also be advanced to show that consistent use
cannot ultimately be based on intentions to refer to all and only
those things that stand in the same causal relation to some act of
the speaker (her uttering a word or pointing at something).

Putnam

argues as follows.
Just as there are too many similarities for reference to be
merely a matter of similarities, so there are too many causal
chains for reference to be merely a matter of causal chains.
On the other hand, if I say 'the word "horse" refers to
objects which have a property which is connected with my production of the utterance "There is a horse in front of me" on certain occasions by~ causal chain of the appropriate~.' then
I have the problem that, if I am able to specify what is the
appropriate type of causal chain, I must already be able to
refer to the kinds of things and properties that make up that
kind of causal chain.
But how did I get to be able , to do
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this? 19
Any way of specifying the speaker's intentions to refer to things
which are alike in respect

g

(including causal chains) is going to

have to answer Putnam's objection.

If one can intend to refer to a

class of things (without presupposing any existing language or connections between words and objects), then one must be able to specify the relevant respect in which the potential referents are like
the thing which serves as a prototype for the term.
relevant respect

To specify the

(whether it be the respect in which two things

resemble each other or the respect in which two things are causally
related), one must be able to refer to that respect.

But referring

to that respect would again depend on being able to use the expression for referring to that respect consistently.

If the basis for

doing this is an intention to refer to all and only those similarities that are like the one that obtains between two other things,
then this intention will require that she specify the relevant similarity between the respects in which these things are similar, and
so on ad infinitum.
The point of Putnam's argument is that if a person is going to
be able consistently to refer to some object(s) with some word, she
must already be able to refer to that object (though not necessarily
with that word).
succeed,

So for .a Gricean account of semantic reference to

we must postulate a

occasion reference.

reference relation more basic than

At the very least we can conclude that a Gri-

cean account of reference is not complete.

19

Ibid, p. 66.

But this does not mean
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that the project is fundamentally misguided.
For a speaker to be able to use a word consistently to refer
to some object or kind of object, she must either have a representational system rich enough to enable her to recognize respects in
which things are similar (e.g., mentalese), or her representational
system must be so limited that, given any two items, she can only
recognize one respect in which they are similar.

Consistent use of

a word would be possible under the second condition as well as the
first.

For suppose there is a person whose mental abilities are

very limited.

The only similarity that this person is capable of

recognizing is similarity in size.

Now suppose she has the inten-

tion to refer with the word 'small' to all and only those things
whose image is similar to the image she has now.

I suggest that, on

the basis of this intention, she could consistently use the word
'small' (as long as she can remember the image). 20 She could do this
because, even though there may be an infinite number of ways in
which two things may be similar, this person can only recognize one:
similarity in size.

She need not even specify the respect in which

two things must be similar when she intends to refer with 'small' to
all and only those things which resemble the image she now has,
because for her there is only one possible way.
Actual human beings have much richer mental abilities than the
person we were imagining.
ties between things

20

We can recognize many possible similari-

(and we recognize many possible causal rela-

Her use of the term would strike us as bizarre (and inconsistent)
because she would call a large object that was far away, 'small', and
the same object, when it was close, she would not be call small.
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tions).

For any actual human being to be able to use a word consis-

tently, she must be able to tell when something is related to something else in the appropriate way.

For example, to use the word

'blue' consistently to refer to things which are like some blue circle image with respect to color, a person must be able to recognize
which things are similar, and which are not similar in this respect.
This may be a biologically based ability.

Notice, however, that for

consistent use of 'blue' to refer to blue things, she need not be
able to specify the respect in which, for example, one blue circle
with a radius of one inch is similar to another blue circle with the
same radius and not similar to a third black circle of the same
size.

She need only recognize that the first and second circles are

similar in a way that the first and third are not.

If she can do

this, then she can intend to use the word 'blue' to refer to things
that are similar to some blue thing in the way that the first circle
is similar to the second circle and not to the third.

On the basis

of this intention, given that she is able to recognize when things
have the relevant similarity,

this person could consistently use

'blue' to refer to blue things.
It is possible, then, for an isolated speaker to use a certain
term consistently whenever she wants to refer to certain items.

But

this is just one condition for her to be able successfully to refer
to that item on a particular occasion.

Recall that semantic refer-

ence is to be explained in terms of speaker's reference (or reference

in the

speaker's

idiolect),

and this,

in turn,

explained in terms of successful occasion reference.
successfully to refer on a particular occasion,

was

to be

For a speaker

her intention to
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refer to a particular object with a certain word must be successful.
This intention is spelled out as

an intention that her audience

should identify a particular object (e.g., a table) on the basis of
their recognizing that she uttered a particular sound (e.g., 'glug')
intending thereby to get them to recognize that this was what she
intended (the Gricean mechanism).
One condition that seemed to be necessary for successful occasion reference was that the speaker consistently used a word to
refer to the same thing(s).

This was necessary if the audience was

to have anything to go on in interpreting the speaker's utterance,
that is, in recognizing the content of the speaker's intention.

In

addition, for successful occasion reference, the audience would have
to recognize the relevant similarities between what the speaker did
in the past and what she is doing now and between the context in
which the speaker acted in the past and the context in which she is
now acting.
will

have

If the audience can recognize these similarities, it
a

reasonable

chance of

recognizing

that

the

speaker

intends to get them to identify a certain object by means of its
recognizing that this is what she intended when she uttered the
word.
The audience may go through a reasoning process like this:
There is S.
She is uttering 'glug' again right in my face.
Every time there is a table around S does that. But S would not
go around saying 'glug' in my face for no reason. She must be
trying to do something. Since she couldn't believe that saying
'glug' in my face would have any effect save the effect it has
on me, she must be trying to get me to do something. Since she
always says 'glug' when there is a table around, she must want
me to do something with a table.
There is a table here. She
must want me to notice (or identify) the table.
There are a couple of problems with this explanation.

First,
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there is a problem concerning the audience's ability to pick out the
relevant similarities between past and present episodes in which the
speaker utters 'glug'.

Secondly, even if the audience does recog-·

nize the relevant similarities, it is not clear that the audience
would be able to reason that the speaker intended him to recognize
her intention.
Let us begin with the first problem.

Here, again, the problem

of recognizing relevant similarities appears.

There are two simi-

larities that the audience must recognize in order to infer that
'glug' refers to tables on this occasion: (1) the similarity between
what the speaker is doing now and what she has done in the past
(namely, uttered 'glug') and (b) the similarity between the contexts
in which the speaker has uttered 'glug'.

We already had to assume

that speakers have an ability to recognize when things are similar
and when they are not in order to explain how a speaker could use a
word consistently to refer to some object(s), so we may as well
assume that the hearers have such abilities as well.

Thus, we can

assume that a hearer could recognize that an utterance of 'glug' is
similar to another utterance of 'glug' and different from an utterance of 'gleek'.

We can also assume that the hearer can recognize

that one table is similar to another table and different from an
antelope.

However, the hearer must not only recognize similarities

and differences between things, he must also recognize the relevant
similarities, as distinct from irrelevant similarities and differences.

A loud utterance of 'glug' is different from a soft utter-

ance of 'glug'; a high-pitched utterance of 'glug' is different from
a low-pitched utterance.

If volume and pitch are irrelevant to what
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the speaker intends to effect when she utters the word 'glug', then
the hearer must ignore these differences and pay attention only to
similarities of a certain type.
holds for contexts.

But on what basis?

The same thing

The hearer may be able to recognize that two

contexts are alike, but these contexts may be alike in any number of
ways.

The hearer must be able to distinguish the relevant respects

in which one context is like another from the irrelevant respects in
which one context is like another.

If all the audience has to go on

is her observation of similar actions on the part of S in similar
contexts, then given the number of ways in which any two things are
similar (as well as different), the audience will have trouble identifying the relevant respects in which things are similar.
It may be objected that we are making matters too difficult by
restricting our attention to meaningful utterances of words.

It is

much easier to see how a hearer could recognize the important similarities and differences in the speaker's behavior in different contexts when the speaker uses gestures to get across his message.

For

example, Bennett suggests hand-wriggling as a gesture for referring
to fish.

21

Suppose whenever a speaker wants the audience to identify

fish, he makes a waving motion with his hands that imitates the way
a fish moves.

When the 'utterance' resembles the thing it is refer-

ring to, the hearer has more to go on.

He can recongize not only

the similarity between the gesture that is being performed now and
the gesture which was made in the past, and the similarity between
the context

21

in which the gesture occurs now and the contexts in

_Q£. cit., p. 272-273.
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which it occurred in the past, he can also recognize a similarity
between the gesture and the thing(s) it refers to (namely,

fish).

This greatly increases the probability that he will recognize the
important similarity between the contexts in which the gesture was
performed (namely, the fact that they all involved fish).

In fact,

when_ the speaker uses an iconic gesture of this type, the hearer may
be able to recognize, on the first encounter with the gesture, what
the speaker intends him to identify.

If the hearer is able to rec-

ognize the similarity between the gesture and fish, then he will be
in a position to guess correctly what the speaker wants him to identify.

(Pointing gestures may also help the hearer to recognize what

the speaker is trying to get him to identify.)
If words (or proto-words) are

us~d

in conjunction with iconic

gestures, the audience may be able successfully to recognize the
speaker's intention that

it should identify a certain object the

very first time it is used.

The basis for recognizing this inten-

tion, when the word alone is used, could be the constant conjunction
of word and gesture in the past.
are

used,

recognizing

the

However, even when iconic gestures

important

similarities

speaker is trying to exploit) is not easy.
charades knows

(the

ones

the

Anyone who has played

that any given gesture can look like a number of

things.

Which one is the correct one (the one the speaker intended)

is

obvious

not

just

from

the gesture.

Similarly,

when someone

points, there are always a number of things (and aspects of things)
that she might be pointing at.

Discovering which of those things is

the one she intended is quite difficult especially if one cannot ask
the speaker which one she intended.
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Nonetheless,

when gestures

are used

objects the hearer may recognize as

the range of possible

similar to the object to be

identified is greatly reduced (at least in comparison to when just
sounds are uttered).

The audience may successfully guess what the

intended referent is, and so successful occasion reference would not
be prohibitively unlikely.
Thus far, then, we have argued that the hearer may be able to
identify what the speaker is trying to get him to identify by doing
certain things.

Now we turn to the next problem.

How do we get

from the hearer's recognition of the important similarities in the
speaker's behavior over time and the contexts in which this behavior
has occurred to the hearer's recognition that the speaker is doing
these things in order to get the audience to do something?
Suppose an audience sees someone gesturing fishily and saying
'The

fish are

biting.'

The

audience recognizes

between the fish gesture and fish.

the

similarity

If the speaker is to success-

fully refer, then her audience must identify fish on the basis of
their recognition that the speaker is uttering the gesture-sound
combination with the intention that they should identify fish, and
their recognition is supposed to be based on the recognition that
this is what the speaker intended.

Supposedly they recognize this

intention behind the speaker's action by trying to figure out why
the speaker did what she did and inferring that she did it in order
to get them to do something (namely, to identify fish).
Bennett argues that knowledge of the speaker could lead the
audience to believe that she intended to produce some effect-in the
audience by means of the audience's recognizing that this is what
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she intended to effect.

22

Bennett considers the following case:

[O]ne day we observe a tribesman, U, stand in full view of
another, ~. an~ emit a snake-like hi~ing sound while also making with his hand a smooth, undulating, horizontal motion that
resembles the movement of a snake. 23
Bennett aruges that on the basis of what we know about U we could
conclude that U intended "to affect something other than himself,"
since

"whenever

U

engages

in

protracted,

apparently

connected

sequences of behavior he intends to affect something outside himself.

We can also conclude that U intended "to affect A" since "it

would be out of character for U to think he was affecting anything
other than ~.

and we can conclude

that he intended "to affect A

auditorially and/or visually, or in some way arising from the audiovisual effect" since it would also be

out of character for U to

think that he was having any immediate effect on A other than an
audio-visual one.

Further,

because

"whenever Q deliberately pro-

duces a sensory change in another tribesman it is in order to get
him to believe something" we can conclude that Q intended "to get ~
to believe something."

In addition,

the nature of the performance--the fact that it naturally
induces the thought of a snake--forces us to conclude that if U
is trying to make ~ believe something, it is something about a
snake.
This supports the conclusion that U intended "to get ~ to believe
something about a snake."

We could also conclude that U intended

"to get ~ to believe that there is a snake nearby."

The basis for

this inference is that no other plausible alternative is available.

22

Ibid., pp. 138-140.

23

Ibid., p. 138.
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A cannot

think of anything else that

believe about snakes.
that

A

~

might be trying to get him to

What is more, we can conclude

that~

expected

would go through this reasoning process and intended that A

should think that he expected this in order for A to realize that U
intended him to believe that P.

This last step makes it clear that

it is not just we who are supposed to go through the reasoning proBoth A and U also draw these conclusions. 24

cess.

To suppose that two pre-linguistic tribesman

(or even one)

could actually go through this line of reasoning seems rather improbable.

Not only are some of the steps in the

reasoning process

unlikely steps that a primitive tribesman would take, but the very
idea that a person with no shared language or idiolect would be able
to formulate an argument of this sort seems far-fetched.
Let us first go through the reasoning process step by step to
identify particular

inferences

that are questionable.

The

first

inference is:
Whenever U engages in protracted, apparently connected sequences
of behavior he intends to affect something outside himself.
Therefore when he engages in the snake pantomime he must intend
to affect something outside himself.
The inference is valid, but not sound.
person,

primitive

or sophisticated,

It is difficult to imagine a
whose

protracted,

apparently

connected sequences of behavior are always directed towards affecting something outside himself.

I perform such a sequence of behav-

ior everyday when I brush my teeth, and I do not want to affect any-

24

The quotes from Bennet are all taken from Linguistic Behavior,

cit.' pp. 138£.

QE.
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thing outside myself. 25 Having watched National Geographic specials
on television, I find it quite plausible that primitive tribesmen
would go through sequences of behavior aimed only at affecting themselves,

for

example,

inspecting their bodies

for lice.

It also

seems likely that, without the help of words, they might go through
sequences of behavior in order to remember episodes in the past by
re-enacting them, or aspects of them, physically.
unlikely that

~

!:!

would know that whenever

apparently connected sequences of behavior

Therefore, it is

engages in protracted,
he

intends to affect

something other than himself, or that he would reach this conclusion, because the statement is most likely false and
has no reason to believe it is true.
if it is to be true.

most likely

The premise has to be weakened

Let us say, instead, that

in inferring that since,

~

~

would be justified

often, when U engages

in a protracted,

)

apparently connected sequence of behavior he intends to affect something outside of himself, it may be that when he performs the snake
pantomime he intends to affect something outside of himself.
inference may be enough for

~

The second conclusion

~

to go on to the next step.
is supposed to be justified in reach-

ing is that U intended to affect A.
that

His reason for thinking this is

"it would be out of character for U to think that he was

affecting anything other than A."

We should ask whether A would

think that it would be out of character

2 5

It
(assuming
primitive
of myself

This

might be argued that
that my self is not
tribesman to see that
when I brush my teeth

for U to think he was

my teeth are something outside myself
identical with my body). But ta· ask a
I am trying to affect something outside
would be going too far.
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affecting anything other than A.

First, why would this be out of

character? and secondly, why would A think that this was
character?

out of

Bennett. argues that the members of the tribe, being lim-

ited. in what they can believe, for the most part, to those propositions which are easily falsified,
beliefs.

are likely to have mostly true

This is an important assumption,

for in order for A to

think it would be out of character for U to think he was affecting
anything other than -A, A must have noticed something about -U's typical patterns of thought (or at least of thought-guided behavior).
The reason A would think it unlikely that U should think he was
affecting something other than A would be that A does not have any
evidence that U has mistaken beliefs about the efficacy of pantomime.

His evidence for this belief might be that U does not pantom-

ime except when he wants to affect some audience.
know this?

But how does A

If we answer, by observing ~'s past pantomiming behav-

ior, we will not get any further because then we must explain how

~

is supposed to know what U intended to affect with his past pantomimes.

We cannot explain this by saying that A noticed that in the

past U only pantomimed when he intended to affect some audience.
It might be that

~

believes that it would be out of character

for U to try to affect something other than

~

with his pantomime

because A knows that U has generally correct beliefs about cause and
effect.

A could conclude this on the basis of observations of ·u's

behavior in non-communicative contexts.
~

But in order for A to know

has generally correct beliefs about cause and effect,

~

must have

generally correct beliefs about cause and effect, and A must
that he has these beliefs and that they are correct.

b~lieve

We would have
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to suppose, then, that two pre-linguistic, primitive tribesmen have
generally correct beliefs

(Is there any

about cause and effect.

reason to suppose that only later, when they have developed a sufficiently rich language, that they would start to hold false beliefs
about the magical efficacy of incantations and ritual dances.)
will have to suppose that,

before

language developed,

We

primitive

tribesman had beliefs about cause and effect pretty much like our
own (though perhaps fewer of them).
beliefs

that more

sophisticated

Given the number of mistaken

tribesmen

have about

cause

and

effect, this does not seem very likely.
The same presumption of developed rationality and theory seems
necessary to reach the conclusion that U must have
~

affect

intended to

auditorially or visually or in some way arising from the

audio-visual effect.

Bennett argues that A would believe it was

"out of character for !;! to think he was having any effect on A other
than an audio-visual one."

This is just presuming too much of a

primitive tribesman's knowledge of nature and natural processes.
Bennett cites a different kind of rationale for
that !;! wants him to believe something.

~

~'s

concluding

is supposed to know that

whenever !;! deliberately produces a sensory change in another tribesman it is in order to get him to believe something.
~

A believes that

is deliberately trying to produce a sensory change in him.

fore,
thing.

~

concludes that

~

must be trying to get

But what kind of evidence is

eral statement.

~

~

There-

to believe some-

supposed to have for his gen-

Even if A could tell that U was deliberately trying

to produce a sensory change in another tribesman (a dubious hypothesis), and even

if~

was successful in doing so, how, just by observ-
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ing the proceedings, would
observe that
intention.

~

know what

Q intended to do?

a belief has been produced.

He cannot

He cannot observe U' s

Since there is no language, he cannot be told what the

third tribesman believed nor what U intended.

Even if the third

tribesman acted on his newly acquired belief, how

would~

tell

be able to

(or even to guess) that his action proceeded from a belief

which he acquired on the basis of U's action and that U had intended
the whole process to occur?

All A sees is Q making gestures and

noises and the third tribesman going off and doing something.

Why

should A even think those occurrences were connected by intentions
and beliefs?
A concludes that
about

Q is trying to get him to believe something

a snake because he notices that the performance naturally

induces the thought of a snake and reasons that U must be aware of
this fact and able to use his knowledge to get A to think about a
snake.

I might agree, with some reservations, that the pantomime

could naturally induce~ to think about a snake. 26 But it is another
matter to hold that

~

is, or could be, psychologically sophisticated

enough to realize that the pantomime naturally induces the thou'ght
of a snake and is also sophisticated enough to think that someone
else would believe the same thing and would try to exploit this natural fact.

It seems highly problematic to suppose that they under-

stand natural physical processes as well as natural psychological
processes without

2 6

the benefit of

a shared

language

which would

There are some problems with this suggestion because there ·are a
number of things the pantomime could 'naturally' induce someone to think
of.
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enable them to pool their observations and to test their psychological hypotheses.
The beliefs about human psychology which justify ~'s conclusion that "U realized that A would go through these steps and he
realized that A would realize that U intended that A realize that U
intended that A should have a belief about a snake, and A would
trust

_g

enough for this to be a reason for A to have a certain

belief about a snake and

~

expected his intention to be successful

for this very reason," are complex and subtle.

Here we have A mak-

ing sophisticated hypotheses about what U must have reasoned and we
have U making sophisticated hypotheses about what A would think U
thinks.

These tribemen will have to believe (1) that they reason,

(2) that others reason in much the same way, and (3) that others
also believe (1) and (2).

They are supposed to believe this on the

basi3 of non-linguistic behavioral evidence.
Every step in the reasoning process a tribesman is supposed to
go through either to effect some change in another by means of gestures or sounds or to be affected by someone's gestures or sounds
involves knowledge that a primitive tribesman cannot reasonably be
expected to have.

Moreover, the chain of inferences is one that a

primitive tribesman is not likely to formulate.

It is even less

plausible to suppose that primitive people would be aware of their
reasoning processes.·

It is one thing to make

inferences;

quite another to recognize that this is what you are doing.

it

is

It is

assuming too much to suppose that a person, without the benefit of a
shared language, can go through a complicated chain of inferences of
the type required in Bennett's story.

I do not object, on princi-
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ple, to assuming that pre-linguistic people (or animals) have some
cognitive abilities.

It may be reasonable to assume that human

beings are naturaliy endowed with a representational system which
enables them to see similarities and differences

and to classify

objects, events or sensations into general groupings.

It is not

reasonable to assume that human beings are by nature endowed with
the ability to follow (much less to construct) fairly complicated
and correct chains of inferences and to recognize that this is what
we are doing. 27
The explanation of occasion meaning would be much simpler and
much more plausible if we assumed that there already was something
like semantic reference (or meaning), prior to occasion meaning.
Rather than trying to explain semantic (and speaker's) reference in
terms of intentions to effect some change in an audience (namely, to
get the audience to identify some object) on a particular occasion,
we should explain the speaker's intention to effect some change in
an audience on a particular occasion by uttering particular sounds
or making certain gestures,
those sounds and gestures.

in terms of the semantic reference of
What we need in order to get the speaker

into a position to use expressions and gestures for certain purposes
and to get the audience to recognize that this is what the speaker
is up to (in other words, the conditions for successful occasion
reference) are expressions and gestures which already have a reference for

both the

audience and the speaker.

We should explain,

first, how gestures and expressions come to be apt means for carry-

27

I know of human beings who find this quite difficult.
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ing out certain intentions, then we can explain how people use them
for communicative purposes.
Although such. an explanation is not within the scope of this
dissertation,

I would suggest that the basic mechanism by which

words and gestures become apt means for carrying out communicative
intentions is conditioning and imitation.
gestion

that some

gestures

(and

perhaps

We can use Bennett's sugeven

sounds)

naturally

induce certain thoughts and also suppose that some stimuli naturally
induce certain sounds in order to account for the first pairings of
sounds and gestures with objects in the world.
and perhaps

These associations

would be

reinforced through use

also

through their

effects.

After a while, a primitive tribesman might notice that

certain sounds and gestures have an effect on his fellows and on
himself and on the basis of this observation try to exploit the connection.

When he wants to produce certain effects, he might use the

words and gestures that have produced that effect in the past.

His

belief that they will produce this effect need not be based on any
hypotheses he entertains about what others will think he is trying
to do.

Nor will their efficacy depend on what others believe he is

doing.

No one in the tribe need believe anything about the mental

states or intentions of others.

They need not even believe anything

about their own mental states and intentions.

They could still suc-

cessfully communicate their intentions to an audience.
Such an account would be preferable to a Gricean account of
occasion reference because it does not require that we presuppose
that primitive pre-linguistic people have true beliefs about cause
and effect and about the mental processes of others.

It is quite
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possible that language arose before anyone had any beliefs, true or
false, about mental entities and processes of any kind. 28
Once a basic· stock of referring expressions has been established in the language of the group, we can explain speaker's reference in terms of intentions to refer with a certain expression.
Eventually it will be possible to introduce new expressions into the
language simply by using them in conjunction with expressions and
gestures in the already established language.
intentions to get the audience to

Here the speaker's

identify some object when she

utters some heretofore unheard of expression may determine the reference of that expression.

However, she can reasonably expect her

audience to figure out what her expression refers to by relying on
their ability to understand the rest of the sentence and their
knowledge of the context alone.

She need not expect them to recog-

nize that she intends them to identify a certain object and depends
on their recognizing that this is what she intends in order to get
them to do it.
In a developed language, there are institutionally recognized
means for
Once

introducing referring expressions into a the

language

is

sufficiently

developed,

reliance

on

language.
speaker's

intentions to determine reference potential is greatly diminished.
I

have

already,

in connection with proper names,

discussed one

institutional means for changing reference potential. 2 9 There are

2 8

This seems to be Sellars' point in "The Sellars-Chisholm Correspondence on Intentionality," in H. Feig!, M. Scriven, and G. Maxwell
(eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. II (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1958), pp. 529-539.
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procedures in English for

introducing and changing names.

procedures are clearly specified and publicly recognized.

These

They say

who can give a name to whom under what conditions by doing what.
When the properly qualified person does the specified things under
the proper conditions his action is a name-giving, and it is recognized as such by the community in which this procedure is in force.
Institutionalized procedures also exist for introducing other
kinds of terms into a language.

Persons with the right credentials

under the right circumstances can introduce new terms into the language by doing certain things.

A physicist who discovers a new

sub-atomic particle may introduce a new term into the English language by calling the new particle something in her report of the
finding.

What she calls this particle in this context becomes the

English word that potentially refers

to particles of that type.

Similarly, an inventor may refer to his invention with a certain
word when he applies for a patent or otherwise publicly reports his
invention.

That word then becomes the English word which poten-

tially refers to his invention.
I argued earlier that what a name that is given by institutional means

refers

to

intended it to refer to.

does not

depend on

bn

the

name-giver

This also holds true for class terms that

are introduced by institutional means.
to depends

what

What the name or word refers

what the person who fulfills the instituional require-

ments, and is thus entitled to give the name, does, not on what she
intends.

29

In other words, the reference potential of the term is

See Chapter Five.
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determined by the institutional procedures.
Whether a term could have a determinate reference potential
independently of any particular speaker's intention without someone's having intended to refer with that term to some particular
thing or kind of thing, is a different matter.

It could be argued

that the term would not have a determinate reference potential in
English unless the person who gave the term to something did certain
things, but that she would not have done these things, had she not
intended to refer to a particular thing or kind of thing with the
term.

It would follow that her intention was necessary for the term

to have a determinate reference potential in English.
will not work.

This argument

The speaker's motivations for doing what she did are

irrelevant.
What does seem to be relevant is the fact that as a result of
what the term-giver did, the community recognizes the term as having
a certain reference potential,

and that they accept the term as

referring to a particular thing or kind of thing, even if the person
who coined the term or gave the name should now intend to use the
term or name differently.

The community's acceptance of the term

seems to rest on a general intehtion to refer with a term that is
introduced by an institutional procedure to the thing(s) to which
the term was given.
thing(s)

to which

This intent ion to refer with a term to the
it was

given seems to be

the

important one.

Whether a term introduced by means of an institutional procedure has
a certain determinate reference potential in English (which includes
the thing that the term was given to), may well depend on ieneral
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intentions of this kind.

30

Intentions to Refer and Intensions
In this section I will discuss theories of reference potential
that attempt to explain how the reference potential of class terms in a
language is determined in terms of speakers'

intentions

to refer to

things with certain features shared by all and only those things which
will be referred to with that term.
We have rejected a Gricean account of semantic reference which
tries to explain semantic reference in terms of occasion reference, but
there is another kind of intentionalist account of semantic reference.
According to this account,

the semantic reference of class terms

is

determined by what some group of people intend to refer to with the
term.

This group may be ei'ther the majority of people who speak the

same language (in which case the account is a majoritarian one), or it
may be the group of experts.

The basic idea is that people have inten-

tions to use a word to refer to certain objects which have feature G.
(We have already discussed such intentions above.)

The word refers, in

a language, to all and only those things that have feature G if some
group of people have this intention.

The reference rules for expres-

sions in a language could be formulated either in terms of the inten-

3 0

Note that such intentions are general in two ways.
First, they
concern terms in general.
It is not necessary to formulate the intention for each term that is introduced by institutional means. Secondly,
it is a general intention in the sense that the general commun.ity of
speakers has such an intention. It is not the intention of any particular person.
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tions of this group of people:
In 1, ~ refers to all and only those objects to which the relevant
group of-people in~end to use~ to refer;
or, since their intentions are formulated in terms of feature

Q. the

reference rule can be formulated in terms of that feature:
In

1, x refers to all and only those objects which have feature §,

where feature G is that feature which enables speakers to identify and
re-identify objects belonging to the class named by x.
I will consider two accounts that attempt to explain how semantic
reference is determined in terms of speakers' reference.

Both accounts

try to explain semantic reference in terms of what some group of speakers would refer to with some term.

What these people would refer to is

determined by their intentions to use the word in a certain way.

The

first account says that what an English word can be used to refer to is
determined by what the majority of speakers would refer to with that
term.

The second account tries to explain semantic reference in terms

of what the experts would refer to with that term.
based on two observations:

(1)

These accounts are

that the reference of expressions in a

language does not depend on the intentions of any particular speaker;
and (2) that for words to have a reference potential someone must intend
to use them in a certain way.
What is significant about expressions in a language, what distinguishes them from expressions in an idiolect or other physical objects
used on some occasion to refer, is that expressions in a language have a
stable reference potential which
speaker's intentions

is

not dependent on any particular

regarding the word.

The reference potential of

English expressions does not depend on what I want it to be or on what
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you want it to be.

It is independent of our particular intentions.

No

matter how many times or with what intensity I intend to refer to keys
with the word 'snow', the word 'snow' continues to refer, in English, to
snow, and not to keys.

31

Furthermore, expressions in English can refer

(in the right context) even when the thing that produces those express ions

cannot .

A parrot

can say,

intending to refer to anything.

"Polly wants

a cracker," without

Nonetheless, the word 'Polly' in the

sentence she produced does refer to Polly.

The same thing can be said

of computers that produce English sentences.

The computer does not (and

cannot) refer to anything, but referring expressions in the sentences
the computer produces do refer.
Although the reference potential of an_English expression does not
depend on any particular person's intention to refer with that expression, it is obvious that this expression would fail to have a reference
potential of its own if no one had ever intended to refer with it.

So

while it is true that the reference potential of these expressions does
not depend on any particular person's intention to refer, it does seem
to depend on intentions to refer.
On the basis of considerations such as these, we conclude that a
word can have

a

reference potential

in a

language

intends to use that word to refer to something.

only if someone

This may be a necessary

condition for a word's having a reference potential in a language, but
it is not a sufficient condition.

31

I can intend to refer to the kind of

'Snow' may come to refer to keys in my idiolect. Because of this
you may interpret my sentences which contain the word 'snow as sentences about keys. But this does not mean that 'snow' in English refers
to keys.
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bugs I saw crawling above the sink last night with the word 'yuccuk'.
But this is not sufficient for making 'yuccuk'
that potentially refers to those bugs.

an English expression

In order for the word 'yuccuk'

to refer to a certain kind of bug in English, it has to be accepted by
the English-speaking community (or some portion thereof) as a word for
referring to that bug.

It if were,

it would then become 'community

property' and my intentions regarding its use would no longer be important.
Accounts that

explain semantic reference in terms of speakers'

intentions are also supported by the fact that the reference potential
of expressions

in a

language

sometimes

changes.

The

mechanisms of

change are often changes in the way that speakers use the word.
changes are of several kinds.

32

These

Perhaps the most radical change in refer-

ence potential occurs when an expression which previously had no reference potential in English, acquires one.

Another kind of change occurs

when an expresssion which already has a reference potential comes to
have a different one; the set of potential referents may become larger
or smaller or undergo a more drastic change in which some things that
were potential

referents of the expression no longer are,

things that were not potential referents

become potential

All of these kinds of changes occur in English.

and other
referents.

New words are added to

the language, (e.g., 'quark).· Names which previously had only 17 potential referents (e.g., 'Kelly Mink') come to have 18 potential referents,
or which previously had 17 potential
potential referents

32

(e.g.,

referents come to have only 16

if one Kelly Mink changes her name).

Changes by institutional means would not count as evidence.

The
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reference potential of class terms also changes.

For example, 'rummage'

at one time could be used in English only to refer to the arrangement of
cargo in the hold of a ship or a stowage or storage place.

Now it can

be used to refer ta something completely different.
Although one way for the reference potential of expressions English to change is by institutional means, this cannot be the fundamental
way, since the existence of such institutional procedures requires a
fairly developed

community,

developed language.

which,

in

turn,

would require

a

fairly

The reference potential of an English expression

can change even when there are no institutional procedures for changing
it.

There are no institutional procedures for introducing unofficial

names, yet such names often become part of the language.

Slang words

also become English expressions after a period of time, 3 3 even though
there is no institutional procedure for introducing such terms.
become obsolete and no
without

the

Words

longer have a reference potential in English

benefit of an

institutional procedure.

These

kinds

of

change in reference potential seem to be the result of changing patterns
of use within the community.

The basis for these changing patterns of

use seems to be changing patterns of intentions to refer.
What seems to be important in these changes in reference potential
is that the community comes to accept certain uses of words. When it
does, the words become English expressions with determinate reference
potential of their own.
To explain how a word acquires a certain determinate reference

33

The word 'chum', now a legitimate English expression, was a slang
word in 17th century England.
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potential in a language, we must explain how it happens that a certain
way of using the term ceases to depend on any particular person's intention to use the term in that way.

Our general answer will be that a

term becomes a term in a language when the linguistic community accepts
that use of the word.

The accounts that I will discuss say that the

linguistic community accepts a certain use of a word when some group of
speakers (either a majority of them or the group of experts) intends to
use the word to refer to objects which have a certain feature.

Majorit-

arian accounts say that the majority of the speakers of English have an
intention to refer to these things.
Objections

to majoritarian

accounts of

semantic reference

are

based on the claim that what the majority of English-speakers would (and
sometimes do) refer to with a term is not always the same as what the
English term can properly be applied to.

This is especially obvious

with respect to technical terms and with natural kind terms.
ple, consider the word 'gold'.

Most English-speakers,

would refer to a shiny, yellowish,
'gold'.

For exam-

it is claimed,

rather stiff metal with the word

However, there are objects that fit this description but which

are not gold at all (e.g., fool's gold).
does not fit this description.

Further, there is gold which

Thus, the reference potential of 'gold'

in English is not what the majority of English-speakers would call
gold.

34

We could formulate a more general argument against the claim that

34

This argument is loosely based on Putnam's argument that extension
is not determined by intention in "The Meaning of Meaning," Mind, Language and Reality, (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp.
215-271.
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the semantic reference of technical terms, including natural kind terms,
is determined by what the majority of speakers would refer to.
consider what ordinary speakers would call gold.

Let us

Suppose that the basis

of each speaker's use of the word 'gold' is an intention to refer to
things which bear relation

~

(either a causal relation or a similarity

relation) to some prototype of gold.

In order for the speaker to use

the term consistently, she must be able to ascertain whether something
bears this relation to the prototype.

What most speakers must rely on

to ascertain whether an object bears a certain relation to the prototype
are surface features of the prototype and the objects in question.
is what they base their use of the term on.

35

That

However, the reference

potential of words of this kind, in English, often has little to do with
surface features that can easily be detected by the observant speaker.
Thus, the kinds of intentions on which the majority of English-speakers
can base their consister.t use of a term are often not the kinds of
intentions on which correct usage of that term could be based.
Because it does seem possible that the majority of English-speakers could base their consistent use of a word on intentions to refer to
certain things among which are included things to which the English word
does not refer and also among which other things to which the English
word does

refer are not included,

we can

semantic reference of English expressions

reject the claim that the
is determined by what

majority of English-speakers would use the word to refer to.

35

the
This

For this reason, explaining consistent use on the basis of speaker's intentions to refer to everything which stands in the same causal
relation to her utterance as some other thing, is less satisfactory than
explaining consistent use in terms of resemblances.
Seeing similarity
of causal relation is much trickier than seeing similarities in images.
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leaves the hypothesis that the reference potential of the terms
determined by what the experts intend to use the word to refer to.
hypothesis is more plausible than the majoritarian one.

is

This

For although

most of us cannot tell the difference between real gold and fool's gold,
and so most of us would use the word 'gold' to refer to samples of both,
the experts are supposed to be the people who do know the difference.
What the English word 'gold' refers to could depend on what they intend
to refer to with the term.
What would disprove this hypothesis would be some case where not
even the experts used the term correctly.

At first glance

it seems

quite unlikely that there could be an English expression which no one,
no even the experts, used correctly.
'gold' suggests such a case.

But here again, the example of

Before there were adequate tests for gold,

there already existed a word for gold.

Although, in the absence of an

adequate test, not even the experts would have used the word correctly
(i.e., would have used to word to refer to all and only those things
that were gold under the appropriate circumstances), the word for gold
could have still referred only to gold.

The discovery of an adequate

test for gold would make it possible for some people (namely, the ones
who could perform the test) to use the term correctly, but it need not
change the reference potential of the word for gold.

Before the test

was invented, the word for gold could have referred to gold, and after
the tesi was discovered the word for gold still could have referred to
the same stuff.

In fact, it is difficult to make sense of someone's

looking for a more adequate test for gold if 'gold' only meant what the
experts would identify as gold at a given time.
Although the intentions to refer to certain things with the word
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'gold' which guided competent speakers' use of the term did not determine the reference potential of that word in that language, an intention
of a different kind may have.

To explain how it is possible for a word

to have a determinate reference potential even when no one is able to
use the term correctly, we have to suppose that someone has some intention to use the term in a certain way (or else that there is some magical connection between the word and what it refers to).

With natural

kind terms, this intention cannot be a specific intention to refer to
certain things that have an identifiable feature G with the word.
would propose,

I

instead, that the kind of intention people have with

respect to the word 'gold' is the intention to refer with that word to
things that really are gold.

If people had such an intention before

they developed an adequate test for gold, and if the reference potential
of the term in their language was determined by this intention, then we
can understand how it was possible for all of them to use the term in
that language incorrectly.

The basis for their use may have involved

incorrect beliefs about what real gold was like, so that their specific
intentions concerning what to apply their word for gold to may have led
to incorrect usages.

Nonetheless these usages would still have been

incorrect, even for these people, because the word for gold was used to
refer to things that were not really gold and it was not used to refer
to things that were really gold.

Of course, before the test was devel-

oped they could not have said which of their uses were correct and which
were incorrect.

But they could have admitted the possibility that no

one was able to use the term correctly (in the sense of being able to
say of each thing whether it was gold or not under the appropriate circumstances).
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To intend to refer with the word 'gold' to things that really are
gold, one must presuppose that there is a natural order in which certain
things are justifiably grouped together.

This does not mean that one

must presuppose an order independent of any human minds.

The justifica-

tion for grouping certain things into kinds may be that by grouping
things this way we can make sense of all our experiences.

It may be

that we impose an order on nature (or on experiences) and that we are
constrained in doing so only by those constraints which follow from our
desire to predict future occurences effectively.

If we hold this kind

of intentionalist theory of how the reference of natural kind terms is
determined,

then we cannot at

the same time say that the reference

potential (or extension) of these terms is what either the majority of
speakers or the experts would call gold, unless we interpret 'experts'
very strictly.

Only if we restrict the class of experts to those who

know what gold really is, will it be true that gold can be used in English to refer to all 'and only those things that the experts would refer
to.

But this means that if no one knows what gold really is, then we

will not be able to discover what the potential referents of 'gold' are
by observing how people use the word.

36

What natural kind terms can properly be used to refer to depends,
then, to some extent on what the world is like, not just on what speakers think the world is like.

36

This implication should recommend my account over any other which
entails that we could discover the potential referent~ of gold in that
way.
Another important implication of this intentionalist account is
that no important truths about gold will be discovered by observing how
people use the word 'gold'. We cannot assume that people are any less
in the dark about gold (or about good) than we are.
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We should reject

intentionalist accounts of semantic reference

which say that the reference of class terms is determined by what either
the majority of speakers or what the experts would use the term to refer
to.

More precisely, we should reject such accounts if they say that

what the relevant group of speakers would use a term to refer to depends
on their

intentions to use the word to refer to all and only those

things that they identify on the basis of the presence or absence of a
certain feature.
The kinds of facts that support an intentionalist account of reference potential do support the conclusion that speakers' intentions to
refer determine reference potential.

But the intentions that determine

reference potential need not be specific

intention~

to refer to objects

which have certain identifiable features, they can instead be general
intentions to refer to the real things.

Specific intentions to refer to

objects that have certain identifiable features may sometirnes be the
basis for each speaker's consistent use of a word.

But the basis for

speakers' consistent use of a word, even of the experts' use, need not
be the basis for correct use of the word.
What we have in English, and most likely in many other languages
as well, are intentions to refer which presuppose a natural order or at
least an ideally justified theory of nature.

What we intend to refer to

with natural-kind terms, for example, are the actual members of actual
natural kinds--even if we do not know exactly who these members are and
could not recognize them if we saw them.

What we intend to refer to

with terms for properties are similarly actual properties.
Our intention to refer to the real things, not just to the things
we may think are. the real things, explains our deference to the experts.
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It is the experts who are supposed to know about these things.

It also

explains how the reference potential of, for example, scientific terms,
does not change whenever theories change.

As we learn more about real-

ity we are better able to tell what things are potential referents of
our terms, so our beliefs about which objects are potential referents of
our terms may change.

Nonetheless, the potential referents remain the

same.
Our intentions to refer, even our general ones, do not always presuppose a natural order or ideal theory of nature.

At an even more gen-

eral level, however, we can say that our general intentions are to use
words correctly.

For natural-kind terms, the standards of correctness

are the natural order or the ideal theory.

For other kinds of terms,

the general intentions may be intentions to use the word the way it has
always been used or an intention to use the word as the linguistic elite
uses it.

Our intentions concerning the use of names seems to be just to

respect the naming institution.
To be able to carry out these

intentions,

one must

formulate

hypotheses about how one identifies the correct referents (feature G).
These hypotheses are continually revised.

We ask "Would you call that

blue or green?", and "Would that be called a table or a desk?"

It is

(usually) not important that we all have the same hypotheses, or the
same means of re-identifying the correct referents.

What is important

for correct usage is a history of usage and standards of correct usage
that have stood the test of time.

37

37

On the basis of these past usages

It is no accident that dictionaries cite usages by famous men and
women of letters as justification for a usage. The question "What makes
some uses of language correct and others incorrect?" deserves more seri-
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which we accept as correct, we formulate and test our hypotheses.
We could summarize our discussion of theories which try to explain
the reference potential of English expressions in terms of what some
group of speakers intends to refer to with the expression as follows.
If the intentions of the group are supposed to be the intentions which
are the basis for their consistent use of the term, then these accounts
are wrong.

We should make a distinction between these specific inten-

tions by which we guide our own linguistic behavior and the general
intentions which set the standards for correct usage.
will be some relation between the two.

Of course there

Examples of correct usage which

are known to be correct provide the basis for each speaker's hypotheses
about how to use the term, what items to apply it to.

The hypotheses of

most people have to lead to behavior which is more or less similar so
that people can understand each other.

It is through the hypotheses

that individual speakers use the language (more or less correctly).

It

is through something else that the standards of correct and incorrect
usage are set.
The intentions that matter, then, are not specific intentions concerning the use of a word to refer, they are more general intentions to
use the word properly.

Sometimes the intention to use a word properly

is an intention to use the word as it has been used by speakers whose
linguistic competence is not a matter of dispute.

Sometimes this inten-

tion is formulated in terms of an ideal theory of nature or a belief in

ous study. I suspect that there are many factors involved. Only sometimes does a usae become acceptable when a sufficient number of people
use it over a sufficiently long time. 'Chum', for example, was slang in
the 1600's. It has now made it to the status of a colloquialism. What
would it take to make it a correct usage? Surely not more time.
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a natural order.

These intentions to use words properly help to explain

the normative force of language.
by these intentions indirectly.
about how a word should be used.

Actual linguistic behavior is guided
Speakers of a language form hypotheses
Their linguistic behavior may be (and

often is) guided by these hypotheses.

But these hypotheses are formu-

lated because speakers have a more general intention to use the word
correctly, and they are rejected if they do not enable the speaker to
conform to the recognized standards of correct usage.

Conclusion
My primary goal in this dissertation was to see to what extent
intentions to refer determine reference.

My strategy was to divide

theories of reference into theories. of disambiguation and theories of
reference potential.

This strategy has been successful, for it enabled

us to evaluate intentionalist theories by looking only at that evidence
which was appropriate to the particular intentionalist claim.
out this

dissertation we saw

intentionalist claim,

that certain intuitions

but were irrelevant to others.

Through-

supported one
My distinction

between theories of disambiguation and theories of reference potential
is, in itself, an important contribution to the study of reference.
On the basis of intuitions about when determinate reference has
been made, I argued that a particular speaker's intentions to refer do
determine (in part)
sions.

the reference of her ambiguous referring expres-

The speaker's intention to refer was spelled out as an intention

to refer to the object she had in mind.

This object is not the one that
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satisfies

or

resembles

her

representations

of

the

object;

it

is,

instead, the one that caused her to have this representation, either
directly or indirectly.
With respect to the

~heory

of reference potential, I discussed

both the role that a particular speaker's intentions play in determining
reference potential and the role that the intentions of some group of
speakers play in a theory of reference potential.

The claim that a par-

ticular speaker's intentions determine the reference potential of the
English expressions she uses was dismissed.
speakers'

intentions

determine

expressions was more plausible.
rejected this claim.

the

The claim that a group of

reference

Despite its

potential

of

English

initial plausibility,

I

I argued that the sum of individual intentions to

refer does not determine the reference potential of English expressions.
I noted that the speakers of a language could all be mistaken about the
referents of some of their terms.
The conclusions I have reached are important for the philosophy of
language in general and for theories of reference in particular, but
they also have implications for other fields of philosophical inquiry.
Although it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to develop these
implications fully, I will suggest at least some of them.

The general

conclusion reached, especially in the discussion of reference potential,
was that, however they originated, once languages are established they
take on a life of their own.

They are no longer within the control of

individual speakers or even of groups of speakers.

Further, it is pos-

sible that no one in a linguistic community has a

co~plete

the words they use.

mastery of

For complete mastery requires knowledge not only of

what is in one's mind, but also knowledge of what the world is really
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like or at least knowledge of what the ideal theory says the world is
like.
Once we see that mastery of a

language requires

knowledge, certain projects become untenable.

this type of

For example, to discover

what goodness is, it will not do simply to analyze our shared concept of
goodness.

For while this shared concept may guide our use of the term,

it need not be what determines the extension of our word 'goodness'.

To

find out what goodness is we must investigate the world (or at least the
human world).

Investigations of language alone cannot help us.

In addition, inasmuch as our thoughts and beliefs are shaped by
and formulated in a language (and I think they are to a great extent),
the contents of these thoughts and beliefs can always be beyond our comprehension

of them.

This

conclusion undermines

knowledge in the immediately given.

attempts

to

ground

The foundations of knowledge are

not to be found in the immediate evidentness of thoughts and beliefs,
since the contents of these thoughts and beliefs are not immediately
apprehended by minds.
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